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

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WHAT DO WE MEAN BY GOD?

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WHAT DO WE MEAN BY GOD?

Some Studies in the Objectivity of Christian Experience

BY
CYRIL H. VALENTINE
M.A., PH.D. (LOND.)

"He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him."
HEBREWS xi. 6.

NEW YORK
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1929

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PREFACE

THIS essay is built upon the foundation of the author's previous essay on the validity of Christian experience. Much that would seem to call for treatment here can be omitted now that a preliminary study of the field has already been made. And whereas the former investigation led to a fairly wide survey, the present task can, in consequence, be the more easily limited to a single issue. That issue, however, is fundamental to religion. When the relations between recent psychology and religious experience are examined, the sound of a challenge is heard at many points along the line, and an examination of several positions on the frontiers is seen to be an urgent necessity. But even if, as a result of such an examination, the claims of religious experience are vindicated at many of these points, the treaty concluded will be unsatisfactory to the religious consciousness if the objectivity of its experience receives only qualified recognition. Religion cannot tolerate any agreement which refuses to the object of faith the nature of ultimate reality. While the reality of the object of faith is regarded as possible, though somewhat precarious, religion may stand; but if this claim to reality be repudiated as false, then, although much religious experience and practice might remain for a while, nevertheless all would be changed, and at last religion would be replaced by something else, such as philosophy, science, art or music. It must be asked, therefore, Can the object of religious faith be allowed to have ultimate reality?

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PART I

THE REALITY OF THE OBJECT OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER I

THE BASIS OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE?

THE suspicion that God is made in the image of man is no new problem for religious faith. Xenophanes, who lived more than 500 years before Christ, was sceptical about the truth of the popular ideas of gods. In his quaint verse he makes a ruthless attack upon anthropomorphism. And what he said so long ago is still worth remembering: "Men imagine that the gods are born as they are, and have perception as they have, and also voice and form. Yes, but if oxen or horses had hands and could paint and produce works of art as men do, horses would paint the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen. The Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed, and the Thracians give theirs red hair and blue eyes." The repudiation of false ideas of the nature of deity, however, need not carry with it the denial of the existence of God. It does not follow that because the form in which God is imagined is demonstrably untrue therefore the idea of God is devoid of reality. And although the pictures by which God is represented, whether they be mental images or works of art, can be proved to have human origin and to depict objects of sense perception, nevertheless there may be in the idea of God, when all that is partial and false has been rejected, an element of truth that belongs to reality and is independent of all human fiction. Xenophanes refused the name of God to the religious beliefs of his time, but did not deny the reality of God. If we may trust Aristotle at this point, Xenophanes considered that the name "God" was rightly used when it was made to designate that principle of unity and wholeness which for him was ultimate reality. The statement of Aristotle may be

translated thus: "Fixing his attention upon the universe as a whole he said that in its unity it was God." In this way Xenophanes places God upon the objective side together with the universe and thus releases the idea from the subjective side where stand the mythologies. The pictures of God may hang upon the insubstantial walls of the mind's self-built habitation, but the fact of God is embedded in the wide reality beneath and beyond.

It may be found in the end that there is no place where the idea of God can rest except either in the heaven of stars and planets or else in the heart that hopes and fears. But either alternative robs the idea of features which seem essential to the nature of God, if he exist at all. God is not just another name for the universe; neither is he just a fantasy to satisfy human needs. Conceived as merely the universe, he cannot satisfy human needs; but neither can he satisfy human needs when he lacks the reality which the universe possesses. The problem is to understand how God can be as real and objective as the universe, and yet at the same time be what the universe is not. For God, to be God, must enter into the human heart and accomplish there such moral and spiritual changes as the universe is bankrupt to achieve. God must be as intimate, close and human as subjective imagery can fashion him, and yet he must be as remote, vast and incomprehensible as ultimate reality. Here lies our problem. Is there discoverable a unity between the starry heaven without and the moral law within? Or can any consistent theory of reality be found which will bring together both these infinities revered by Kant and blend them both into the idea of God?

There is danger on both sides. On the one hand, in holding fast to such a conception of God as shall provide subjective satisfaction for emotional needs, the grip upon reality may be lost; while, on the other hand, the fixing of the idea of God upon reality may deprive it of those qualities which the mind considers indispensable to the

character of God. The way of Xenophanes secures God's reality at the expense of his character. Following this lead we, to-day, should say that whatever is meant by the absolute is what we mean by God. Xenophanes thought of the substance of the universe as the "unlimited" being of Anaximander's previous speculation, and this he called divine. But neither this nor the absolute is what we mean by God. If this be the only reality behind the idea of God, then in the interests of strict truth it would be more accurate and honest to admit that God does not exist.

The equation of God with the universe does, however, secure objectivity, even although the term God be not exactly applicable to that objectivity. Such objectivity would now be generally admitted, although at a period not long after Xenophanes doubt was cast upon the objectivity of any and all experience. When Protagoras taught that "Man is the measure of all things," not only was God swept into subjectivity, but the whole universe was also brushed away. The Sophists differed widely one from another in the policy they advocated as the most advisable to follow in the circumstances, but all agreed that knowledge was wholly subjective, and that in consequence truth was quite unattainable.

The subjectivism of the Sophists is worth while recalling because the present time has some interesting analogies with that remote period. The Sophists rejoiced that all knowledge, so-called, was reducible to unavoidable self-deception. There have been thinkers between those times and now who have found difficulty in escaping from subjective idealism, but only in recent days have thinkers enjoyed subjectivism as did the Sophists. Even Kant found that he was so imprisoned within the dungeon of phenomena that he could not be sure that the glass through which alone he could look out upon noumena did not all the while distort what was outside and beyond. And, of course, the "ideas" of Locke formed an impenetrable screen between his mind and the real world. Such

subjectivism, however, was either entertained unconsciously, or, if recognised, was far from being a cause of satisfaction. But the Sophists were glad to reduce all to illusion. And in this they suggest the attitude of some few recent psychologists. It is true that such psychologists, unlike the Sophists, have no personal interest in undermining knowledge in general. Nevertheless, their principles (such as rationalising and projecting) must have that effect if pressed to their logical conclusion. But too much pressure placed upon these two pillars of rationalisation and projection would not only bring down the whole edifice of knowledge, destroying the thousands assembled under its protection, but would also, at the same time, cause the death of this blind Samson of vindicative psychology. Such a catastrophe, however, cannot nowadays be desired by anyone. The ancient Sophists alone could sincerely rejoice in such complete subjectivism. The destruction of objectivity in which these modern subjectivists delight is less thorough-going. They would have all other knowledge secure and undermine only religious knowledge. Standing themselves outside the temple, they would shake that to its foundations and watch its collapse. But is religious knowledge so different from general knowledge that it is so much less secure? Is God less objective than the universe? Can we thus shatter religious knowledge and still leave general knowledge as firmly established as ever?

It is not necessary to the task here undertaken that the history of the idea of God should be traced through the development of philosophy. What has to be studied is the present form of the problems of objectivity. A glance back to Xenophanes is sufficient to illustrate the truth that what is new for religion is the form of the difficulty, not the difficulty itself. And the remembrance of the Sophists may remind us, for our encouragement, that there have been periods when general knowledge has had to face the same suspicion of subjectivity which is now so often cast upon religious knowledge. A way of

escape was found then, although no deliverance seemed possible. And so it may be again for religious truth. The work done then by Socrates is more likely to be done now by a school of thinkers than by any single student. Yet, whether made by one or many, and whatever its structure and substance may be, a bridge will be constructed to take the mind safely across from the small island of subjective idealism to the great continent of objectivity. Perhaps the bridge which Socrates threw across the chasm for general knowledge may suggest a plan for a bridge by which religious experience may cross to reality and truth. The design drawn by Socrates was simple enough, but proved secure. When Protagoras washed the narrow shores of self with the impassable ocean of the unknowable, and declared that man making his measurements upon the shoal of his own mind was taking the scale and size of all that could be certainly measured, then knowledge seemed to be marooned for ever. But Socrates discovered that the man who in trying to measure all things was stranded on subjectivity was man the sentient creature. The right scale of measurement, however, was not sense-perception, but reason. Man's true and unique characteristic was his rationality. Sentiency he shared with all the creatures of earth, but reason distinguished him from them. And the man who was the measure of all things was not sentient, but rational man. His rationality delivered him from himself and carried him across the gulf to the objective side. Sense-perception was subjective, but rationality was objective. In so far, therefore, as man became rational, he measured all things accurately.

A similar rescue is urgently called for to-day by religious knowledge. What the Sophists did for general knowledge in the fifth century before Christ, some psychologists are doing for religious experience in the twentieth century after Christ. During the intervening centuries the objectivity of religious truth has not, of course, gone unchallenged. Both Hobbes and Hume

seemed to be reducing the things that mattered most to the precarious position of subjectivity. And others besides Locke and Kant found difficulty in holding, or even reaching, objective truth. Leibniz, for instance, was unable to allow any real vision of the chief monad God to the individual monads which had already been locked into tenements that had no windows. And Berkeley, having declared that all knowledge was either "*percipere*" or "*percipi*," was forced to invent "notions" by which the individual mind could know other minds, and God. But fascinating as would be the study of these and many similar dilemmas, we must limit our investigation to the problem as presented to-day. And the closest parallel to our present problem seems to be furnished by the pre-Aristotelian philosophers already noticed.

The bridge of Socrates, so useful to general knowledge, is not serviceable for the transition from the subjective to the objective in religious experience. The rational does not bring us to the object of faith and worship. But a similar bridge, or this one widened, might lead us safely across. The insufficiency of rationality alone to serve this purpose must be evident. The universe, or the absolute, although called divine, or even God, cannot in itself be a suitable object for religion. Or, what is the same thing, the universe or absolute as reached by reason alone cannot satisfy the religious need. But perhaps the objectivity of the universe when reached by a wider bridge might be seen to contain further tracts which reason alone could not reach. And on the analogy of the Socratic teaching we may expect to gain the end in view by extending our method rather than by abandoning altogether a previous way and seeking an entirely new approach. It was not necessary for Socrates to deny the important part played by sense-perception in gaining knowledge. It was enough for him to show that together with sense-perception went also and always in man the element of reason. May it not be possible to show

similarly that together with reason there goes also (perhaps always although it is often unrecognised) something else which is essentially religious? If man as sentient is the measure of all things, then there is no objective truth: if man as rational is the measure of all things then, although there is objective truth, there is still no guarantee of objectivity for religious experience. But if there be some higher attribute of mind which includes the rational as the rational includes the sentient, then there may be objective truth reached by religion.

We want, therefore, to move from the rational to the religious as Socrates proceeded from the sentient to the rational. If we could say that man, as religious, is the measure of all things, our problem would have vanished. Yet to speak of man as religious in this connection, and to make the term religious occupy the place of sentient and rational in the previous formulæ, may seem like question-begging. Whether religion is or is not true depends upon whether the religious object is or is not real. We cannot infer the existence of the object from the experience, since we need to test the validity of the experience by the nature of the object. Some other and wider term is needed. The term spiritual again seems useless in this connection. It is too vague, and leads to no fruitful corollaries. What we need is a term that follows upon reason as reason follows upon perception; and one, moreover, which includes reason as reason includes perception. The term which seems to be most fitting is "responsive." Response is more than sense-perception, and more than rationality, yet both are forms of response. But by a full response, including reason and perception, the mind may reach an object which is not merely the universe of science or the absolute of philosophy, but which, while being both, contains that which they each lack and which qualifies it to be the close, intimate, inward presence indispensable to religious experience. Man as responsive may reach an objectivity which is essentially religious in nature.

The nature of response must be studied in subsequent chapters with a view to establishing its competence to reach a reality which can answer to the tests of objectivity and also meet the religious need. And in this investigation which must follow, even if certainty cannot be attained, it will be some warranty of truth that probability can be considerably increased. Meanwhile it will be well to have before us the kind of difficulty that it is hoped to remove. This age-long problem has become acute in our own time, and therefore the exact form in which the problem is presented to-day must be examined. It is, as has already been hinted, from the side of psychology that the attack upon the objectivity of religious experience is being made. And the opposition is all the more difficult to meet because there is no open antagonism between psychology and religion. Psychology recognises and respects religion. It enjoins and encourages religious practices. But it questions the objective existence of the God of religious faith. All that religion means by God, all that Christianity worships in the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is made to belong to the subjective side of the equation; while on the other side stands only the universe of science. Here, once again, is the old dilemma: either we must recognise that what we mean by God is non-existent, or else we must agree that by God we mean the universe of science. And neither alternative can satisfy the religious consciousness.

Religion to be true must satisfy the whole, unitary self. This will be illustrated at a later point, but may now be assumed. The failure of the universe of science to stand as the object of religion is its inability to respond to the needs of man in a manner which satisfies his nature as religious. Something more is required than science and philosophy have at present discovered. But at the same time an object which lacks the reality of the universe is equally unsatisfactory to the religious mind. There is no security in the idea of God as dependent somehow on man and as having the universe as a mere

background. A God who falls short of the reality of the universe is no God for a rational faith. There is no sufficiency except in a God upon whom both man and the universe alike depend. God must be all in all.

For the mind that is truly, fully and normally religious, the sanction of psychology for the use of the forms of religion is a mockery if the reality of God as their centre is denied. Let it be proved that these practices, such as prayer and worship, are of the utmost value to the self in producing a sense of strength and comfort, yet such proof is but the offering of stones instead of bread to those whose hunger is for God. The characteristic of religion at its highest reach is its love for God in himself and quite apart from all his benefits. The forms of religion are used or neglected according as they serve or hinder the approach to God. The consolations and inspirations of religion are valued only as coming from God and not as merely benefiting the self. All the forms and ceremonies might be spared. The one thing that cannot be spared is the finding, not merely the seeking, but the finding of the true and living God. It is, therefore, no comfort to the religious soul to know that psychology approves of the practice of religion, if at the same time it casts doubts upon the ultimate reality of the God of religious faith.

There are, of course, some who are so sure that they have found God that to them everything else seems secondary, and the one great certainty is God. How many mystics might be quoted to illustrate this assurance of God. And those who have this conviction of the presence of God are not likely to have their faith shaken by any doubts as to the objectivity of their experience, for to them the universe itself seems less real than God. Their certainty must always be an encouragement to those who are less sure. But such conviction of certainty cannot be taken in itself as sufficient evidence of the truth and reality of the object of their experience. On this point the words of Professor Graham Wallas are worth

pondering. "The feeling of conviction arising in the mystic state has in the past supported many different conceptions of the universe, taught by many different religions and philosophies; and they cannot all be true. . . . The feeling of conviction, like the sensation of sight, is never an infallible guide, and it only becomes the best guide that we have when it is found, as Aristotle would say, in the right way and at the right time ("Ethics," Book II., chapter iii., § 5). We must, that is to say, go behind our feeling of conviction, and ask ourselves whether it was formed under those conditions which experience has shown to be most likely to guard us against error." [1] The conviction of reality is not in itself, therefore, sufficient evidence of objectivity. Although there may be some real object behind the experience, that object may be different from the object believed in by the subject.

This question of the evidence from mysticism has been studied psychologically by Professor Leuba. But since his position has been examined and criticised at length in the chapter on subjectivity in the author's previous book on the validity of Christian experience, it need not be studied again here. It is enough to notice that psychology often assumes that the element of objectivity in religious experience is provided by the universe as a whole, while the idea of God comes entirely from the subjective side and is just the coloured glass without which religion cannot look upon the reality that science studies through its perfectly transparent lens. Jung [2] has devoted much time to the study of religion from the psychological standpoint, and the "Psychology of the Unconscious" is largely concerned with elementary religious experience. In his analysis, Christianity, like every other religion, is reduced to a psychological sub-

[1] Wallas, "The Art of Thought," pp. 211, 212.
[2] Jung, "Psychology of the Unconscious," p. 16; *cf.* also pp. 111, 144, and 209.

jectivity. And myth and dogma, although they may be universal, or even unavoidable, are shown to bear witness only to human need and to be far removed from the truth of reality. We are asked to recognise, therefore, that there is an incompatibility between belief in the God of Christianity and our knowledge of the universe.

In his book on "Analytical Psychology" he is equally emphatic that the idea of God is a fiction of the mind and has no reality behind it to give it any truth.[1] Such a conclusion is endorsed by Professor Leuba as a result of his psychological study of mysticism.[2] All that we mean by God comes out of our own minds, and is our interpretation of the object given to us out of reality. That object itself bears little resemblance to the conception we form of it. And what is left after we have stripped off the robes and ornaments which we ourselves have furnished is not the sort of object we should pray to or worship. Jung denies the existence of God, while Leuba declares that what exists is not what we mean by God. Both are saying the same thing. Adler[3] also draws the same distinction between our idea of God and the existence of a God corresponding to our idea. According to his view God has no place in reality, but the idea of God is a useful human device for occasional use when we are called upon to face the harshness of bare reality. There is no chair fixed in the sky over our heads, but the image of Cassiopeia's chair aids us in viewing the stars; so with the Plough, so with Orion. Where should we be without these pictures? Yet the universe of astronomy contains none of these figures of human interest. So with the reality of science. We may picture it as God, and in that way give it human warmth and make it recognisable and tolerable to the mind. But how different is the universe of science from the world of theology.

[1] Jung, "Analytical Psychology," p. 415; *cf.* also pp. 33 and 53.
[2] Leuba, "The Psychology of Religious Mysticism," chaps. xii. and xiii.
[3] Adler, "The Neurotic Constitution," p. 33.

There is some ground, then, for the belief that the danger which confronts religion to-day comes from psychology. Half a century ago the enemy was biology. But the fierceness of that war is now over. The young among us can just remember the stir and discomfort felt when a President of the British Association [1] announced the hope of science to produce synthetically a living organism. That conflict, however, belongs to history rather than to experience. Although no formal peace treaty has been agreed upon, something like a truce prevails. Yet the result of that contest is seen in the altered shape of the map and in the surrender by religion of not a few positions found to be wholly untenable. To-day the opposition which comes from psychology is less fierce, and the conflict is being carried on in a manner more akin to arbitration and less suggestive of ruthless warfare. One lesson from the former struggle may, however, be remembered with profit—religion does not necessarily lose power by surrendering a position. There are occasions when the redefining of boundaries is a considerable benefit to all. Yet, with all willingness to readjust minor points, it is impossible to yield certain central posts. And when the assault is upon the reality of God, then limits of concession have obviously been reached. Religion may change its idea of God, dropping from time to time features seen to be incompatible with the main conception. To-day, in the light of psychology, attributes once thought essential may be seen to be foreign to the nature of deity. But in this gradual process of clarifying and defining the idea of God there are fixed limits beyond which it is impossible to pass without ceasing to express the idea of God at all. For instance, in defining a ball, the mention of colour may be omitted, although the familiar idea of a ball contains colour; similarly, the material of which the ball is made may be rejected; even the shape must not be specified as necessarily round, or more exactly spherical, since a ball

[1] Professor Schäfer in 1912.

may be ellipsoid. But if, further, it is urged that the surface of a ball need not be curved, then a limit has been reached which cannot be conceded. For an object which has not a curved surface, however interesting and important as a brick or other object, is certainly not a ball. Similarly with the idea of God, there are attributes which cannot be surrendered without losing God altogether. We cannot give a brick for a ball and pretend that so long as we call it a ball it will serve the same purpose. So with substitutes for the living God. It is not enough to call the universe of science by the name of God and offer that as a substitute for the God of religion. But neither will it suffice to set up some psychological fiction as the inevitable projection of human need or aspiration, call that God and set that up in the place of the God of religion.

It is this procedure of psychology in trying to reduce the objective to the subjective level which causes it to be suspected as treacherous to religious faith. Denials of the existence of God are not frequent in the writings of psychologists. More often the name God is retained to designate a persistent fantasy projected by the mind upon the world outside. And what makes psychology to be regarded as inimical to faith is its discovery of those processes of the mind by which such a fantasy as belief in God might be produced. If the idea of God can be accounted for as mere projection, and the doctrine of God explained as an example of rationalising, then the God so discovered is a God made by man in man's own image, and such a God is not an object suitable to meet the religious demands.

The problem which is being forced upon us by modern psychology with such peculiar insistence is, as we have already seen, no new problem. But the form in which the problem is now presented appears to increase its difficulty. The suspicion of subjectivity attaching to the nature of religion is considerably heightened when the psychological mechanism by which the ideas of religion

might originate has been discovered and proved efficient to produce those very ideas. The acuteness of the difficulty for faith as urged by psychology is, however, in point of fact, more apparent than real. The origin of an idea does not affect its validity. Though the conception of God be proved to be a projection, it may, nevertheless, be a true projection. The principle of the uniformity of nature might also be termed a projection, but its truth or falsity must be tested empirically, whatever its psychological origin. The purpose before us is the testing of this idea of God with a view to ascertaining the degree of probability which can be legitimately claimed for its objective reality.

Although the danger to religious belief is generally regarded as issuing from the quarter of psychology, there is also another line of attack which has to be faced. Philosophy, though less popular than psychology at the present moment, is but little less formidable as an assailant upon the citadel of religious faith. It must be understood, of course, that neither philosophers nor psychologists are unanimous in their conclusions; and, further, that, for the most part, they do not make deliberate attacks upon the teaching of religion. Some psychologists and some philosophers would definitely support the Christian revelation. There is, however, a trend in both psychology and philosophy which, for the time being, is in a direction opposed to orthodox belief. And it behoves the Christian thinker to examine the situation with the utmost care, with the widest charity, with an open mind and with a resolute faith in Christian truth. The position seems to be this: While, on the one hand, as we have seen, psychology tries to reduce the content of faith to the level of subjectivity; on the other hand, philosophy, at the same time, pronounces that the element of objectivity which can be allowed to religious experience is very different in nature from what religion means by God. Between the two we are presented with a miserable dilemma. We are offered, from psychology, a

Godhead that lacks reality, and from philosophy, reality that lacks Godhead. And the horn of the dilemma presented by philosophy is as damaging to faith as that presented by psychology.

The modern apologist for the faith has not done all, therefore, when he has met the challenge of psychology. He may be able to show that psychology, by its very nature, is limited in its field of study. He may be able to show, further, that the antagonism between psychology and religion arises entirely owing to the failure of psychology to recognise its proper limits. And finally he may be able to show that within its limits psychology does not contradict, but rather supports, the validity of Christian experience. Such an argument would be most valuable, for there is an urgent need that religion should be shown to stand free from the shackles of the subjectivism of psychology. But when that has been shown, there still remains the challenge of a philosophy which accepts objectivity but which defines objective reality in terms which are inconsistent with the Christian revelation. Philosophy may reject as unreal what we mean by God;[1] or it may retain the name but give it a meaning which is unacceptable to any religion;[2] or, again, philosophy may offer a God who, though suitable in nature to be an object for religion, cannot possibly be conceived as possessing the essential attributes of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.[3] All these conclusions must be understood as declarations that philosophy can find no place in reality for the God of Christian worship. And this is a serious matter. Religion cannot claim for itself a field apart from the domain of philosophy. Canon Streeter[4] may be able to reconcile the claims of science with the claims of

[1] McTaggart, "Some Dogmas of Religion."
[2] Wildon Carr, "Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics."
[3] Bosanquet, "The Value and Destiny of the Individual," Lect. VIII., and "What Religion Is." And Bradley, "Truth and Reality," chap. xv.; "Appearance and Reality," chap. xxv.
[4] Streeter, "Reality," chap. ii.

religion by assigning to each a separate road by which to approach reality, the one the way of quantitative measurement, the other the way of qualitative evaluation. But this method, true and valuable for many purposes, is not applicable when we are seeking to reconcile the object of religion with the reality of philosophy. The problem of objectivity, therefore, confronts the Christian apologist in philosophy no less than in psychology.

If we make terms with the subjectivism of psychology, and accept as the content of religious experience something which originates on the human side and falls short of ultimate reality, then gradually the religion which finds its centre in such an object will change its nature until it will cease to be unique and will, therefore, cease to be true religion. There is something forced and unnatural in singing hymns and addressing prayers to the conception of an ideal humanity,[1] or to the vitalising principle of all existence.[2] The object of religion must be such as to evoke worship. A fiction issuing from the human mind, however necessary its formation might be, would exercise no constraint as having rights inherent in itself. As soon as a man were convinced that the idea of God represented only human aspirations and hopes, he would no longer worship such an object, either amongst the congregation or secretly in his own heart. We cannot, therefore, make terms with psychology on this issue without yielding what must be considered as essential to religion, an object which has inherent rights and is capable of constraining worship. But neither can we come to a truce with philosophy, for the object furnished us by philosophy is not suitable to meet the essential demands of Christianity. Men might occasionally feel some religious experience towards an ideal humanity or towards the absolute. But this experience could never rise to the level of prayer and worship. The universe, or the absolute, or reality, as they are presented by

[1] *Cf.* Leuba, "The Psychology of Religious Mysticism."
[2] *Cf.* Wildon Carr, "Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics."

philosophy, are not capable of sustaining a religion. If there be no place for what we mean by God in this sphere of the ultimate, then gradually, as we are convinced of this truth, we shall relinquish our religious practices.

It is claiming too much to say that without God as the object of religion men cannot be religious. But the religion which lacked God as its centre would differ greatly from Christianity. Such a religion would be so much a matter of temperament that it would need no argument to support or justify it. The only type of religion which is worth vindicating is a God-centred religion. And only a God-centred religion could produce either evangelists or apologists. We will ask, then, what is the least demand that must be made in order to satisfy a religion with God as its centre? Some attributes of deity, perhaps many, may be found to be either unessential or at the most secondary and derivative. What we need to discover is the least that we can mean by God when God is used as a religious term. What are those features which cannot be relinquished without surrendering God as the object of religion? It would seem that the minimum essentials for the God of religion are two. As against psychology we must claim for God the nature of ultimate reality; as against philosophy we must claim for God the nature of responsiveness. The problem of the objectivity of religious experience may therefore be stated thus: Can God have the nature of ultimate reality and at the same time be responsive to human needs?

CHAPTER II

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF OBJECTIVITY IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

If it be asked why the mind should seem compelled to project the idea of God upon reality, and afterwards defend that idea with elaborately developed systems of rationalising, psychology has a ready answer. And it is this easy explanation of the manner in which the idea of God arises that makes the psychological analysis of religious experience appear to be destructive of objectivity. It will be well, therefore, at the outset to notice the principal ways in which, according to some psychologists, the idea of God may arise.

Religion, we may be told, is a regression to childhood. The attitude of the child in the home to its father is adopted as the attitude of the grown person towards reality. But science and philosophy discover a world that is not a home, and a reality that is not a father. The need for protection and security, however, is so persistent that we refuse to recognise the inhospitable character of the world of nature. The complete indifference of reality to our private hopes and fears must be disguised. Whereas science and philosophy would lead us into the world of truth, we are not adult enough, according to psychology, to face that bleak and barren prospect. We therefore cling to our religion, which encourages the childish fancy that we have merely passed into a larger nursery and may still believe that, despite all evidence to the contrary, we are being cared for and safeguarded. Religion, according to this theory, is the regression to the age of parental shelter, and a projection of the idea of fatherhood.

According to another theory, religion, with all its ideas of majesty and power and glory, exists as a com-

pensation for our inferiority. It is the especial consolation of the weak, the oppressed and the outcasts. The balance of misery and impotence is adjusted by a picture of heaven, and by a faith in a great deliverance. Not only to individuals, but to whole groups of people, and even to great nations, religion offers, in all times of affliction and distress, the compensating faith that all will be reversed at the last. The most convincing form of this compensation is the promise of final triumph to frustrated virtue, and of ultimate vindication to persecuted integrity. Religion reverses the verdicts of the world and establishes the cause of the righteous poor. The crushing sense of weakness which disheartens the good man is removed by the compensation of a power that makes for righteousness. And it is not only the downtrodden and the morally zealous who crave a compensation in religion. Do we not all feel our insignificance and feebleness in the face of the night-sky, the earthquake, the tempest and the thunder? The immensity of space and the inexorableness of nature produce in us a feeling of nothingness and futility. But religion compensates for our feebleness by offering to make us confederate with the power behind the universe.

In both these theories the analysis of religion reduces the idea of God to a projection of human need. According to one view our greatest need is for a loving father to shield us from harm; according to the other view our greatest need is for a mighty king to rule the world in righteousness. And these needs, we are told, determine our conception of God. But our need for such a God is, of course, no evidence against the existence of such a God. In showing that the need for God is natural to the human mind, and in explaining the origin of that need, psychology is keeping well within its own province and is, moreover, rendering valuable service to religion. Some psychologists, however, go farther than this and assure us that no such God as would meet these human needs could possibly exist. But psychology has no

authority to make any pronouncement on this subject, and in doing so is going beyond its legitimate limits. When psychologists tell us that the nature of reality is quite incompatible with the idea of God, it is not on the authority of psychology that they pronounce their judgment. The study of the nature of reality belongs to the province of science and philosophy. It is what they say and not what psychology says which must be authoritative on this point. And although the authority of science and philosophy may be invoked for the denial of this or that particular conception of God, it does not follow that the reality of science and philosophy must of necessity exclude any and every conception of God. What seems to be needed is an inquiry which will seek to discover what conception of God is acceptable to science and philosophy and at the same time satisfactory to religion. And it ought to be recognised that no conception of God which lacked the reality required by philosophy could be sufficient for the needs felt by religion. Unless a place in reality can be found for God, then the idea of God as a mere projection of human need will cease to meet human need as soon as its subjectivity has been discovered.

The insufficiency of a God who is merely the projection of human need may, however, be readily conceded. But for that reason, it may be urged, whenever there is occasion to make use of the idea of God, something less obviously unreal than a mere projection has to be found to give substance to this fiction produced by the imagination and emotion. It is assumed that the fantasy, however false, must have some element of reality behind it. The reality may be distorted and disguised almost beyond recognition, but there must be some reality present. We may entirely misconceive the object, but there must be some object to be misconceived. Psychology, therefore, suggests some of the facts that might be misconceived and interpreted in terms of God.

The element of truth behind the idea of God may be

variously described. One suggestion is that our own unconscious mind is the object upon which our religious experience centres. If that be so, then what happens when we believe ourselves to be in communion with God the Creator of the world and the Redeemer of humanity is just that we are experiencing the unity between our conscious and unconscious mind. The peculiar sense that we have of peace and strength and assurance comes to us from our own unconscious. The more we learn the secret of drawing upon our own reserves of energy in the unconscious, the greater our vitality. Religious practices are of value because they induce this contact with the unconscious mind. This is the true basis of our religion. What we misinterpret as God is in actuality this unconscious mind. The fact of religious experience is thus assured. It is only the explanation that is at fault. Here, then, is something which, it is suggested, might stand for the object of religion. But if the object which we mistake for God is our own unconscious, we have only to be convinced of our mistake in order to change our terms. What we mean by God is not our own unconscious. And if the grace of God be only the influx of energy from our own reserves, then we shall learn to avail ourselves of our resources without the self-delusion of pretended prayer to God. Some form of auto-suggestion will meet our need better, since it will be more consonant with truth.

A more substantial ground for religion, however, is offered in the second suggestion. The element of objectivity which meets our projections may be referred, we are told, to the sense of racial unity. The herd protects its individuals with something resembling paternal care. The herd has a power which the individual lacks when he stands alone. The individual is only safe while the herd flourishes, and if he be cut off from the herd he will have to face certain danger and probable death. What is true for primitive tribes is in a large measure true also for civilised societies. We owe almost every-

thing to the society in which we live and to the social tradition which we inherit. There are many good reasons why we ought to be loyal to the herd. But we are not merely urged to loyalty by good reasons. Apart from all reasons we are driven to the herd by our gregarious instinct, the strength of which is evident in class feeling and in patriotism. The strength of the herd instinct is evident enough, and equally evident is its close connection with religion. The existence of beliefs in tribal and national gods, for instance, indicates the affinity between the herd instinct and religious experience. But while this affinity is allowed, the recognised falsity of a national God must be taken as proof of the insufficiency of the group consciousness alone to provide an adequate ground for the idea of God. And, moreover, it is an unfortunate truth of psychology that, whereas the instinct binding a man to a herd is very strong, it is also accompanied by an instinct of pugnacity or combativeness which disposes him to be hostile to every neighbouring herd. There is found no instinctive constraint which disposes a man to be loyal to the human race as a whole.

Racial consciousness is only an extension of the herd instinct to include at the most all of the same colour. There is no instinct for universalism. The whole problem of social ethics is found in the difficulty of transcending group-morality and reaching to universal obligation. We cannot, therefore, deduce the idea of God from the sense of unity in humanity as a whole, because no such sense exists. On the contrary, what consciousness of loyalty and obligation to the whole of humanity does exist to-day is the result of a prior belief in God as the Father and Saviour of all men alike. Thus, while on the one hand we cannot base the idea of God upon an instinct of universalism, since no such instinct exists: we cannot, on the other hand, base the idea of God upon the herd-instinct, since that can only provide a God who is too much limited to a single herd to be capable of standing as the God of humanity as a whole. If the reality corre-

sponding to the God of religious experience be nothing but the consciousness of racial inheritance and corporate unity then we must admit that, although something stands on the objective side of religious experience, it is untrue to speak of that objective element as God.

There are other suggestions of a slightly different kind which also call for notice. Hitherto we have been dealing with elements of existence which might be the objective facts experienced by religion and interpreted as God. Now we must pass to the consideration of alternative objects which may be set up as realities qualified to occupy the place left vacant by a God whose unreality is assumed to have been demonstrated. The object of religion, it has been said, may be furnished by the idea of humanity. The religion of positivism, as promulgated by Comte, set humanity in the place of God. And here, certainly, we reach a worthier conception than those already examined. The love of man has occupied a prominent place in the higher religions of the world. Judaism and Christianity both teach the service of man as a religious duty. Neither religion, however, anticipates that the worship of humanity can replace the worship of God. But positivism definitely sets up humanity instead of what we have mistakenly meant by God. It does not identify humanity with God. It rejects the idea of God as false and substitutes the idea of humanity as true. Comte was quite clear in his own mind that humanity was not God. But believing that religion did not need the idea of God at its centre, provided some other adequate object could be found as the focus of experience, he offered the idea of humanity as a fitting substitute. There was no question of projecting theology upon this object, for in Comte's opinion the age of theology had already passed and its vacant throne had been ascended by philosophy. But the reign of philosophy was, he thought, also coming to a speedy end, and positive science would at last be acclaimed and crowned. Just why it should be necessary under the rule of positivism to continue a worship which ought to have

been superseded when philosophy succeeded to theology, Comte could not explain. But the need to provide at the centre of worship an object which positive science could sanction as true led to the promulgation of the religion of humanity.

Professor Leuba has gone a stage farther than Comte, and has offered the vision of an *ideal* humanity as a centre for religion. But this seems, judged by our standard, to be less satisfactory than humanity as it exists at present. The one object has the great advantage of real existence, whereas the other exists only as an ideal waiting to be realised. If it be true that religion must reach reality or fail, then the religion which has behind it nothing more solid than a dream of mankind made perfect, although it may have all the charm and allurement of poetry, will not satisfy the craving for reality. Ideal humanity is at present non-existent, and cannot, therefore, replace an existent God. It is a suitable substitute only for a potentially existent God. But a religion without an existent or living God is not sufficiently unique to deserve to be placed higher than philosophy, science, art, and music. Unless religion can offer to men a living God they will find equal satisfaction in music, art, science, and philosophy. There is no justification for the pre-eminence of a Godless religion. If religion be not unique in the possession of God, then many men would find a more fitting expression for the subjective and emotional side of their religious nature in the pursuit of music, art, science or philosophy, rather than in the practice of religion. We are not so destitute as to need poor substitutes for God. If there be no true religion with a real God, then let us turn elsewhere and seek reality with a religious fervour by other paths. Religion is a quest for reality. But so is philosophy—so is science—so is art. True religion differs from these in believing that somehow reality is God, and God reality.

The idea of humanity, whether actual or ideal, fails as an object of religion because it stands all the while

over against reality. Humanity is always on the hither side, reality on the thither side. Humanity as a whole can never be the object of religion, because it is always the subject. Humanity is not the goal of seeking. It is the expeditionary party that scales the heights in one confederacy organised for the discovery of a reality which is God. The same objection must be brought against all substitutes for God. In so far as they fall short of reality they fail of true deity.

Professor Wildon Carr,[1] to instance yet another suggested substitute, seeks to reinstate the idea of God into his philosophy, but finds that the only place for that idea is as a synonym for the vital principle of all existence, or for the principle of rationality and self-consistency. But this idea lacks the kind of reality that a God of religion must have. The life-principle in the universe is not a real God, for it is still on our subjective side. It is just our own individual life-force extended, not only to humanity, but beyond that to include all sentiency. But such a device merely extends the level and does not raise it at any point—or offer anything above that level which can reach down. The principle of rationality, again, is not reality, but the instrument by which we try to test the nature of reality. We are all the while upon the flat and do not touch anything that is above our own reach. The same kind of objection must be brought against the conception of God based upon General Smuts' philosophy of holism.[2] Most valuable as much of his thought is in illustrating both the need for and possibility of a united whole of personality as the subject of true understanding, nevertheless his theory of the holistic universe appears to fall just short of the minimum requirements for religion. Religion might exist in its essential nature despite the insistence of General Smuts that the "whole" of which human personality is a part must differ from personality at least as widely as personality differs from a

[1] Wildon Carr, "The Changing Background of Religion and Ethics."
[2] Smuts, "Holism and Evolution," chap. xii.

physical organism. The absence of personality in the object of religion would not disqualify it, provided responsiveness were assured. And this is a characteristic of the holistic universe. The defect of what, in General Smuts' system, would stand for God is its faltering grasp upon reality and its failure to escape sufficiently from the meshes of subjectivity. Every whole, according to General Smuts, is itself together with its field. This field, which is qualitatively continuous with the entity at its centre, is of a wideness which varies with the nature of the whole. These fields overlap and constitute the medium of influence between one object and another. Personality, of course, as a high type of whole, has a large field. The overlapping and interaction of these fields of personality form a kind of social or general mind. Add to this the fields belonging to all the wholes in the universe and we get the nucleus for a new and completer whole. With this whole we seem to have reached very near to the object of religion. The one flaw is the origin of this whole on the subjective side. This whole is not ultimate, it is not eternal, it is not even fully existent.

We must conclude, then, that all theories are unsatisfactory which offer as the objective element in religion any entity that falls short of ultimate reality. Such objects as the unconscious mind, the consciousness of corporate unity or the idea of humanity are all too proximate to be able to deliver us from the clutches of a subjectivity that destroys the reality of God. Even the idea of the life-force does not carry us beyond the human side of things, for the mind of man is the highest product of the life-force. The worship of the life-force would take us no higher than the worship of humanity as the consummation of the evolutionary principle. And the same objection holds against the holistic universe in which there is being evolved out of human personality a new whole which will be different from and greater than personality. If religion is found incapable of bringing us to

any object more ultimate and final than such ends as these that we have noticed, then it must be admitted that the religious need is likely to find more satisfaction in the pursuit of science, art, or philosophy. Indeed, the religious tone discernible in the work of many who follow these ways of approach to truth ought to convince us that they are not far from the kingdom of heaven. The reverence of modern science in the face of truth, the humility of philosophy before the grandeur of reality, and the submissiveness of art to a beauty that is given to it by the actual, are characteristics of the religious way of life. It may well be asked, therefore, whether, after all, the world of science, art and philosophy may not be the reality which provides religion with its needed objects.

The universe studied by science and the reality contemplated by philosophy when presented as the true objects for religion to focus upon have one great advantage over all other objects offered to us, and it is this, that they do give what is ultimate and fundamental. And the religious need can be satisfied by the ultimate and fundamental as it never can be satisfied by floating forms that have no sure anchorage in the substantial bottom of existence. However attractively the semblance is decked out by the mind, its hollowness disproves its genuineness. Let the face of religion be as winsome and benign as ever the heart can desire, it will cease to constrain our love when it is discovered to be but a mask. Religion is too serious a thing to be occupied for ever with a toy. Images and idols may receive earnest attention for a while during the infancy of our religious growth. But there comes a day when we put away childish things. Make-believe is surrendered and the business of life undertaken. To the adult mind such objects of religion as the racial mind or the life-energy dressed out in robes fashioned by the mind according to its own taste, must seem like playthings of the nursery. How much more invigorating and challenging as an object of religion is the idea of the universe as discovered in its undisguised

reality. So essential are the features of truth and reality to the object which shall sustain religion in the minds of enlightened and developed personalities that we may expect to reach nearer to that object through the real universe of science than through the nebulous regions of psychology.

But with all this readily admitted, it must be felt that the universe as conceived by science and philosophy wants something which is essential to the conception of the God of religion. It has the characteristic of reality, but it does not appear to have the other essential attribute of responsiveness. Religion must say to science or philosophy, "one thing thou lackest." Yet in looking upon them religion ought to love them, for indeed they are not far from the kingdom of God. What, then, must they do to be saved? How can the object of scientific research and of philosophical speculation become also the object of religious devotion?

Science and philosophy readily take a religious colouring. On their religious side they become pantheism. Their failure to provide an object which religion can accept as what it means by God is seen in the failure of pantheism to become a satisfactory religion. But at the same time that pantheism just falls short of giving us an object that can stand for what we mean by God, it only needs supplementing in order to reach to the minimum requirements. And science and philosophy are equally near to the threshold. How great an element of truth there is in pantheism must not be overlooked. We reach here a level higher than that of a religion with a false god—and higher than that of a religion without a god. Pantheism has a God, a real God. The universe is God.[1]

If we do not accept the God of pantheism as answering to what we mean by God, it is not because it offers something that is in a wrong category (as were those substitutes which belonged entirely to the human side of

[1] Evans, "Theistic Monism."

things), but because it offers something that lacks sufficient quality. The defect of pantheism is its incompleteness, not its falsity. But its limitation is the negation of fuller truth. There is possible, however, a Christian pantheism wherein the supplementary truth of Christianity corrects the partial truth of pantheism. "That God may be all in all" is a prayer impossible to the orthodox pantheist whose creed is that now, and from everlasting, God is all in all. He cannot become in the future what he is and cannot help being now in the present. Again, "We are Christ's and Christ is God," states a pantheistic truth without necessitating the conclusion inevitable to pantheism that our end is absorption in the whole. To relate the universe closely with God is consonant with Christian teaching: to equate it with God is the error which spoils pantheism as a religion. For it is just this identification of God with the universe as it is here and now that precludes pantheism from attributing to God the character of responsiveness. That is the great defect, the one thing lacking to this conception of God. It fails of the minimum requirements of religious experience by possessing reality only and not responsiveness as well. This deficiency, however, is recognised by the higher pantheism. When Tennyson wrote:

> Speak to him, thou, for he heareth, and spirit with spirit can meet,
> Closer is he than breathing, nearer than hands and feet,

he was making good this fault in rigid pantheism. A reality that hears and replies, that meets us and responds to our invocations, would be an object suitable to be the God of religion.

The same defect which spoils the universe of science as an object of religion is discovered again in the absolute of philosophy. When we examine the three great arguments for the existence of God we cannot but be impressed by their strength. They are bound together like three strands of a cable, and by means of this cable we

are drawn back to what is original and ultimate. From time to time the arguments naturally need restatement in the light of fuller knowledge. The teleological argument in particular has required some overhauling and refurnishing. At times the very conception of purpose has seemed inapplicable. But wound together in the cord with the cosmological and ontological arguments the teleological argument adds something to the dependableness of the whole. A study of these time-honoured proofs convinces the mind that something is here established beyond a peradventure. We are carried somewhere by an irresistible compulsion. Unquestionably there is discovered for us an existent object, and one, moreover, that is permanent and secure. The only doubt that can arise in our minds is concerning the character of the object so reached. If that object be termed the absolute or ultimate, then the arguments may be taken as proving the real existence of such an object. But they prove nothing about the nature of that object. Its attributes remain undefined. It is this absence of any qualitative content in the object proved to exist which must lead us to deny that what has been proved to exist is what we mean by God. The minimum requirement for the idea of God is not here met. The object whose existence is proved by these arguments is not proved to have responsiveness as well as reality. If the existence of God is to be established, then another line of argument must demonstrate that this object has at least the attribute of responsiveness. An entity whose only proved attribute is existence is not a deity whose existence has been proved.

But before endeavouring to justify the attribution to reality of that kind of responsiveness which is indispensable in the object of religion, we must first be sure that the character in question is indispensable, and we must also discover more fully the type of responsiveness required. In affirming that religion must have an object that is both ultimate and responsive, it is not necessary to deny the name of religion to Buddhism or pantheism.

There is no occasion to draw any hard and fast line between what is and what is not religion. It is possible to have religion without God, and it is possible to have God without religion. But the highest type of religion is that which centres in God, and the highest conception of God is that which makes him the centre of religion. A God without a religion is less a true God than a God who sustains a religion. A merely abstract God, however self-consistent in nature and attributes, is not so genuine a God as the God who is worshipped. The idea of Godhead is less fully expressed in the God of philosophy than in the God of religion. Accordingly, the acceptance of a philosophical deity in preference to a God at the centre of religion would be justified only if the one could be shown to be true and the other false. The only warrant we could have for choosing a God of philosophy who was not also the God of religion and rejecting the God of religion as being also the God of philosophy would be a sufficient proof that the only kind of God who could possibly exist must have such a nature as to disqualify him from being a God of religion.

Just as a God without a religion is less truly God than a God with a religion, so a religion without a God is less characteristically religion than one with God. Religion is less true to its essential nature when it lacks God. If a true and living God could be found whose nature were suitable to the object of a pure and undefiled religion, then the religion with such a centre would be preferable, as religion, to one without such a centre. A religion without a God can only appear to be a higher type than one with a God on the assumption that no God worthy a place at the heart of a true and spiritual worship can reasonably be thought to exist. If the existence of such a God is a reasonable probability in the light of all the evidence, then the religion that has such a God is the highest and best type of religion. But while we say this we must at the same time respect the honesty and sincerity of the seeker after truth who prefers no God to a false God.

And a God whose existence is dubious is not what we mean by the true and living God. A hypothetical or imaginary God may appear to the unprejudiced inquirer to be little better than a false God. The choice seems to lie between the God of reality and no God at all—between a God-centred religion and a religion without a God. True religion can tolerate only a true God.

Since, however, a religion with an existent God is the highest type of religion, it is obviously of great moment to spiritual religion that it should be able to offer to the genuine inquirer such claims for a true God as shall seem adequate to meet the demands of his reason. And it may be possible to show that what is sufficient to commend the God of religion to a mind devoted to truth may be something less than complete demonstration. A belief such as this belief in God's existence is of such momentousness, and its consequences are of such vital significance, that it seems to carry with it an obligation for acceptance by reason on less evidence than would be required for some other hypothesis. As soon as the probability reaches a certain point approved by reason, then to reject the idea of God as existent fact would be to incur a responsibility far heavier than any honest inquirer could feel justified in accepting. If there is reasonable probability that the minimum demands of religion for its object can be met, then there seems to be a rational constraint to affirm that the object of religion is true. But so important is it to obtain this affirmation of God's existence from all sincere investigators that religion on its part must for this purpose reduce its demands to the lowest terms possible. And those lowest terms are reality and responsiveness.

The magnitude of the consequences depending upon the existence of the God of religion are such that to declare the idea false would be an irresponsible and unwarranted procedure wholly unbecoming true science, unless the evidence were so slight as to constrain the reason to pronounce adverse judgment. The conception

of God is of such a unique nature that existence cannot be denied without very strong evidence to the contrary. The ontological argument insists that the idea of God is such that it cannot be affirmed and the existence of God denied. And this is true of reality as a whole, or of the absolute, in spite of Kant's objections. The idea of a non-existent reality or absolute violates the principle of non-contradiction. A reality which did not exist would be less real than one which did exist. So that existent reality is more ultimate than non-existent reality. An ultimate which does not exist ceases to be ultimate if one single thing exists. At least the idea of the ultimate exists; therefore the ultimate must either exist or be less ultimate than the idea of itself. Accordingly it must be concluded that the idea of the ultimate carries with it the existence of the ultimate. It cannot, however, be argued that the term God can here be used instead of the ultimate and God's existence thus established. But it can with reason be contended that the idea of God is such that its claim to partake of the nature of the ultimate cannot be lightly dismissed. The idea of God is so intimately blended into the vesture of the concepts of truth and reality that it must not be torn out until proof is forthcoming that the fabric will not be ruined thereby.

The importance of finding a place in reality for the object of religious experience is so great that in order to secure that place religion must be prepared to divest the idea of God of all but what is essential. But at the same time it would be a false apologetic which would seek to win that place at the cost of an essential attribute of deity. That way God is lost altogether. To find reality for the object, for instance, and at the same time to forfeit responsiveness would be only less detrimental to religion than the winning of a responsiveness which had lost all touch with ultimate reality. Religion is committed to the postulate that reality is responsive. But the kind of responsiveness essential to the object of religion is, of course, not the kind which would meet and satisfy any

and every desire and petition of man. A response to human need it must be, and, therefore, it must be qualified by human nature. But the type of human nature which conditions this response is a developing manhood which, however far removed at present from the character of the object of religion, is nevertheless growing towards that character. But while this responsiveness essential to religion must be qualified on the one side by the nature of a humanity that is developing towards the nature of reality, it must first be qualified on the other side by the constant nature of reality itself. Even though it be impossible to define the reality of religion more precisely than to describe it as responsive, yet what is responsive is reality, and the kind of response must be the kind that could be made by reality. The reality qualifies the responsiveness as much as the responsiveness qualifies the reality.

The unique feature of a religious attitude to reality, that feature which distinguishes it from a scientific or philosophic attitude to reality, is the implicit assumption that reality responds to such claims upon it from the human side as are consistent with its own inherent nature. But this attribution of responsiveness to the object of religion carries with it a necessary corollary. Response is a kind of attitude or relation existing between two terms. That which issuing from the one is response, on reaching the other is receptivity. And what is thus received by the second comes as an answer to a previous request. The request beginning from the one end is met by the response following from the other. Request, then, comes before response. "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you." Religion begins with the request on the human side, and the response on the divine. But many requests so made can only be responded to with refusal. A long course of discipline is needed before Solomon can petition, "not for wealth or long life, but for wisdom." And still more discipline is required before the prayer

can be "not my will but thine be done." During this education of the soul a stage is reached when "Lord, teach us how to pray," becomes the constant entreaty, and when every petition is preceded by the request: "Teach us to ask such things as shall please thee." And when this point in religious growth is reached, there is effected a complete change of centre. Copernicus delivered men from the belief that the sun moved round the earth, and set them in a world where the earth moved round the sun. And a similar change is made in religion when the first and great concern becomes man's response to God, rather than God's response to man. That revolution in religion means the discovery that the responsiveness or communicativeness between reality and humanity depends upon humanity growing into the likeness of reality. "Be ye therefore perfect as your Father is perfect." With this complete reversal of the earlier attitude comes the recognition of a need for salvation and sanctification—for the deliverance from the self-centred life, and the cultivation of the God-centred life instead. The religious response to human need develops into the response of God to the need of human nature to be saved from all that is not centred in God and reality. And instead of asserting the necessity for reality to respond to the claims which we make upon it, we submit to the necessity that we should respond to the claims which reality makes upon us. Our religion becomes our response to God, more than God's response to us.

This change of centre from self to God eases the problem of objectivity. With this conversion wrought in us we deny that we have any right to dictate to God what his nature must be. It is God's right to be the fulness and perfection of his essential nature. And only if that nature were such as to make impossible any mutual response between God and man would it fail to be what we mean by God. Religion for man is achieved in mutual response between human nature and the nature of God. We are not justified in defining the nature of God from

the human end and afterwards demanding the existence of such a God and making religion depend on the existence of the God of our definition. Whatever the nature of God may be, provided only it have reality and allow response, then religion is genuine. In seeking the essence of religion in response to God, we are following in the footsteps of Schleiermacher. His definition of religion as a sense of dependence upon the divine came near to the position here occupied. The use of the term dependence may, however, be criticised on the ground that it leans too much to the emotional side of human nature. What has just been said of the change in religion whereby we submit to the claims of reality upon us might suggest the definition of religion as surrender or submission to the God of reality. But these words lean as much to the volitional side as does dependence to the emotional. The word which best expresses an attitude of the whole self is "response." And religion is the expression not of any instinct or faculty of man, but of the unitary self in all its fulness. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy mind and with all thy soul and with all thy strength." Religion is nothing less than such a response of the whole man to the whole reality.

When a man becomes thus responsive to the true nature of reality he becomes religious in the purest and fullest sense. The measure of his response to the call of reality upon his soul is the measure of his religious development. But the voice with which reality calls to the soul of man is a voice that speaks in diverse languages. Its voice is heard sometimes in the quietness of beauty, and sometimes in the trumpet call of moral obligation. It finds utterance also in the law and order of the natural world. Reality also speaks with other tongues that we may hear "every man in our own tongue wherein we were born." The native language of some souls is music, of others art, while others again speak in the tongues of science or philosophy. But when all these speak as the spirit gives them utterance, then in them all

we hear the ultimate claims of reality upon the soul. And to these claims we must yield our souls or lose touch with reality altogether. But even when these demands of reality upon the mind have been recognised and met, there is still wanting something which is distinctive of a religious response. One man may answer the call of beauty with a self-surrender that has the warmth and intensity of religion. And such a response may be religious, but it is not religion. In like manner another may be fired with the passion of the moral life, and social reform may become to him, as we say, his religion. Yet, although religious and pertaining to religion, such a response is not religion properly so-called. Again, for another, the love of truth may be so single and absorbing as to partake of the nature of a religious devotion. But still in this response we have not reached the unique feature in religion. Artist, statesman, scientist may all be religious in their disinterested and whole-hearted pursuit of their tasks, but religion is more than art, or government, or science, and more than all these blended. When religion is defined as response to reality, or more accurately as the response of the whole man to the claims of the whole reality, we are carried beyond the subjective side of experience and touch the objective side. The response to reality might be religious on its subjective side, but at the same time it might not be permissible to call it religion. For nothing can be abated of the minimum demands of religion. It is not merely reality that can stand as the object of response in man, but reality as itself responsive. Art, science and philosophy may express modes of response to reality and to that extent may be religious, but because the reality responded to is not itself conceived as being necessarily responsive to man, we have not reached the level of religion. Religion is the response of man to a responsive reality. It is essentially communion. "Deep calleth unto deep." One side of religion is, of course, the quest of the soul for God. "The spirit searcheth all things, even the deep things of God."

But the other side of religion is the invitation from God to man. "Thou shalt call, and I will answer thee." It is this side which is the essential, unique and primary aspect of religion. Both sides, however, must be brought together in the one full experience of the soul. "I press on, if so be that I may apprehend that for which also I was apprehended." The response characteristic of religion is this mutual response, and no word can better express this than the single word *love*.

Religion is, then, essentially a mutual response between personality and reality. The object of religious experience is a reality which is in mutual response with man. And for such reality the name God is reserved. The term personality is used here to indicate that, on the side of man, the response is made by the self as a whole. It is not emotional, volitional or intellectual; neither is it instinctive. It is all this, and as much more than this as personality is more in its unity than the sum of its analysed parts. The more perfect the personality becomes in its unitary fulness, the more adequate will be the mutual response between it and reality. And upon the rightness of this response depends the understanding of the object of religious experience. It is here, in this response between developed personality and ultimate reality, that we must look for the bridge spoken of in the first chapter, a bridge which will bring the soul across to religious objectivity as the bridge of Socrates brought the mind across to rational objectivity. If we are to know reality as a whole, know its character and quality, know its inherent and essential nature, then it is only by an act of the self as a whole that such knowledge can be attained. If at this point religion claims the pre-eminence over science and philosophy, it is not in any disparagement of their service or with any suspicion of their results, but only on the ground that in religion alone is the whole personality in relation with the whole reality. Science and art focus upon parts and aspects of reality, or, if they rise to the study of reality as a whole, merge into

philosophy rather than into religion proper. And philosophy, although taking reality as a whole for its object, differs from religion in pursuing its investigation with the intellectual interest unduly predominant. Philosophy and religion differ also in this, that religion posits responsiveness as an essential attribute of reality. On this single issue of the responsiveness of reality must religion stand or fall. Uniquely, essentially and distinctively religion is a mutual response between personality and reality.

CHAPTER III

THE RELIGIOUS RESPONSE AS A CRITERION OF OBJECTIVITY

THE response which is called religious is one amongst many forms of response. Its claim to be considered the highest form rests upon its nature as an attitude of a whole to a whole. Religion is a holistic relation, to use the term coined by General Smuts.[1] The two terms in the relation are, on the one side, reality as a whole; and on the other, the self as a whole. It is in this response of whole to whole that knowledge of reality is to be gained. Religion affirms the knowledge of God. And this knowledge comes from communion. Communion is the name reserved for that mutual response between personality and reality which is the unique characteristic of religion. But response is a wide experience. There is one kind of response distinctive of religion, and such response affords a peculiar type of knowledge. But there are other kinds of response and other types of knowledge. And one manner of response is best suited to one form of knowledge, and another to another. Yet all response is response of mind, and all knowledge is knowledge of reality. If knowledge of God be required then the religious response is the suitable means to that end, and no other means will serve as well. The method adopted for acquiring knowledge must depend upon the nature of the object to be known. The knowledge of reality as a whole requires a response made by the mind as a whole. But let us, before we proceed, make quite sure that religious knowledge is just a branch of general knowledge.

Religious knowledge is an extension of general knowledge, but the extension is made by a further use of the same methods already adopted and approved. All knowl-

[1] Smuts, "Holism and Evolution," chap. v.

edge is response. Sensation is response to stimulus. Perception is a further response to the stimulation of the senses, as when light falls upon the retina and an object is seen. There are differing modes of response possible, as, for instance, instinctive response, or, on a higher level, emotional response. But all behaviour, even the most rudimentary, is response. In a developed state, behaviour becomes an organised and regulated response to an enlarged environment. And the knowledge of this environment is gained by the adoption towards it of an attitude of inquiry and investigation. The kind of response made to an object is usually called either cognitive, emotional or volitional; but it is always a response of the whole self to the object, and not a response of a part of the self. If we distinguish three types of response it is only because at different times one or other of these features predominates. And which feature is most prominent in the attitude adopted should normally depend on the nature of the object responded to. Some objects require an intellectual attitude, others an emotional, others a volitional; but in each case the difference is due only to the blend and proportion. There is no attitude of mind possible which is purely cognitive or volitional or emotional. The balance of the mind is relative to the object responded to. If, for instance, the object be one for examination by the intellect, then, although cognition must be paramount, conation must also be present in the act of attention, and emotion as part of the interest which sustains the attention.

The attitude of mind in science is such as we have just described with intellect predominant. The object to be studied in any branch of science requires a mind organised in this manner. What must not be overlooked, however, is the need for will and emotion to supplement intellect in the pursuit of scientific truth. Very great discipline and application are necessary for the cultivation of a scientific mind; and very great emotional satisfaction may be found in discovering, in any subject studied, the

correlation of the parts and the structure of the whole. Science cannot starve emotion or atrophy will-power. Indeed, the pursuit of science may become religious. The devotion of a scientist to his subject would deserve to be called religious in so far as it became a response of whole to whole. Such an attitude would not, for reasons already given, be religion. But whenever the scientific attitude expresses the whole mind, and the object studied is regarded as reaching back to reality as a whole, then the scientific attitude acquires the nature of a religious response. It is, perhaps, not infrequently that a scientist becomes religious without knowing it, and stands nearer to true religion than he suspects. It is, however, more easy for the philosopher than for the scientist to become religious in tone, because the object of his study being the whole, it readily evokes at times the response of his whole self. Plato and Spinoza are typical of the genuine philosopher in the religious quality of their character and work. But once more, though religious, this attitude is not religion. Yet often it comes very near to being religion.

When we pass from the region of science to the region of art, then, the end in view being changed, the way of approach must be changed, too. But the end is not so greatly changed after all. Science and art go to the same world as a field of study, and both seek a systematic unity and relatedness of constituent elements. The cleavage between art and science may easily be exaggerated, as seems to be the case in Canon Streeter's book on "Reality." The close connection between mathematics and music may suggest that the difference between art and science is not fundamental. Art seeks to construct a system from elements discovered and selected. Science seeks to discover the system that holds together all the facts to be found. Art, in order to build its limited system, eliminates whatever is foreign to its purpose. Science must embrace all the facts and be ready to reject its tentative system rather than any of

the discovered facts. But, at the same time, the kind of system presented in art must not be so unlike a true ordering of the parts as to offend the sense of veracity; neither must it be a closed and exclusive system unrelated to the greater order of nature beyond. Rather, it must be typical in its system, and must be organic to larger spheres. In distinction from science, however, art has as its end the satisfaction of emotion rather than intellect, and accordingly it is more dependent than science upon the subjective factor in experience. Science must sacrifice the subjective needs to the objective demands; but art may modify the objective elements to suit the wishes and desires of the heart. In an æsthetic attitude of mind the intellect and will have their part to play, but must be subservient to emotion. But a scientific response differs from an æsthetic response merely in the changed balance of the mind. In both the whole mind must be active.

Similarly when the response of the mind is a moral response, the whole mind is organised about the volition. But just as an appeal to emotion at the expense of all else would be bad art and would have a detrimental effect upon character, likewise a moral claim that ignored reason and feeling would be false morally, and would militate against the integration of human nature. The moral response to a situation must be satisfactory to intellect and feeling if it is to be carried through with unfaltering will-power.

Although it is impossible to eradicate will and emotion from cognition, it is possible to develop cognition at the expense of the other sides of the mind. But a scientist who had so far lost a proper proportion in his mind as to be weak in determination and failing in interest would not be a successful scientist. Men of exceptional intellectual brilliance who lack the discipline necessary for regular application, or who have not sufficient emotional drive to sustain any prolonged investigation, are pathetic failures in their work. So the moralist, whose zeal is not

according to wisdom, may easily alienate more than he wins to his cause, and may, owing to his lack of sympathy and understanding, aggravate rather than alleviate the evil he seeks to cure. Without wisdom and sympathy no fulfilment of duty can be truly moral. And once more, the artist who lacks fixed purpose and despises hard study will never achieve great art. The mind must be organised about an end, and whether the end be intellectual, moral or æsthetic, the mind must never be allowed to become distorted or ill-balanced. The whole mind must respond as a unity, the kind of response it makes being relative to the object.

In different spheres of response, then, different attitudes in the subject are called for. In some instances intellect must dominate, in others emotion, and in others volition. And it is at least conceivable that there may be objects to be known and ends to be attained which demand a full development and perfect balance of all sides of the mind. Perhaps every object studied and every end pursued would be better understood by such a unified and harmonious mind. But be that as it may, when we come to the knowledge of personality we do certainly seem to have reached an object that requires an evenly balanced response for any considerable measure of understanding to be possible. Here the predominance of the intellectual, volitional or emotional state of mind would make appropriate response impossible. But obviously it is of the utmost importance that in all personal dealings a proper response should be acquired and maintained. The sphere of personal relationships is peculiarly the province of moral response. But an ill-balanced moral attitude would be as disastrous to the understanding of human nature as would a critically analytical or an emotionally unrestrained attitude. The moral response, to be serviceable in its own sphere, must be the expression of a character built up by a perfect adjustment between wisdom, duty and sympathy. In all personal dealings, whether we call them moral or not, a full and balanced

response is necessary to proper action. The physician in practising medicine must adopt a personal and not merely a scientific attitude. He must treat the patient and not merely the disease. The personal factor in any relationship requires a more evenly balanced response than the impersonal.

We may conclude, therefore, that when the object to be known is a whole, then the condition of the mind knowing must approximate more nearly to an even balance of response than when a part only of some whole is studied. And this is true of wholes lower in the scale than personality. If we want to know an animal, for instance, our attitude may be predominantly intellectual, as must be the case when we are observing reactions to stimuli or characteristics of normal behaviour. Such a study would be psychological and would regard the animal under observation as a part of a larger whole, as a member of a species. The anatomical study of an animal deliberately dissects the whole into constituent parts and examines their nature and interrelation. And again, the attitude of mind is mainly cognitive. If, however, the aim of the mind is to know some individual animal as a separate and unique whole, then to our physiological and psychological knowledge we must add something else that comes from a new and different attitude of mind towards the animal. It is not that physiology and psychology are useless here: far otherwise. Our understanding of any particular animal will be all the fuller for such knowledge, and if we want a complete understanding such knowledge is indispensable. But it must be supplemented. Our intellectual attitude towards animal nature and behaviour in general must be replaced in this instance by a response in which there is a more even balance. Sympathy and obligation must come to bear upon the object as well as observation if we are to understand the animal as an individual. A mutual responsiveness must be acquired between whole and whole, and from the kind of response made the character of the animal will be inferred.

It is this full-minded response that leads to personification. Because it is first developed in personal relationships, such full response from the subject naturally suggests personality in the object whenever it is experienced. Whether the object is personal or impersonal, the response will be a response of whole to whole. But since the better known whole is the type of whole which is personal, there will be a tendency to think that the other whole is personal also. Primitive man personifies freely without much discrimination. Gradually, however, the distinctiveness of interpersonal response is recognised. In the absence of mutual response all idea of personality comes to be abandoned. We to-day may still respond to nature with this evenly balanced and fully developed mind, and in such a response we come to an understanding of nature impossible to us if our attitude be mainly cognitive or mainly emotional. With the same unified mind we may regard separate natural objects such as mountains, rivers, clouds, birds, animals or flowers. This is the attitude of the true nature poet, and is found at its best in Wordsworth. What we describe as the call of nature is an experience of our justly blended response. And when in this way a balanced unity of mind is restored to those who have been taxed by prolonged response of one type only, a great refreshment is enjoyed. But in this attitude to nature we do and must make discriminations. We do not believe that there is personal response between our minds and natural objects. That would be a lapse into the pathetic fallacy. Yet those who have been accustomed to experience such mental attitudes towards nature would be reluctant to affirm that there was present no sense whatever of mutual response. And since all would readily admit the responsiveness of animals and the possibility of its cultivation in some animals to a very high degree, there is no necessity to draw a line at any point and insist that below that line no response at all is conceivable. All life is one and varies only in quality and degree. Nevertheless, there are marked differences in

the kind of life. And what we should describe as the companionship of nature would not be the same experience that would come from the companionship of animals. And this again would be quite distinct from human friendship. In each case the mind would make a response as a whole, but the answering or awakening response would have a quality detectable as unique to the different levels occupied by the object.

We may infer, then, that the understanding of individuals, or wholes, or vital centres of unity and system, is gained by a response of mind as a blended whole. Also, differences in the nature of the object responding are discernible. And the most perfect mutual response is between person and person. The question thus arises whether this ascending scale of response through natural objects, animals and persons, can be extended to reality as a whole. If these other objects, themselves but parts of reality, are only understandable as wholes by a response of mind which approximates to an even balance, must this not be the condition of understanding reality as a whole? And when such an attitude of mind is adopted, does reality respond to the mind? And, if so, is that response the kind experienced from nature, or from personality, or does it seem to stand higher in the scale and to be different from either?

The scientific or philosophical attitude to reality is predominantly intellectual. Mr. Bradley,[1] for instance, makes the logical postulate of non-contradiction the test of reality. In approaching reality from this angle of the mind, the one assumption necessary is that reality shall respond to the claims made upon it by the intellect. In so far as such response to the intellect is discoverable, reality is there affirmed to be present. The degree of response to logical demands is said to be the degree of reality in the object. Tested in this way, space and time, causation and self-hood, are all proved to have degrees of reality, but also to be relatively unreal. The stigma of

[1] Bradley, "Appearance and Reality."

unreality attaching to such common objects of experience, although the unreality be but relative, is, however, felt to be unjust. If this is the inevitable conclusion to be drawn when the test of non-contradiction is applied, then it must be questioned whether, even for purely intellectual purposes, the standard set is not too high and exclusive. A criterion of reality which excludes everything but a featureless absolute must be admitted to be too stringent in its claims. As in the example of the three proofs of God's existence, we had to conclude that, although something was proved, it was not what we meant by God; so here we may have to say that although something is reached by this logical test, it is not what we mean by reality. To wipe away all the colour, richness, warmth, movement, variety and human-relatedness from the world we know and then to call the resultant the real world is to misuse terms most unjustifiably. Call it a logical world, or a universe of self-consistency, but not the real world. Were it possible to reduce mind to pure cognition and to maintain it perpetually in that state, then a world that responded to logical claims might be considered as the real world, and all else as unreality. But since the mind in its most cognitive attitude is still a unity with volition and emotion present, and with sensation and perception no less operative than reason, the real world must be fuller than the world which answers to the demands of logical consistency. It is not that the logical claims are false, it is merely that they are inadequate when taken alone. Just as physiology and psychology are indispensable to the understanding of an animal as an individual unit, so logic and metaphysics together with every branch of science are necessary to the knowledge of reality. But, if reality be a whole, then no partial response, whether cognitive, volitional or emotional, whether on the level of sensation, perception or conception, would be adequate to the understanding of the object. The logical test must be extended. Not only intellectual, but also moral and æsthetic claims must be

met if the object is to deserve the name of reality. To assume that reality must respond to logical claims, but may repudiate all other claims of the mind, is an arbitrary procedure. The object reached by such a method cannot but seem to the mind as a whole to be lacking in reality.

If we would know reality, not piecemeal and under certain aspects, but as a unity and a whole, then we must extend our postulate to include not only logical necessity, but also moral and æsthetic necessity. The test of what is real must be a more complex test. By reality we must mean that which meets the mind when as a perfectly integrated and fully developed unity it makes a response as a whole to the reality which must be a rich, full, harmonious whole. If it be objected that this procedure involves the initial error of dictating to reality what it must be like, then the answer must be that the mind is itself part of reality and that the claims which it makes are not, as it were, imposed upon reality from outside. Coming as they do from mind, they come from reality, and, moreover, from that part of reality which alone is able to make demands upon the whole. The claims of mind upon reality may, indeed, be regarded as the utterance of reality through its own chosen organ of self-expression. Unless it be assumed that reality is unknowable by that part of itself which is the human mind, then it is at least as likely an assumption that reality will respond to the demands of a fully developed and perfectly balanced personality as that it will respond to the demands of the intellect alone. Indeed, since the intellect in seeking reality excludes so much that to the full personality seems most real, it may be considered as more probable that reality will respond to the mind as a balanced whole than to the mind as predominantly intellectual. We may thus be led in the end to conclude that developed personality is the only suitable organ of complete understanding. And personality when compared with mere intellect is not at so great a disadvantage in making its claims upon reality. It is not as if the intellect were

capable of gaining knowledge without the need for any prior postulate. Without the logical postulate that the universe is knowable or that intellect has the capacity to know the universe, there can be no beginning to a rational system of knowledge. This is a claim upon reality. All postulates and axioms are claims upon reality. But postulates and axioms are not to be regarded as exempt from all question because they are intellectual claims. Even the postulates and axioms of the intellect may be called in question if they fail to yield the results which justify their initial assumption. And it may be argued that the kind of reality reached by the intellectual methods alone is so unsatisfactory as to throw doubt upon those methods and to raise suspicion as to the competence of intellect alone to gain the end that it sets before itself. An expanded postulate would, if it yielded better fruits, go down justified rather than the other. The bridge of Socrates needs to be widened.

The new postulate for the knowledge of reality must be, then, that reality as a whole is knowable by personality as a whole; or, conversely, that personality when completely integrated and fully developed is competent to know reality as a whole. Some objects require an intellectual attitude, others a moral, others an æsthetic; but reality as a whole requires a response of the mind as a balanced whole. Any whole is best understood by the mind which as a whole makes a response upon it. This is eminently the case when personality understands personality. And if reality be a whole at all, then it must be a fuller, richer whole than human personality even at its highest, and must, therefore, require a response not less complete than that whereby person knows person. Reality may not be intelligible, but metaphysics assumes that it is. And to be intelligible it must have the nature of a system and unity. The postulate is, then, that if reality is to be known as an organised whole, the subject knowing it must be a fully realised and organised personality.

The nature of the object to be known, when that object is reality in the fulness of its meaning, requires an attitude of mind which in its quality as the response of whole to whole is a religious attitude. Intellect alone precludes itself from the knowledge of everything in reality that is outside of its own sphere. But reality is a bigger and richer object than intellect is competent to measure. The attitude of mind necessary is found in the fulness of response characteristic of religion. But the making of such a response is not itself religion. A similar response is necessary for the understanding of any whole, and so may be called the religious type of response. What makes religion is the adoption of this type of response not to any whole, but to that unique whole which is reality. And the conviction of all genuine religious experience is that when such an attitude is adopted towards reality as whole, then there is a response from reality to the soul. We have seen that such a mutual response as is here posited has its analogies elsewhere. The poet and artist would alike insist that although natural objects are below the level of personality, nevertheless there is some response appreciable when a proper approach to nature has been made. But it is in personal intercourse that we find exemplified the most perfect response and counter-response. When we pass from personality to a higher unit of wholeness in which personality is but a factor, can we deny the presence of that element of mutual response which seems to increase as the relationship ascends in the scale of developed individuality? Probability would seem to favour a response from reality to personality, and such a response must be the unique feature of religious experience. And a response to the claims of perfect personality appears to be more probable than a response to intellectual needs only. The religious postulate of mutual response may, therefore, be regarded as a continuation and not a contradiction of the postulate of general knowledge.

In speaking of the object of religious experience as

responsive reality rather than as personal God, we are observing the rule of reducing religion to its lowest terms. Mr. Bradley insists that it is unjustifiable to make a personal God an essential of religion. And this is not necessary, since with the belief in a responsive reality we reach a stage which deserves the name of religion. It is for experience to decide whether the nature of the response is sufficiently akin to that familiar in the highest and purest form of personal intercourse to warrant the use of the term personal. The refusal to use this term would, as Canon Streeter points out, almost inevitably suggest something less than personal fellowship. But it is improbable that a complete whole would in its nature resemble a whole considerably lower than itself (such as a natural object) rather than a whole approximating more nearly (such as personality). The use of the word supra-personal may be advisable as suggesting all that we mean by personality, and much more besides. But when we come to ask what is personality as we know it, then we must recognize that as we know it personality is obviously imperfect and incomplete. The much more besides personality-as-we-know-it may be what is required to fill out what is lacking in human personality. If there be more yet over and above all that constitutes the perfection of a personal whole, then we cannot conceive what it is. Accordingly, with all this in mind, it would seem preferable to speak of the response necessary to religion as a perfected personal response. But the measure of our human experience of this perfect response of personality is necessarily limited by our own imperfection. Nevertheless, if reality as a whole is to be known at all truly, in however limited a measure, it is only by a response of the whole personality that it can be known.

The problem of objectivity in this connection needs carefully defining. The objectivity of reality is different from the objectivity of some entity in nature. In the one case the objectivity is externality. A tree, a house, a book, a chair, as objects of knowledge, are external to

the mind. But reality is not the sum total of such things as are in this sense external. Reality includes the mind that knows as well as the universe known by the mind. It is a more comprehensive whole which contains mind as a constituent element. The objectivity of religious experience does not, therefore, imply the complete externality of the reality which responds to the mind. It will be an experience in which personality becomes aware of itself as a part of a larger whole. Personality in man will be organic to reality just as the heart or brain are organs in the human body. Thus, as personality becomes aware of its place and function in reality, it will also become aware that the imperfection of its nature is an impediment to its proper functioning. This is a characteristic feature of all religious experience—the sense of the greatness and goodness of the whole, and, by contrast, the sense of the impotence and wickedness of the self as a part of that whole. The vision of God is accompanied by the conviction of sin. But the only health and salvation for the part lies in its own completeness and right adjustment to the whole. The familiar cry of St. Augustine is true of all religious experience: "Thou hast made us for thyself, and our heart is restless within us until it find rest in thee." The mind as a part of the whole can only know the nature of that whole in which it is a part when it fulfils its own true being and achieves a right relationship with the whole. The object of religious experience must be both within and without. The universe fails as a religious object because it is wholly external; and reality must include the mind. The absolute of philosophy fails because it absorbs its parts and obliterates its distinctions; and reality must conserve and integrate its parts.

But what kind of knowledge does personality gain of the nature of the reality to which it is integral? We know that personality functions most characteristically and perfectly when in relation with other personalities. Does the response of personality to reality sufficiently

resemble that personal response to justify the inference that the object of religious experience has the character of personality? The answer to this question is all important. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that no convincing reply can be given. We are still in the region of conjecture and probability. But it must not be forgotten that in this instance the attainment of a sufficient degree of probability carries the same obligation of acceptance that certainty would have. The doubt here arises not so much in the minds of those who have experience of religion as in the minds of those who try to gauge the existential import of that experience. The subject of religious experience would almost invariably interpret the response as both mutual and personal. And this inside evidence must be allowed to count. Comparing religious experience with general experience we find also confirmation of this belief. It is more likely that the response between personality and a larger whole of which personality is a part would resemble the response of person to person than the response of natural objects to a person. The natural object is more external to personality than another personality. It is something more than a figure of speech when we talk of entering into another's mind. The evidence, on the whole, is in favour of a response which is personal in nature. Personality could hardly find that satisfaction which is a characteristic of religion if the object of response were less than personal. Nevertheless, with mutual response alone, although the personal quality were lacking, religion would have sufficient for its continuance.[1] And the probabilities of response from reality to personality as a whole may be considered sufficient to secure religion a permanent place in experience. The further probability of a personal character in that response will be adequate for those who have entered at all fully into a genuinely religious attitude of mind. Nevertheless,

[1] General Smuts, for instance, would allow that there is response in the religious experience which personality has of reality, but he would not allow that this is a personal response. ("Holism and Evolution," chap. xii.)

it must be admitted that one whose state of mind is religious, but who has not become the subject of religion, might hesitate to accept the evidence. The necessary justification for rejecting religion as spurious, however, is altogether wanting, since the probability is sufficient to render acceptance obligatory upon the mind.

The nature of this obligation to accept the validity and genuineness of the religious assumption arises from the principle of continuity. If the minimum essentials of religion can be shown to be consonant with general knowledge then they must be allowed to stand. And we have tried to show that there is continuity between the religious relationship, both on its objective and subjective sides, and the general experience of the mind in relation with analogous objects. If religion can be shown to be not a deviation from the accepted line of experience, but a movement farther ahead in the same direction, then, although its position cannot be fully reached either by science or philosophy, the consequences dependent upon such a position being reached are of such a nature that the sense of direction must be taken as sufficient evidence for the security of the position. But at the same time that that is urged, it must be admitted that what is thus secured on the basis of sufficient probability is only what we have called the minimum of religious requirements. The same authority cannot be claimed for anything that lies beyond that margin. What is thus guaranteed is the response of reality. That the response is personal in nature is a proposition less fully certified. Nevertheless, that basis of guaranteed rock is enough for religion to erect the structure of its faith upon. Science and philosophy may question the building, but not the foundation. And even if science and philosophy decline to take part in constructing the edifice, at least they should be willing to meet with the builders in laying some of the foundations.

It remains to be asked whether, without trespassing beyond the domains of scientific and philosophic acceptation, it is possible to discern in the object of religion other

features than the bare outline of responsive reality. Having tried to establish the probability of response, we must consider further the nature of the reality which responds.

We have suggested already that the universe of science is disqualified as an object of religion, because it is external to mind. The world of science may be compared to the picture thrown upon the screen. We cannot possibly include the lantern as part of the picture. In like manner mind stands over against the universe. But since mind is the most important element in reality, we cannot possibly identify reality with the universe of science. It is the inclusion of mind within the whole of reality that constitutes the problem at this point. Reality cannot be a closed system viewed by mind. Somehow or other mind must be a term in the system. But as soon as we are set the task of forming a systematic whole with mind as a part it becomes apparent that mind must be the most significant part. Other factors may be interrelated amongst themselves, but mind must stand related to the whole system. The relation of mind to the whole system does not, however, imply direct relation with every element in the system. It is possible to know a system without having detailed knowledge of all its constituents. A mathematical formula, for instance, may be thoroughly understood without knowledge of all the instances to which it applies. General principles, no doubt, need concrete manifestation in order that they may become intelligible; but, once grasped, they interpret other things, and are seen to have an application beyond the narrow field of present knowledge. The aim of science is not the accumulation of detailed facts, but the discovery, through facts, of the underlying system of truth. The mind can attain the comprehension of a fundamental system without the examination of every element belonging to that system. In a similar way, one person may know another person intimately and accurately without knowing every action and thought in that person's

history—without even knowing the whole ambit of the mind at the moment of intercourse. Just so the mind may be related to the system as a whole without being related to a summation of all the factors that go to make up the system. The system has a principle of organisation—a centre of relation—a character—which is discoverable in it as a whole. And this character it possesses as a unity, not as a medley and multiplicity of entities. Thus we may infer that the reality which is responsive to personality is not reality as a totality, but reality as a whole. And reality as a whole, as a unit, must have a dominant principle, a centre of inter-relatedness, a quality and characteristic belonging to it as a whole. The relation between mind and that system in which it is an integral part is a relation between it and the centre of that system, or the principle of that system. It is a response between mind and the nature, quality and characteristic of the system of reality.

The human mind comes to the fulness of its being not in intellect, but in personality, which includes intellect blended together with much more. It is this personality as a whole which is the subject of the relationship with the system as a whole. And the claim of religion is that only the whole personality is a proper subject for such a relationship. Indeed, the personality which can stand in a right relationship to the system of reality must be a fully developed and perfectly integrated personality. The further claim of religion is that reality as a whole can be known in virtue of its nature as a system, a unit, a dominant principle, a character. And this knowledge is gained when the personality as a whole adopts the attitude of response to the claims which the nature of this system makes upon it as a part of itself. And that the character of this system of reality is such as to effect a relationship of mutual response conditioned by its own nature and by the nature of human personality is the essential postulate of religion.

Postulate of religion

The responsive reality that stands as the object of

religious experience with the unified and perfected personality as its subject is not an immense totality, but a system with a characteristic of its own. And this characteristic of the system of reality as a whole, which stands as the object of religious experience, we call God. God is not the universe that stands over against mind. God is not the absolute that includes and absorbs mind. God is not just a synonym for reality. But when reality is conceived as a system, then as a system it most has a nature. God is the characteristic of the system of reality. And religion posits that this God is responsive to the needs of evolving, integrating, completing personality.

CHAPTER IV

THE RESPONSIVENESS OF REALITY AS A POSTULATE OF FAITH

THE answer to the question, What do we mean by God? can never be a short answer. The desire to tell all that we mean by God and to describe all that God has meant to human hearts might lead to the editing of a library of devotional literature, with extensive commentary. But here, fortunately, as in so many other fields of knowledge, it is not necessary to explain all that there is to be explained. The question here asked does not seek as answer a system of dogmatic theology. That may follow. The question that now presses for an answer is not what God might mean to us, but what we in solemn truth can mean by God? What, in the light of all knowledge available, are we entitled to claim as the meaning of God? Where does God stand in reference to science and philosophy? What is his place and function in the universe? What is his holding upon reality? Where does God fit into the total system of things?

These are urgent questions. God cannot mean all that religious experience affirms and at the same time be negligible in philosophy and inconceivable in science. In the full make-up of truth either God must have first place or no place. The thought that any theory of ultimate things could be propounded without reference to God is an impossible thought for the mind that has experienced religion. But because science and philosophy are devoted to truth, they are under obligation to challenge religion with the question: What do you mean by God? And religion, if it be sincere and earnest, must ply itself with this same inquiry. The religious mind ought to have the courage to ask: Am I deceiving myself all

the time? In all conscientiousness and truthfulness, what do I mean by God? Is God real? Is God the greatest real in all reality? The question as pressed thus is fundamental to all doctrine. It is not enough to offer in reply the orthodox doctrine of God. That doctrine carries with it the inference of existence. And the inference being disallowed, the doctrine is discredited. If God be such an object as religion affirms him to be, then he must exist, for he could not be all that religion teaches unless he had real existence. That inference may be taken, and is often taken, as evidence of God's existence. But what if the dilemma be turned against religion? Suppose the position be stated thus: If the inference of existence is insecure, then the whole doctrine must be equally insecure. And since to science and philosophy the existence of God does seem to be dubious, it is small wonder that with scientists and philosophers the Christian doctrine of God carries little conviction.[1] Religion, of course, may argue that such an idea as the idea of God, if it be really believed and accepted, ought to bring the conviction of existence, and that the lack of that conviction can only indicate spiritual obtuseness. But, on the other hand, it may be retorted that if the existence of such an object as God is undiscoverable, then the nature of God must be unprovable. In such fashion the disputes and misunderstandings are continued without possibility of reconciliation. Obviously, therefore, the term disputed about must have a double meaning. Perhaps the existence which religion requires is not the existence that science rejects.

Let us examine more closely the kind of existence necessary to God, and the kind understood by science. The usual procedure of apologetic would be to begin with the conception of God in religion and to endeavour from that idea to establish existence.[2] The method here

[1] *Cf.* Huxley, "Religion without Revelation."

[2] This is the method adopted by Dr. W. N. Clarke in "The Christian Doctrine of God." It is, of course, a legitimate method for

adopted is the reverse. We begin with existent reality and attempt to demonstrate its suitability as the basis for the idea of God. But in adopting this method we must choose a point of departure which will not only be acceptable to science, but which will also provide a reasonable probability of satisfying religion. By an existent object science might mean some entity which could be tested and proved to occupy a position in space and time. Clearly, if this be the only conception of existence, then there is very little hope of securing a place for God in such a world. But by the existence of God we do not, or need not, mean position in space and time. God is not an entity amongst other entities, one of the many. Clearly, we must not take our starting-point from existent entities. A more favourable beginning, however, might appear to be provided by the sum total of all existence. But such an object, again, can never yield the God of religion. To set aside any other objection, this totality of existence is not known to science, and cannot but be unknown to religion also. And in point of fact, we have not moved from the first position. The only difference between that existence and this is numerical, and from this kind of existence there is no transition to the existence of God. This is not the existence that belongs to God, but only the existence that depends on God.

Existence of this kind is not compatible with the idea of God; neither is it the most important factor in science. Science is always trying to penetrate beyond the actual fact in order to discover the principle exemplified in that fact. Its aim is not the discovery of existent entities. That is only its starting-point. From the examination and classification of facts, it proceeds to the construction of a system of interrelations. Such a system, when discovered, has a law, or dominant principle, or nature, or

the purpose there in view. But for the purpose of bridging the chasm between science and religion the reverse method may be better.

character. Now whether or not this unifying principle which gives coherence and quality to the system, and without which it would not be a system, is itself existent in the same sense in which the parts of the system are existent is a point of nomenclature. If that principle, or centre of the system, have a kind of existence, then that is the kind of existence we need for God. If in the interests of exact nomenclature it be decided not to extend the term existence to cover this character of wholeness and unity in the system, then, in that limited sense of the word, it may be conceded that God does not exist. But whether this principle of systematic unity be existent or not in point of terminology, here is something that science recognises as real. The system is as real as the elements that compose it. Indeed, it may be claimed to be more real, since, even if it be not called existent, it is, nevertheless, constituent of a wider field of existence than any of the single existent entities. Here, in this kind of reality which a system possesses, we find a common meeting ground for religion and science. If science acknowledges the reality of unitary wholes or systems, then so far it has gone to acknowledge the reality of God.

When we pass from science to philosophy this quest for the underlying systems is carried a stage farther, and one all-comprehensive principle is sought. Here, again, as in science, the purpose is to discover an underlying system. Philosophy is not occupied with the totality of things, but with the co-ordinated unity and wholeness which comprehends all. Whatever existence or reality belongs to this system, embedded in the sum total of all existents and realities, that is the kind of existence or reality that is the foundation of the idea of God. And philosophy in affirming that reality is a systematic whole is going so far to affirm the reality of God.

But while in this kind of reality which belongs to wholeness and harmonised unity we may find a firm foot-

hold for religion within the domain of science and philosophy, it must be recognised that the object of scientific and philosophic study is not identical with the object of religious experience. It is, of course, inconceivable that the object of religious experience should have no place in the reality of science and philosophy. But, as we have already seen, the bare affirmation of reality is insufficient for religion. If reality is to be the object of religion, it is not enough that reality should be merely a harmonious whole. That is enough for science and philosophy. Their task is to discover the kind of system that holds all the elements together. A pronouncement as to the quality and character of the whole would be their last word. But with religion this must be the first word. Religion assumes from the very outset that the nature of the whole is such that it responds to the claims of integrating, developing personality. Without this postulate we have philosophy only, religious philosophy perhaps, but not religion. It is only when we add to the reality of science and philosophy the attribute of responsiveness that we reach the object of religion. The reality of the object is the same kind of reality that has a place in science and philosophy, but the attribute of responsiveness to personality belongs to the object of religion alone. To ignore, or gloss over, this unique feature of religion would be a false apologetic. If religion has nothing to offer more than can be found in science and philosophy, where is the value of religion? The great attraction of religion is its fundamental assurance of fellowship, communion, or mutual responsiveness between reality and personality. Philosophy cannot, without being false to its own position, give this initial assurance to the mind. It may end its quest in that confidence, but its duty is to hold the mind in suspense during the whole of its laborious investigation. The idea of responsiveness is not essential to philosophy at any stage. But religion is differently placed and cannot surrender the belief in responsiveness either first or last, or

at any time. Yet, staking all upon responsiveness as it does, religion need have no fear of philosophy, for not until philosophy had finally established the unresponsiveness of reality could there be any unreconcilable opposition between it and religion. And the likelihood of such antagonism ever being reached is very remote.

The probability in favour of responsiveness in the ultimate has been estimated and computed as adequate to carry the obligation of acceptance. The principle of continuity points in that direction with a sufficient degree of probability to guarantee the advance. Nevertheless, the responsiveness of the ultimate is not a postulate of pure reason. It is a postulate of faith. Reason cannot take the place of faith in religion. Reason may lead us to the system of reality, and may recognise the probability of responsiveness as a characteristic of that system; but it is only faith that is able to make such responsiveness a postulate rather than a conjecture. And we cannot dispense with such faith in religion. To replace faith by reason would be to reduce a full personal response to a merely cognitive response. The type of response which is indispensable to religion cannot dispense with reason, but it requires also as much more than reason in the response as there is more than reason in personality itself. The challenge of psychology cannot be met by trying to reduce the object of religion to an object of reason. Rather we must prove the incompleteness and insufficiency of the object of reason and discover what is that something more which is necessary.

The responsiveness of reality postulated by faith and guaranteed by the principle of sufficient probability may be defined as a certain kind of response. The nature of the response must be qualified by the nature, not of one side only, but of both sides of the relationship. On the one side of the relationship stands reality as a co-ordinated system. The character of this system must be such that it can respond to personality. The kind of character posited as inherent to the system of reality as

a whole is the kind that could enter into mutual response with personality. And this character is what we mean by God. God is on the one side of the relationship. On the other side of the relationship is human personality. The object of religious experience is the character of reality as a systematic whole, the subject of religious experience is human personality as a progressively developing whole. The response made by reality as a whole is a response to personality as a whole. It is not a response to any and every aspect of personality, or to any and every hope or ambition entertained by personality. It is not a response to an idealism based upon intellect alone or upon emotion alone, or upon volition alone. It is, moreover, not a response to the soul only, but to the body as well. Sensation is a factor in the experience just as cognition, volition and emotion are also factors. The response is made from reality as an actual whole to personality as a potential whole. Personality, as personality, is not yet an accomplished whole. Mind, of course, in one sense, is always a unity. But personality is an evolving product not yet made perfect. The measure of the responsiveness appreciated by personality is the measure of its development. As the personality grows in character more and more like the reality whose character is experienced in the mutual response of religion, that response becomes more and more a perfect relationship between part and whole within the great system of the ultimate. But it is in this relationship between personality and reality that personality is stimulated and aided to the attainment of perfect development and proper relationship. This is the experience of saving grace. The whole adapts the part to itself in so far as the part responds to the claims of the whole upon it. Thus the mutual response characteristic of religious experience is conditioned from both sides of the response. The needs of developing personality qualify the relation on one side and the nature of harmonious reality on the other.

That personality should find its self-fulfilment in a

response to the whole of reality is only what would be expected, since mind is an essential factor in reality. The character of God, or the nature of reality, is not changed by that maladjustment which we call human sin. But so long as personality remains unreconciled to God it is out of harmony with the nature of things. It resembles an ill-fitting or a diseased part of the whole. Its functioning is disorderly and unco-ordinated. When, however, the self responds to the nature of the whole and functions as an organic part in a perfect system, then in that proper adaptation it finds its own health and perfection. In this development of personality which follows upon the adoption of a religious faith is to be found the verification of the faith adopted. But since this evidence of validity has already been examined in a previous book, it will suffice merely to mention it here. And also the argument for establishing the metaphysical probability of a response from reality to personality has there been shown to rest upon the evidence that personality is integral to reality and cannot on that account be repudiated by reality. That argument need not be repeated here. Suffice it now to reaffirm the high degree of probability in favour of the responsiveness of the ultimate to the claims of maturing personality, and to insist at the same time that religion itself regards this attribute of reality as a postulate of faith and not as an established conclusion of reason.

Although this postulate is essential to religion, its truth is not a matter of importance exclusively to religion. Art and morality, unlike religion, do not find this postulate indispensable to their continued existence. Yet the nature of both would be changed if the postulate were rejected. The conviction that no response could possibly be made by reality to the claims of morality and art upon it would inevitably have a weakening effect upon both. The nature of values, both moral and æsthetic, would be considerably affected if value had no significance for reality. But, obviously, it is not any and every effort of art or morality which must be received and gripped by

reality. It is, however, a precious faith that reality accepts those creations of value which in any degree fit into its own pattern. Reality safeguards our investments when they are genuine and honours our cheques when they are properly drawn. There is commerce between reality as the one party, and morality and art as the other parties, whenever the currency rings true. Base and spurious coinage must be rejected, but true values are always recognised and paid in full.

Morality assumes, even although the assumption be not essential to its existence, that reality is not indifferent to moral achievement. It is not all one in the latter end whether virtue or vice triumphs. Goodness is in harmony with the nature of reality, evil is discordant. The sanction of morality is more than social convention. Beneath all the fluctuating and varying codes of human groups there lies an ultimate basis of right and wrong. That is right which expresses and fulfils the character of the wholeness of reality, that is wrong which runs counter to it. The obligation to speak truth, for instance, like every other real obligation, is ultimate. It cannot be reduced to expediency or utility or convention. For there is no answer possible to the man who still asks, as he well may, why he should be ruled by expediency, utility or convention? The final and absolute obligation to speak truth lies in the nature of reality as a whole. Truth is an attribute of the ultimate system of all being. To deviate from truth is to fall away from reality and to go the way of chaos, negation and death. The unique, unanalysable, unresolvable element in moral obligation is its contact with the ultimate. If the ultimate has no place for moral value, then the nature of obligation cannot be the same as if it had. Morality then becomes merely an earthly Jerusalem, very imposing and venerable, no doubt, and worthy of allegiance, but lacking the absolute claim of the new Jerusalem let down from heaven. The absolute which is beyond good and evil leaves morality to pitch its camp where and how it best may. But we

look for the city which has the foundations whose builder and maker is God.

Art no less than morality would suffer a marked change of character if there were no point of contact conceivable between its ideal constructions and the reality beyond. Time and again the dove may be sent out only to return to the ark because no resting place could be found in reality. But one day it returns bearing some token that it has reached reality at last. The aim and achievement of art would change, slowly perhaps at first, but inevitably and increasingly, if against every work of art had to be written the judgment—untrue to reality. As things are, art by its construction of unified wholes is expressing an implicit belief that the nature of reality is a qualitative whole whose nature is such as would satisfy the æsthetic judgment. However much art may draw upon the resources of the mind for its elements, it presents the finished work as having a quality and character which is true to the objective world. Whenever art degenerates to the level of merely expressing private emotion, then it ceases to be true art. The attributes of objectivity and universality must be present. The product must be typical and characteristic of experience, and of experience which is true to reality. Without the belief that somehow the quality of reality is comparable to the highest conceptions of art, there would be a feeling of unreality about all art which would vitiate the æsthetic satisfaction. The denial of the postulate of responsiveness in the ultimate would thus be detrimental to the creation and appreciation of art.

Religion, then, is not alone in being concerned about the character of reality. Morality and art also have interests in the issue. Yet it cannot be pretended that all stand together in this matter. What would be damaging to art and morality would be destructive of religion. Even science and philosophy are, of course, not altogether invulnerable at this point. The intellect makes its postulate that reality will prove to be a system and will meet

the demands of logical necessity. A wholly unresponsive reality would, therefore, rob science and philosophy of all possibility of reaching certainty at any point. There is, therefore, some advantage common to all parties in this quarter. And some kind of alliance is much to be wished for. Yet the interests are not identical, and while all can stand together lending each other support, they will not all necessarily fall together. Religion runs the biggest risk.

And yet this very risk is congenial to religion. The element of risk involved seems to have value and significance, and seems, moreover, to be essential to the nature of religion. This is true also, in a measure, of art and morality. The degree of uncertainty adds a zest to the game, and without it the game would not be worth playing. Art is a great peradventure. It is hazarded that what is so appealing to the soul is not wholly lacking in truth and reality. Although it matters desperately whether the mark be hit or missed, yet art must ever be drawing a bow at a venture. Chance enters into the business at every turn, and may ruin or win all. But more impressive than its place in art is the place which the element of risk occupies in morality. For it almost seems that without some risk morality would lose much of its value; indeed, would almost change its nature. If the consequences of a moral act were always foreknown, then the moral quality of decision would often be lost. Heroism would forfeit its character if immunity from danger were certain. Honesty would cease to be praiseworthy if it were merely the best policy. And if all morality were reducible to enlightened self-interest, then self-sacrifice would be impossible. The exact apportionment of reward to virtue and punishment to vice, whether in this world or the next, if it were certain, would rob morality of its venturesomeness and would destroy its value as a character-forming influence. It is the risk and uncertainty attaching to moral choice that gives moral value to decision. If truth-speaking, to revert to an

earlier illustration, were always either expedient or utilitarian or conventional, and nothing more, then the determination to speak truth would merely reflect belief in expediency or utility or convention. But belief in morality would lead to the speaking of truth even though there were considerable uncertainty as to the consequences when judged by expediency, utility or convention. Do right, though the heavens should fall, is a precept that contains truth, although it exaggerates the conviction that moral action is independent of its consequences. It cannot but be felt, however, that if the heavens are so opposed to morality that its performance is followed by their downfall, then the obligation to moral action is greatly weakened. But the precept in the modified form —Do right, though the whole earth rise up against you— does express the truth that risk and danger and uncertainty only add to the moral value of choice. Without the real risk of morality in such a world as this, the significance of morality for such a world would be spoilt. In a world of perfectly developed personalities the results of moral action might always be calculable. But in a world of evolving personalities there must always be uncertainty as to the effects of morality. To press ahead of the moral level of society is always dangerous. There is a persistent aptitude in human nature to stone the prophets; but it is the character of a prophet to risk the stoning.

The element of risk present in both art and morality is not a permanent necessity of their nature. Indeed, their progress depends upon the gradual elimination of risk. It is part of the purpose of art to discover means by which truth may assuredly be reached. The discovery of perspective by Uccello and tonic sol-fa by Bruno are comparable to the early uses of inductive logic by Roger Bacon. It is all a reaching out after certainty. Similarly, the aim of morality is the reduction of moral risks by the building up of a social order which shall be favourable to moral action. A world safe for morality is a true ideal. Even if there are no moral discoveries (a

questionable doctrine) moral safeguards and securities are to be sought and established. The abolition of slavery, the raising of the age of consent, the acceptance of obligation under the League of Nations and innumerable other legislative advances, not to mention the education of a strong public opinion on all moral issues, all tend to reduce the risks of moral action. In perfected art and morality all risks and uncertainties will have been transcended. Meanwhile, during the process of achievement, the risks involved add to the values attained. An eternally established value is not the same as an accomplished value. The whole would be poorer for lack of the values that have been won through danger and uncertainty.

This element of risk belongs, too, to the nature of religion. A strong factor in the appeal of religion is its splendid venturesomeness. By its initial postulate of faith it declares itself to be for ever committed to the cause of the ideal. It is pledged utterly, come what may, to a great adventure. It forsakes all to follow the gleam. For the end that is set before it, it endures the cross, despising the shame. It sells all the smaller pearls, precious though they are, in order to purchase the one pearl of great price, the responsiveness of reality. It stakes all that it has, even life itself, upon this great issue. And while it is necessary that there should be a sufficient probability in order to justify such complete abandonment, such a degree of probability having been reached, absolute allegiance becomes obligatory. To stand aside, then, is to make the great refusal. It is the treachery of one who in a beleaguered city will not take his share. He who is not with us is against us. The obligation of acceptance belongs to sufficient probability, but the character and value of allegiance depend upon the degree of uncertainty as much as upon the degree of probability. Without the uncertainty, the heroism of allegiance would be gone. Without the danger and chance of discovery, the adventure of exploration would

be mere travel of convenience. In the end religion is the finding of truth, but it is a quest. "O that I knew where I might find him," is a genuine cry of religion, as also the complaint: "Thou art a God that hidest thyself." And the finding is gradual. "Thou shalt see my back parts, but my face thou shalt not see." Religion is a divine hazard.

If the adventure of faith be the foundation of our religion, then we can raise no complaint that the evidence does not reach full proof. It is enough to justify faith, and faith prefers so much and no more. Where is the allurement of seeking if we know beforehand exactly what is to be found? Religion is not the carting of stones from place to place for the sake of the exercise. That is a safe and certain occupation. Religion is the scaling of the cliffs in the confidence that some precious stone is there to be found.

From this point onwards we must make extensive use of faith. Faith we have shown to be founded in fact; but its nature is to rise above the level of scientific facts. Faith is a key by which the nature of responsive reality is interpreted. It is not the function of faith to construct its object. That method reduces all to the flat of subjectivity once more. The function of faith is not to construct, but to construe. The object is given to faith, its character is discerned by faith. But faith is the only way in which the object can be understood. It is not the adoption of an arbitrary method. It is the use of the only method possible to us and suitable to the object. Faith as the response of our whole personality is the only means we have of knowing the nature of the responsiveness characteristic of reality as an organised whole. When we say that without faith there is no knowledge of God, and that the whole edifice of doctrine is built up by faith, that does not mean that the whole construction is fictitious. To ask in this connection for knowledge which is not of faith is to ask for the impossible. Only faith can have such knowledge. Faith is the condi-

tion of the knowledge of reality as God. It is the only adequate response of subject to object when the object is reality as a whole. And there can be no objection to faith as an organ of knowledge. What may be asked, however, is that the knowledge thus gained should, like all knowledge, be verifiable. The method of this verification has already been examined in a previous book. The evident result of faith in the integration and development of the personality that consistently exercises it is the most suitable proof of validity. That reality, as a whole, is responsive to personality can only be tested by the effect produced in personality when an attitude of response is adopted by it towards reality. If the consequence of such a relationship is the building up of personality into a harmonious whole, then the responsiveness of reality to the needs of personality may be legitimately inferred. "By their fruits ye shall know them," and the fruits of the spirit are the test of the effectual working of the spirit within the heart of man.

It is not necessary to prove that all the doctrines of religion have some counterpart in science and philosophy. But it is important that religious faith should not lose touch with reality. Science and philosophy are not committed to the postulate of responsiveness as religion is, nevertheless they, like religion, are seeking truth and reality. The reality of religion cannot, therefore, stand apart from the reality of science and philosophy. There are not two ultimate realities, but only one. The scientific method of investigation is different from the religious way of knowledge. But fundamentally the object is the same in both. The inductive method in logic differs from the deductive, but both are valid, and which is to be followed depends upon the nature of the investigation made. In like manner, the scientific and religious methods are not opposed, but supplementary. Both methods have their place, and at times the results discovered by one method may aid the understanding of results discovered by the other. For all truth is the truth

of God, and the full truth will not be known until all discoveries are properly correlated. No branch of inquiry can afford to neglect other branches. Religion is the better for fellowship with science and philosophy. The comparing of results, the re-interpretations of meanings, the re-arranging of the parts will often yield a fuller understanding of the truth. Religion needs to be continually re-examining its doctrine in the light of new knowledge gained in other fields. This attitude of mind does not, however, imply readiness to surrender positions as soon as difficulties are exposed; nor does it indicate a faltering belief in religious truth. Rather it shows the larger faith which is convinced that all light and truth come from the one divine source.

Religion stands specially close to philosophy on the one side and to psychology on the other. And the restatement of its doctrines in terms of both is often a most profitable labour. Here, however, another method of approach is suggested. A parallel between the various lines of investigation may be sought by another device. If there is discoverable a starting-point approved as true on all sides, and if from that base the direction of advance can also be sanctioned, then it will be possible, from each position reached, to trace a line back to the original starting-point, and thus ascertain whether or not the movement made has been a deviation from the proper course. By such a method we should be assured of the objectivity of religious experience. Reality as a system would be the approved base, responsiveness the sanctioned direction of advance. Thus, if responsiveness leads to personality, then personality may be regarded as objectively real. In like manner all the dogmas of religion would have to be related to the responsive reality at the back of all experience. Whatever could be shown to lie along that line of movement would have a claim to objective reality.

The problem of objectivity centres in the nature and influence of God. It will be a sufficient task now, there-

fore, if we limit ourselves to the one question, What do we mean by God? But before we proceed to illustrate in outline the method by which the nature of God may be shown to belong to the unshakable rock of reality, it will be necessary to examine the nature of the response by which we are able to cling to the rock. The accessibility of God is as vital to faith as the objectivity of God. The response is mutual between personality and reality. The competence of personality to respond to reality, and the character of reality as responsive to personality, are equally important to religion. We will first, then, examine the subject of religious response and its qualification for knowing reality, and afterwards the object of religious response and its qualification to be known.

PART II

THE RESPONSIVE SUBJECT OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS RESPONSE

THE object of religious experience cannot be thought of as either wholly external or wholly internal. When the inwardness of religion is unduly stressed then the danger of subjectivism is approached; and when the outwardness alone is considered then the insufficiency of formalism begins to appear. Either way religion is tainted by unreality. Reality is neither wholly within nor wholly without, but is both within and without. And what is within is conditioned by what is without, and what is without is conditioned by what is within. The object of religious experience is reality, and reality embraces both the mind within and the universe without. Reality is not only present in the object of experience, but is also present in the subject of experience. Religion is the perfect synthesis of subject and object. It is unfortunate that in this connection there should be a double meaning in the word "object"; but this seems, from the nature of the case, to be unavoidable. We may speak of the object as that which in any experience is set over against a subject; and this is the common use of the word. But when we speak of reality as an object of experience, or when we say that the object of religious experience is reality, then we mean more than what is set over against the subject, for the subject, too, is an essential part of that reality. The use of the word "object" is, however, justified in this connection, because what we intend to call attention to is the fact that such experience is a relationship between mind on the one part, and that which is set over against mind on the other part. The objectivity of experience depends upon that which is set over against mind being

given to the subject and not merely provided by the subject. The objective side of the relationship is not constructed by mind in the act of experience, but in that act is construed by mind. The problem of objectivity raises the question, not whether the subject is part of reality, but whether the object is part of reality. The answer to that question must insist that there is only one reality, and that if the object is a part of reality then it is a part of the same reality as that in which mind also has a place.

But we must distinguish further between the subject of religious experience and the inwardness of the object of religion. In religion we find ourselves and attain to the fulness of our self-hood. This finding of our inward soul, however, is not the end aimed at in religion; it is the consequence of some greater end being achieved. If finding our soul is a consequence of true religion, losing our soul is its condition. It is here much as it is with happiness and morality. Happiness follows upon the reaching of other ends, and these ends can only be reached when happiness has been forgotten. So it is in religion; if we make self-realisation the goal, we lose that larger reality in which alone self can find fulfilment. But if we seek the great reality which is beyond and above ourselves, then in finding that we also find ourselves. At last, "the beyond that is without" and "the beyond that is within" are brought into perfect unity, or, perhaps it is more fitting to say, into perfect harmony.[1] But the object as being within the self can only be discovered by pursuing the object as being outside the self. The quest merely for the God within the soul leads neither to the soul nor to God. That way, by ever narrowing circles, experience is reduced at last to vanishing point.[2] The object within the soul is found

[1] Tudor Jones, "Nature, Thought and Personal Experience," chap. xii.

[2] *Cf.* Leuba, "The Psychology of Religious Mysticism," and the criticism in "Modern Psychology and the Validity of Christian Experience," Part I., chap. iv.

in a proper response between the soul and the reality of which it is a part. And in that right relationship between the self and reality, the reality of the self is experienced. But, since the self as real is dependent upon a reality that is greater than the self, it is this greater reality that must be the prior and predominant interest in all true religion. We are to think, then, not of the object which is within, but of the subject which responds to an object which is first without and which afterwards is found to embrace also that which is within as a dependent part in a greater whole.

It is by adopting an attitude of religious response to reality conceived as God that the self develops into the fulness of harmonious, integrated personality. The advance to such an ideal is evidence of the validity of the prior and conditioning experience. But here we are concerned, not so much with the self, as with the nature of the response which befits the reality responded to, and which, therefore, perfects the personality which is an integral part of that same sole reality. This response, by which the soul meets the object of religion, is best described by the religious term faith. When the responsiveness of reality is recognised as a postulate of faith, two inferences can be drawn. First, this postulate is not an intellectual certainty in the sense that it can be proved beyond question by the methods employed in science. But, secondly, the basis upon which this postulate rests is wider than mere intellect, since faith is an affirmation of personality as a whole. And, in the nature of the case, its warranty is all the more adequate just because it is not merely an intellectual postulate. The region entered upon is one wherein whole meets whole, and only a postulate of the self as a whole would be appropriate. When faith is used in a scientific sense it finds its place in the venture of an unverified hypothesis; but in a religious sense it implies an attitude of the whole mind to the whole reality. In adopting this attitude there is, of course, still an element of venture, and

still, as in scientific procedure, a need for verification. In science, however, the presence of faith indicates that a hypothesis is unproved; but with the proving or disproving of that hypothesis, faith is superseded. In religion, on the other hand, faith is not temporary but essential. It represents the proper and permanent attitude of mind towards the object; and verification does not mean that faith is superseded, but that it is confirmed.[1] In the one case, faith implies uncertainty, suspense, refusal of full assent; in the other case, it implies response, surrender, assurance. The difference in the use of the term faith arises from the difference in the two spheres of inquiry. While science is predominantly intellectual and mainly analytical, religion is entirely personal and synthetical. For the one, faith is a temporary and unsatisfactory attitude of mind; for the other, faith is the only appropriate attitude to reality, and the only possible response of personality as a whole.

Religious faith coincides with scientific faith on its intellectual side. All faith is belief. In science faith is merely belief and therefore only a tentative and provisional substitute for knowledge. The aim of science is always to eliminate belief by establishing knowledge. But in religion faith is not only belief, but also comprises much more besides mere belief. Thus, the advance from belief to knowledge would affect but not destroy a religious faith. Belief in the object of religious experience is coupled with trust in that object and obedience to that object. Faith as an attitude of personality includes aspects corresponding to the aspects of personality. Belief expresses the intellectual side of mind, trust the emotional, and obedience the volitional. It is possible to believe in reality without believing that it is responsive, and such belief might satisfy science and philosophy. But in such an object neither emotion nor volition could find satisfaction. Religious faith, since it includes the

[1] *Cf.* Balfour, "Humanism and Theism," lecture on "Probability, Calculable and Intuitive."

whole of mind, must posit an object which can receive our trust and evoke our obedience. We trust an object which responds to our essential needs. We obey an object which demands our response to its inherent nature. The postulate of the responsiveness of reality is, therefore, more than an intellectual requirement; it is a necessity for religious faith. And religious faith, being an attitude of personality as a whole, is the only appropriate attitude to adopt to reality as a whole.

The relationship between personality and reality described by the term faith is analogous to that relationship between the subject and object of knowledge which in psychology is called "attention." In an attitude of attention there is present in a marked degree, not only the intellect, but also the will and the emotion. In some experiences of attention the interest may be so great that the awareness of effort is absent. It would be an error, however, to call this state of mind "involuntary attention," if by that it were implied that will was not present. Interest has an element of volition, although this may be made subservient to emotion. It is equally misleading to call attention "voluntary" when the interest is slight, if by so doing we suggest that it would be possible to have another kind of attention without any volition. The proportions of volition and emotion in an act of attention vary; but both are invariably present in some degree. Whatever the admixture of will and feeling, however, the intellect is always dominant in attention. Attention is a distinctly cognitive attitude of mind. The intellectual side of attention is especially noticeable when the object falls within the field of science. The more abstract and remote from personality the object is, the more predominantly intellectual the act of attention must be. But when we pass to fields where personality counts for more, the more evenly balanced will be the response of mind. History, for instance, may be read much as fiction is read, for its deep personal interest. And with the increase of emotion,

volition will decrease; and if the purpose behind the reading of history be present enjoyment only and not the acquisition and retention of knowledge, then the degree of cognition may decrease also. But it is always a matter of gradual transition. Passing into the region of art for a further illustration, emotion may predominate the state of mind; but in that case the state of mind would not be one of attention. Both æsthetic and moral attitudes need to make use of attention to realise their ends. But whatever the purpose for which attention is employed—whether intellectual, æsthetic or moral—attention itself is predominantly cognitive. It is possible, however, after making a study of some piece of music, for instance, to sit and listen to it in a state of mind that is an even balance; without undue effort, although some effort may be necessary; without undue intellectual scrutiny, although the intellect will be far from dormant; and without excess of emotion, although emotion will be strongly felt. Such a state of mind would only be possible after much attention had first been given to the piece, but would itself be a more evenly balanced response than attention proper could be. Now, if we imagine this evenly balanced attitude as directed upon reality as a whole, we shall have reached a perfectly religious state of mind. Such an attitude is faith. And just as there can be no knowledge of a partial object, whatever its nature, without attention, so there can be no understanding of the whole of reality without faith. Without attention we should learn nothing of the universe, and without faith we should understand nothing of God.

The mean whereby we receive is faith.[1] Without faith we cannot receive grace any more than without attention we can learn the lesson that is being taught. The teacher may give the lesson. With every aid of blackboard, picture and action; with illustration and repetition; with all possible simplicity and lucidity of language the lesson

[1] Articles of Religion, xxviii.

may be given: but if we pay no attention at all, we receive nothing at all; and, so far as we are concerned, it would have been all one if the lesson had not been given. And so it is with the divine grace, which, whether through the sacraments or through other channels, is the action of the religious object upon our souls. If we have no responsive faith there is nothing we can receive. This demand for faith is not an arbitrary condition, any more than is the need for attention. Both arise out of the nature of the case. Just as the knowledge of objects is only possible when attention is present, so the grace which is bestowed by the responsive object of religion is only actual for faith. The grace is present, whether faith receives it or not; just as the object of knowledge exists whether discovered by attention or not. Faith no more creates grace than attention creates the object of knowledge. Both are means of receiving what is there independently of either. Grace no more depends upon faith than the universe depends upon attention. But without attention the one cannot be apprehended, and without faith the other cannot be appropriated.

"According to thy faith be it done unto thee." Faith has its scale of measurement, which begins at the lowest and most momentary response of the soul and reaches right up to the full and permanent response of developed personality. Hitherto we have spoken of faith as the perfect and constant response of the soul to God. This, however, is a state to which we must attain, and not a state that we at present experience. The term "faith" must be used to describe all the attitudes of mind which, having as their object that responsive system of reality which we call God, approximate, in however slight a degree, to the ideal state of faith. Indeed, provided the object of experience be conceived as God, however inadequate or distorted the response made thereto, that response is in the nature of faith. But when we consider our own imperfect state of response to God we may well cry: "Lord, increase our faith." And when we re-

member the necessity for some faith, however poor the quality or small the amount, we may well understand our Lord's concern expressed in the utterance: "When the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?" What is so uncertain to the mind of Christ was, not the gift of God's grace in response to essential human need, but the condition of receptivity on the side of man.

In the ideal attitude of faith a full personality is harmoniously balanced. In the absence of such perfect personality, faith must of necessity remain imperfect; but the response of faith, however imperfect it may be, is always met by the gift of grace; and because of that gift there results a further development of personality towards unity and wholeness. "By faith ye are saved through grace." The doctrine of justification by faith has thus a psychological foundation, and on that psychological foundation it is seen to be the complement of the doctrine of saving grace. The response of faith to the object of religious experience allows the object to influence the subject. By standing in relationship with a perfect whole, the self becomes more and more conformed to the nature of the object. However far removed from the ideal condition of faith the response may be, the direction of the response upon reality conceived as God allows the influence which is called grace to pass from the object to the subject, and the effect of grace is the upbuilding of personality and therewith the perfecting of faith.

In that perfect act of faith wherewith a fully developed personality would respond to reality as a whole, there would be found a harmonious and duly proportioned balance of parts. But when we speak of intellect, emotion and volition as blended into a unity which is expressive of personality as a whole, the proportion in which the parts are found is not a mathematical adjustment. What is meant is that the blending is such as to make the response expressive of the whole of personality and not merely one side of it. The measurement of

mental conditions is, perhaps, impossible. Certainly it is not a numerical equality of parts that is here meant when a perfect balance is spoken of. What is intended is that kind of attitude in which the full nature of personality is expressed. Neither the cognitive, emotional or volitional attitudes express adequately the whole mind. But an attitude of mind is conceivable in which personality as a whole responds to an object the nature of which is capable of evoking and receiving such a response.

It is generally taught and unquestioningly accepted that religion is an experience possible for all. The poor, the simple, the ignorant may have a religious experience which it at once deep and true. "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes." It is not our wisdom (or, in other words, intellectual attainment) that gives the index of our personal development. Indeed, an unbalanced intellectualism is likely to spoil the response of a full personality. The organisation of the mind about an intellectual end is, of course, as legitimate as its organisation about an emotional end; and both are often necessary states of mind. But a continuous intellectualism towards all objects produces as warped a character as an unregulated emotionalism or a hyperconscientiousness. Just as Darwin lost his appreciation of music through neglect of æsthetic culture, so the attainment of a persistently intellectual attitude of mind to all objects must lead to the atrophy of other sides of character. This would be true whether the disproportionate development ran along the lines of intellect, emotion or will. The neglected sides of character would be starved. It is conceivable, therefore, that a permanently intellectual attitude of mind might make almost impossible that balanced response of the whole personality which is necessary for religious faith. The approach made by such a mind to the object of religion

might very well preclude it from any understanding of the object as it is in itself. But the approach of some simple mind, in virtue of its balanced response, might lead to an understanding of the object impossible to the merely intellectual mind. The wise, from whom these things are hid, are those who, owing to their fixed state of unbalanced intellectualism, are unable to make that full response of personality which is the only response appropriate to reality conceived as responsive, as Father, Lord of heaven and earth. But the prudent are equally debarred from the privilege. Their exaggerated moralism and formalism have stifled alike their love and their reason. By approaching reality with their harsh and narrow moral exactments they, equally with the intellectualists, have the divine truth hid from their eyes. When we place these two types of mind in the one class we discover that the defect common to them both is lack of sufficient love in their response. It is evident, therefore, that love is the essential without which there is no understanding of God. And this must be so since the nature of the response required in religion is itself essentially personal. Love is the characteristic of personal response and is, therefore, requisite in the relationship between personality as a whole and that object of religious experience which is not less or other than perfect personality. For the merely intellectual mind, a reality that met intellectual claims would suffice —for the merely ethical mind, a reality that reacted automatically to right and wrong might seem adequate —but for full personality, only an object that can enter into personal fellowship and communion will satisfy. Such fellowship and communion are the consummation of love. To the mind that loves there can be revealed that which by its very nature is hid from the wise and prudent who have not love.

Both intellectualism and moralism, then, are dangerous to the full response of true faith, because both may be divorced from love. But, at the same time, it must be

recognised that love cannot be separated from either knowledge or duty. Love carries with it the desire to understand and the wish to obey. Where love is, however, both understanding and obedience have a personal quality. The characteristic of the babes to whom divine truth can be revealed is not ignorance or disobedience, but trustfulness and dependence. And our response to reality must likewise be characterised by childlike trustfulness and dependence. These features in the religion of the poor and simple entitle them to a large measure of understanding. Yet, with all allowance made for the genuineness of religion amongst the unlearned, it must be admitted that such religion would be so defective as to become almost false where it is not accompanied by a moral rectitude of life, and by a search for the knowledge of God. Not infrequently, however, as a result of religious experience, the fruits of moral integrity are apparent in the conduct of life; while the longing for the knowledge of God is evident in the satisfaction derived from Bible study. The error to be guarded against is the supposition that religion needs neither intellect nor will and might flourish better without both. It is the nature of babes to grow into maturity. The fault of the wise and prudent was not maturity, but a perversion in their growth which has resulted in their losing in age what they possessed in infancy—the response of trust and dependence, the love that learns and obeys. "Except ye become as little children ye cannot enter the kingdom of heaven." It is not, however, ignorance and undisciplined behaviour which are the genuine characteristics of childhood. They are the accidents which are to be eliminated, the immaturities which are to be outgrown. The characteristics of childhood are trust, obedience and love.

We must not deny the quality of religious faith to the experience which is deficient on the side of knowledge, provided there is a real desire to gain fuller knowledge. But the knowledge sought by religion is not, of course,

the kind of knowledge sought by science. And yet there is a point of contact. All knowledge is one. Religion seeks knowledge of the character of reality as a system or whole, and such knowledge is independent of much of that detailed understanding of parts and relationships which is the province of science. But true religion ought to welcome all knowledge that brings fuller understanding of its object. Hence, it should encourage science, since the end of science is the discovery of those parts and relationships which belong to the system. And just as we do not deny the quality of religion to the experience which is defective in knowledge, neither should we deny the quality of religion to that experience which, while stressing the intellectual side, is deficient in the balance of parts. The deflection from the ideal in the one case may not be greater than in the other, and in both types of response the essential element of love may be present. There is, no doubt, an arrogant, proud and insolent type of intellectualism, and for this there can be no place whatever in a religious response. But the tone of not a little scientific research to-day is very different from this. The modern scientist in approaching the object of investigation often manifests a reverence and awe which are religious in character. Whenever the scientist stands back, so to say, and views the object as part of the great reality, then his object lies within the object of religious experience and his attitude thereto is of the nature of a religious response.

The association of awe with the irrational element in religion is an unfortunate error.[1] The use of such terms as irrational and non-rational suggests an element which is contrary to reason, or, at the least, is independent of reason. But the cultivation in religion of the non-rational can only result in the disruption of personality. The function of religion is not to give satisfaction to those parts of mind which science and reason neglect. Its purpose is to supplement reason and to fill out the merely

[1] *Cf.* Otto, "The Idea of the Holy."

rational into the fully personal. Religion, in being more than rational, is not adding to reason that which is non-rational. Rather, reason itself is but one activity of personality in its fulness. The peculiar tone of awe which characterises religion does not attach to a non-rational element in the religious response, but issues from the religious object. Professor Otto in his book on "The Idea of the Holy" seems to be mistaken in thinking that the essence of religion is a non-rational element in the response. He seems also to be guilty of a false psychology when he limits awe to a non-rational state of mind. The feeling of awe arises whenever the subject consciously stands in relation with the ultimate. The experience does not belong exclusively to religion, but may be felt when any object is responded to as something which belongs to the ultimately real. The scientist may approach with awe an object that he regards as having upon it the touch of the great reality beyond. In the presence of some work of art, or while listening to music, or when considering the majesty of the moral law, in so far as contact with basal reality is felt, the experience will be tinged with awe. When religious experience loses, as it may, the quality of awesomeness, then it has lost hold upon reality. But when that happens it is because the conception of God has been lowered and the hold upon reality loosened. The genuinely religious experience which has as its object the character of reality, the responsiveness of the ultimate, the nature of God, cannot but be tinged with awe. There may be more true religion in the art or science that approaches the real with reverence than in the religion, so-called, that is devoid of reverence.

A religious attitude qualified by awe may be adopted to lesser objects than reality as a whole. But this is only possible in so far as those more proximate objects are regarded, consciously or unconsciously, as symbols of the nature of the ultimate. This is true alike in science, art and religion. The reverence felt and expressed for

the Lord's Table in a church, to take one instance, is evoked because that Holy Table is recognised as a token of something fundamental for life. The only object which is adequate to sustain awe is reality as a whole. Although a religious attitude is possible towards nearer objects, it can only be continued so long as the reality of such objects is believed to inhere in a great system of reality whose nature qualifies such nearer objects to stand as symbols of itself.

Awe is not the only accompaniment of the religious experience, nor is it the unique feature of a definitely religious state of mind. The distinctly religious quality in the response of personality to reality is to be found rather in a consciousness of imperfection. Religion terms this feeling a conviction of sin. The consequence of standing as an imperfect, ill-adapted, improperly fitted part in the presence of a full and perfect whole is an awareness of the contrast between the self with its poor and ill-balanced response, and the reality beyond which makes response to the self in so far as the self can bear it. What Professor Otto calls the "creature-feeling" is, in genuine religion, more than a sense of the dependence of a creature upon the creator. It is a consciousness of imperfection, incompleteness and maladjustment in the presence of perfection and completeness, adjustment to which is the condition of existence. The normal accompaniment of this sense of sin is the assurance of forgiveness. The foreign, hostile element in self which removes the self from the reality of religion is less potent than the magnetism of that reality which attracts the self, purges it of the poison of unreality and builds it up into the likeness of its own perfection. The response of religious faith is a response of the forgiven to the forgiver. Especially in the Christian Gospel is this experience of forgiveness made fundamental in the attitude of the soul to God. The experience of forgiveness awakens in its turn a new and deeper sense of love. And this, again, in its turn is strengthened by the sancti-

fying grace which follows upon forgiveness. Awe may be felt towards an object which, though regarded as reality, is not necessarily regarded as responsive reality. The experience of forgiveness, essential to true religion, is only possible when the object is regarded as both real and responsive. "Only God can forgive sins." Forgiveness of sins can only come from the ultimately real. That type of responsiveness is possible only to reality as a whole. The assurance of being forgiven can only come when the response made by the self is directed upon the real.[1]

Other features distinctive of the religious response are prayer and worship. Prayer has special regard to the responsiveness of the object of religion, worship to its reality. We should not continue perpetually to worship an object which was discovered to be unworthy of our worship. And we should not long persist in offering prayers to an object that could neither hear nor answer. Both worship and prayer are peculiar to religion, and both indicate that the object of religious faith is more than the object of scientific or philosophic study. But in being more than, it is not other than, this object. Beginning with reality, religious faith posits the attribute of responsiveness. Given responsiveness, religious experience proceeds to give fuller definition of the nature of this responsiveness. With the affirmation of responsiveness in reality we reach the threshold of religion, and at that step genuine religion begins. Beyond the threshold are chambers and corridors in great number, and within, at the very centre, is the hearth where the most intimate fellowship is enjoyed. If religion begins with mere responsiveness, it is not content with the bare affirmation of response. Indeed, the very conception of response leads on to further definition. Response to what?—is the inevitable question. And the nature of the response is dependent upon the nature of the terms at either end of the experience.

[1] Mackintosh, "The Christian Experience of Forgiveness."

The attributes of God must be manifold: perhaps, as Spinoza thought, infinite. There is here, however, no necessity to study in detail or even to enumerate those few attributes known to us at present and included under the head of the doctrine of God. The question to be faced is whether it is possible to have sufficient guarantee that what is experienced as an attribute of God (for instance, his character as forgiving sins) does truly belong to the object of religious experience, and is not merely projected upon it falsely by the subject. We have defined the object of religion as the character of reality conceived as a systematic whole; and we have seen that religious faith, with considerable evidence in its support, postulates that this character must be such as to respond to the essential needs of developing personality. To deny this postulate of responsiveness as belonging to the character of the system of reality would seem to involve the denial that reality is a systematic whole. And if reality is not a system, then science has no sure foundation, since any of its smaller systems may fail for want of correlation with other partial systems in one comprehensive system. And if such a comprehensive system has no place in reality, the quest of all philosophy must be an illusion. This, of course, may be so. But both science and philosophy by their methods of procedure assume, whether implicitly or explicitly, that reality is such a system, and that the principle of unity in that system can eventually be discovered. On this ground, religion stands side by side with science and philosophy, and differs from its confederates only in affirming that already we can know, in part at least, what is the nature of this system. And one of the things that we can know about its nature is its responsiveness to personality. And since personality is an integral element in the system of reality, the inference of such response seems to follow of necessity from the initial affirmation that reality is a system. Personality is the highest order of system known to the human mind, and a system of reality which did not

include personality as an essential factor would only be a partial system after all and could not represent the nature of the ultimately real. Personality, therefore, is a factor which must be reckoned with in any final synthesis. And the type of personality which will best fit into a comprehensive scheme of reality will obviously be a developed, integrated and unified personality.

The chain of inference develops thus: Reality is a system; as a system it has a character; its character must be such as to respond to what is an essential factor in itself as a system; personality while disorganised within itself cannot be properly organised into the larger whole; the effect of the whole upon personality, therefore, must be the growth and integration of personality and its adaptation to the system of the whole. If reality is in any sense a system, scheme, organic unity or principle of wholeness, then it must deal with imperfect and recalcitrant elements within its being and bring them into conformity with its own inherent nature. Reality as a system must respond to personality as a factor in its system, and the nature of the response will depend as much upon the character of the whole system as upon the needs of personality as a factor in that system. Either reality is not a system at all, or else it not only responds to personality, but makes a saving, sanctifying response. A system in which developing personality forms a factor would of necessity be of such a nature that it would aid the development of personality, because only by such development could personality be properly adapted as an organ in a perfect whole. The relationship between reality as a system and immature personality as an element in that system must of necessity be one of saviourhood.

It must be recognised, however, that in order to reach this conclusion we have found it necessary to go beyond the premises allowed by science or philosophy. The validity of the conclusion must depend, therefore, upon the justification for such an extension of the initial

premises. The new premise which has been added is the necessity of human personality to the system of reality. But the fact of personality lies outside the scope of science. Even psychology, as General Smuts points out, has never treated personality as the one important subject for investigation. Science seeks to discover a system in which personality is not a factor. Personality is too indefinite and incalculable to be allowed to disturb the equilibrium of the ideal system of science. But this, as we have said, is a study of the picture on the screen to the neglect of the lantern. The mind that knows must be one of the terms in the whole which includes all that is known. But when we speak of mind we must mean personality as a unity, otherwise we are speaking of an abstraction only. Personality must make one in the great company of reals. But in saying this we are, of course, assuming that personality is real and has a place in ultimate reality. We are, that is to say, affirming in advance that the system of reality must be such as to include personality. And here it is that we must reluctantly part company with philosophy. Whether personality is a factor in ultimate reality must remain uncertain to philosophy until the nature of ultimate reality has first been discovered. Then, but then only, may the question be asked whether personality is included or not. Religion, however, begins by affirming that personality is an element in reality, and that the more perfect it is the greater its reality. For religion, personality is not only integral to reality but is the sole organ for the understanding and interpretation of reality. Religion posits that the nature of reality is such that it fosters the growth of personality to maturity. Science may ignore personality, philosophy may question its reality, but religion claims that the reality in which personality is a factor is a truer conception than the reality which excludes personality. And if personality is a factor in reality, then the whole system of reality must be characterised by that fact. Reality must be in

relationship with personality, and its nature must be such that it can adapt personality to itself. Reality must either spurn personality, or else must so mould it as to adjust it perfectly to its own character. Personality as we know it will not fit into a larger scheme. It is itself too disorganised and ill-associated. If personality is essential to reality, then reality must deal with it and fit it for its place in the great whole. In a word, reality must play the part of the redeemer.

CHAPTER II

RESPONSE AS EXPERIENCED IN COMMUNION

RELIGION, by insisting that personality must be included in the system of reality, passes, as we have seen, outside the fields of science and philosophy. But with the postulate of a mutual responsiveness between personality and reality, religious faith and science, by a willingness on both sides to stretch the arm, are still able to touch hands. The logical postulate of non-contradiction must be extended to include the inherent claims of personality as a whole, instead of merely expressing the claims of intellect; and the response of reality to those wider claims must be assumed. But this requires merely an enlarged foothold and not a change of position. And, moreover, the advance made when the minimum requirement of religion for responsiveness is shown to involve personal response is a move in the same direction as that entered upon by science. If, for the time being, this move places religion beyond reach of science and philosophy, they can still hail and salute each other as fellow-explorers. Henceforth, the paths followed by science and religion are not identical, and may at times deviate from the main line. But the general direction remains the same, since the goal of both is one. And as by different paths they ascend the mount of truth, they can signal to one another. At last all paths will meet at the summit. And those who reach there first may from that point of vantage be able to direct the others on the final stages of their long climb. And although religion should expect that the honour of guiding others to the top of the mount would be hers, she must not refuse to receive on the way some directions from explorers by other routes.

The postulate of responsiveness in the ultimate

includes personality as a term on the subjective side of the relationship. And from that it is inferred that personality is a term on the objective side as well. The personality assumed in the object must, of course, be conditioned by the nature of the object. Reality, as has been said, if it is personal at all, cannot be other than perfect personality. But if it is not personal, then the response of reality to human personality must be insufficient to meet the claims made from the human end. A reality that is non-personal can no more satisfy the expanded postulate than a non-rational reality can satisfy the logical postulate. It may be objected, of course, that the probability of the expanded postulate being satisfied is too small to justify its expansion. So to argue, however, is to assume that personality is not part of the scheme of reality. But that is the point at issue. The justification that religion needs for going beyond the point reached by science and philosophy is to be found in the warranty for the inclusion of personality in the system of ultimate reality.

The objection against the inclusion of personality in a scientific system would appear to issue from the nature of personality. Personality, it would seem, is far too incalculable to be entitled to a place in any system. If so eccentric an element as personality were admitted, then havoc would be wrought throughout the whole system. Such an objection, however, only exposes the inadequacy of the conception of system. No doubt the system which included personality would be very different from one which excluded it. But the question is whether reality as a whole is not much more like the kind of system which includes personality than the very different kind which excludes it. The abstract, impersonal system expels so much from itself that when it is identified with reality, what lies outside the system seems to be the most important part. Such a system, by excluding personality, excludes also most of what personality values. It is as if great pains were taken to extract all the water from the

milk in order that the remaining cream might be thrown away. When, however, the purpose is to gain an understanding of reality, then a system which is as baffling and changeable as the inclusion of personality can make it, will have to be preferred to the clear cut system which has mathematical precision and certainty, if it be found that reality is more like the former system than the latter.

If reality be defined in terms of a system which is closed to personality, then obviously personality must be declared to be unreal. But such a definition is arbitrary in the extreme, and the deductions drawn from it are unsatisfactory. Inevitably, with the exclusion of personality, there must also be excluded much else which seems to be essential to the ordinary experience of reality. This means, of course, that in general experience we measure reality by a wider gauge than mere intellect. And the question must be asked whether the fuller experience is not the better qualified to know reality? The assumption that those features in experience which are tractable to intellectual shaping are the only real elements is a dubious assumption. It involves cutting the world in two with a hatchet and declaring the one half real and the other half unreal. And when it is found that most of the things which are greatly valued fall on the side of unreality, the division seems not only unfair but also untrue. The final objection to such a procedure, however, is that in attempting to solve one problem it raises a greater problem. The problem of unreality is far more formidable than the problem of reality. Any theory of reality which limits its scope to what is apprehended intellectually leaves a residue which, since it is not real, must be unreal. And yet this residue not only enters into experience, but often forms the most valuable and characteristic element in experience. And, moreover, this residue cannot be denied existence altogether, notwithstanding its lack of reality. But what can be meant by the existence of unreality, or unreal existence?

The distinction formerly drawn by Locke between primary and secondary qualities may be referred to in illustration of the procedure here criticised. Such qualities as size, shape, weight, position, and so forth, are mathematically ascertainable whether the object presented to the mind be a star or a stone. With these qualities known, inter-relations between different objects can be inferred and a mathematical system of actions and reactions reduced to the nature of a formula. For many purposes such knowledge is sure and sufficient. Astronomy has need of no other categories in order to reduce the universe to the obedience of law. But such primary qualities do not exhaust the nature of the world experienced by mind. How much, for instance, do colour and scent mean to the rose? And, again, is sound insignificant? Yet these qualities, the very features which give the character and value to the world we know, were called secondary qualities and denied any place in the real world. The reality of philosophy might be characterised by primary qualities only, but the reality of experience was coloured, scented, musical—and such that the hands could handle. A further analysis made by Kant, placed time and space also somehow upon the hither side of things and left reality yonder bereft of time through which to pass or place whereon to stand.

This process of transferring attributes from the thither to the hither side of experience has, of course, from one point of view, been most salutary. It has meant that, in bringing the attributes across the gulf between object and subject, their reality has been brought with them. For, unless this carrying of reality across from object to subject be recognised, a cleavage must be admitted to exist between science and philosophy on the one part and experience on the other. In that case, science and philosophy might continue to study the frame hanging unmoved upon the wall over there, but experience would claim that what it held in its hands over here was the picture. And it is the picture that matters after all. The

measurements of science may discover the dimensions and construction of the frame; the speculations of philosophy may fashion a picture suitable to fit the frame; but all the while the picture that has been torn out of the frame is held firmly by experience. This vandalism, however, is a misfortune to experience no less than to science and philosophy; for the picture can only be properly seen and appreciated when hanging in its frame. Its removal is a mistake all round.

Similarly, the cleavage made between reality and unreality only leaves an unsystematical reality on the one side and an unreal system on the other. The greater the number of qualities thrown on to the personal side of experience, the more real does that side become, until at last it must appear that the problem is no longer how to find a place for personality in reality, but, rather, how to find a place in reality for that which is not personal. In the system of intellect the minds that know stand back from the system and remain external to it. But in the system of reality the minds that know are the main factors. Reality is not the system of their knowledge, but the system of them. When we speak of reality as a system, it is a system of minds that we must mean. And by mind we mean not merely intellect, but personality as a unity or whole. Reality is not a system corresponding to the systems of knowledge, with the knowing mind outside as a spectator. That is an abstract system, and greater reality attaches to the side of the minds that know than to the system of their knowledge. Reality includes all their knowledge by synthesising both them and that which they know. Reality is a system of personalities or a community of souls. The problem, therefore, as noticed above, is not how to include personality in reality, but how to account for that large element of reality which is non-personal. That can only be included when it can be shown to be necessary to, or dependent upon, personality.

We have now made a very considerable advance

beyond the reality accepted by science and philosophy. We have also passed far beyond the responsive reality which they seemed to be under obligation to tolerate because the probabilities were sufficiently favourable and the consequences of such a far-reaching and significant nature. What those consequences are we are now demonstrating, and in doing so we must insist again that in the nature of the case the probabilities are sufficient to make acceptance obligatory. Two assumptions are made. It is assumed that human personality is real and that reality is personal. Ultimately these two assumptions are one: if reality is personal, then it may be inferred that in so far as we develop personality we acquire reality. In the order of thought, however, the assumptions are made separately. The probability justifying the assumption rests upon these issues: That a reality which excludes the mind that knows is less likely to be true than one which includes the mind as an integral part of itself; that the mind which knows best the kind of reality that includes mind as a part of itself is not a merely cognitive mind but a fully personal mind; that the full personal mind, because it is a part of reality, will be met by reality as a whole not merely in those claims which belong to its intellectual side, but much more in those claims which express its essential nature as personal; that this response to the claims of personality must be a response which is personal in nature; and, finally, that that which includes personality as an integral part of itself cannot itself be less than personal. Here, then, are the probabilities. And the argument is this: That the consequences of accepting the conclusion are of such a nature that on the probabilities its rejection is unwarranted and its acceptance obligatory.[1]

It is, of course, possible to question the reality of personality. A behaviourist psychology may contend that there is no evidence of the existence of a self. The be-

[1] The consequences depending upon the acceptance of Theism have been examined by Lord Balfour, "Humanism and Theism."

haviour of human beings can, of course, be observed just as the behaviour of any other animal organism can be observed. But the behaviourist insists that in the case of human beings, as in the case of animals, the assumption of a "self" that behaves is gratuitous, if not, indeed, unwarranted. Biology also seeks to explain behaviour, but again excludes any reference to a self. The causes of action can be traced back to physiological reactions and gland secretions. In thus limiting their scope to the study of behaviour both psychology and biology are, of course, justified, provided they allow another study to take up the subject without the imposition of such arbitrary limits. Psychology is justified in attempting to explain human experience without reference to personality, but psychology has no sufficient evidence on which to deny the existence of personality. If psychology elects so to define its study as to exclude personality, then it must allow another branch of study to arise (the "personology" advocated by General Smuts, for instance) which will investigate that field. In like manner biology may trace the chain of causation in physiological changes within the organism apart from any reference to a controlling self; but such an investigation does not entitle biology to deny the existence of the self as a centre of experience. The analysis of the psychological and physiological structure of experience cannot prove that the experience is incapable of having an experient. Psychology and biology may legitimately examine the experience, each from its own angle, and each without reference to a subject of experience. But whether or not experience is possible without an experiencing subject is a question which neither psychology nor biology has any authority to answer. The assumption that experience can exist independently of an experient leads inevitably to the philosophy of Hume and to a sort of psychological atomism. But the final answer to that type of philosophy was provided by Kant when he taught that the unity which distinguishes an experience from a mere succession

of disconnected sensation is the unity of the subject. Science is within its rights when it limits its analysis to the experience and leaves aside the subject of experience. But philosophy must ask whether experience does not include within its full scope not only the object which acts as stimulant, but also an enduring subject which responds.

Religion, unlike psychology and biology, is committed to the existence of a constant subject of experience, and that subject is regarded as a unity, as a developing whole, as a growing personality. Philosophy might accept the necessary existence of an experient mind without allowing the reality of personality existent in such a mind. Religion, however, passes beyond both science and philosophy in positing the reality of personality. Religion at its minimum is satisfied with the mutual responsiveness between mind as a whole and reality as a whole. And in so far as science and philosophy reach this level and adopt this attitude of subject to object, they have so far become religious and experienced religion. And let none deny the truth or genuineness of such religion; and let no bigoted zeal excommunicate those who, being not against us, are for us. But while we make all possible concessions in order to include all who may be included within the borders of religion, we must not pretend that what constitutes religion at its minimum is characteristic of religion in its fulness. Having passed over the boundary we are in the territory of religion and our journey to the central shrine is but the continuance in the way already travelled. The journey, however, need not be short or easy. The advance from mere responsiveness to personal responsiveness may be difficult, but there is no other road by which we can reach our destination. The ascent may be made by easy stages, as already indicated, but personality must be accepted if religion is to be more than the borderland of unexplored mystery. The way that leads to the centre of religion lies beyond the highways of science and philosophy, but it is not a reversal of their

direction. At last it must appear that all true roads lead into the one true and living Way.

We must now consider the type of responsiveness which is characteristic of religion, and ask what is involved when such responsiveness is made essential to reality. There is an experience of religion in which the responsiveness is merely present without being at all clearly conceived. One form of mysticism is a relinquishing of the self into the ultimate. It must be assumed in such passive surrender that reality receives the self, but it is believed that the condition of the self being received is its abrogation of self-hood. By ceasing to affirm individuality the soul becomes absorbed in universality. Here we have an instance of the mutual responsiveness between the self and reality which we have discovered to be essential to religion. Such mysticism can claim, therefore, to be a genuinely religious experience. It differs from normal religious experience, however, in this important detail—whereas for typical religion the responsiveness between reality and personality is believed to develop personality so that the more perfect the personality the fuller its hold upon reality; this kind of mysticism assumes that reality is only reached when personality is surrendered. In the one case the end of religion is to build up a complete, harmonious personality; in the other case the end is to find reality at the cost of personality. If it be true that reality can only be had at this price, then those who are willing to pay the price will gladly do so. Most people, however, would seriously question the worth of a reality that destroyed human personality, and would probably conclude that it was wiser to fight for personality against reality, even though it were foredoomed to be a losing fight. Behind such resistance, however, there would be implicit a contradictory belief that, despite all seeming to the contrary, personality was more real than a reality which repudiated personality. And once more we should be back again at the dual meaning of reality—what reality means for general experience, and what it is made

to mean in some abstract theory. A reality that can find no use or place for such a product and part of itself as personality is not a reality acceptable to experience however self-consistent it may prove when tested by the intellect. That unreality should be preferable to reality is an intolerable conclusion, and such a deduction must discredit any theory of the nature of the real.

The mystic experience, as distinct from the mystic doctrine, is not restricted to any one type of religion. It is rather a quality which pervades all religion. Its quality and value may be found unimpaired whatever the beliefs held by the mystic. A religion of personal fellowship may be, indeed must be, characterised by mysticism. There are two errors, however, against which mysticism must guard itself: first, there is a danger of limiting mysticism to unconscious states of mind, with the result that the unique feature of mysticism is its abnormality; secondly, there is a danger of substituting mysticism for religion, with the result that mysticism is cultivated for its own sake. The mystic experience which leads to trance and to the suspension of consciousness is only guaranteed as valid experience of reality on the assumption that full, conscious personality is unreal. The cultivation of mysticism for its own sake involves a belief that mysticism is identical with religion, whereas it is only the accompaniment of religion. Mysticism in itself is no more religion than is the feeling of awe which, like mysticism, also accompanies religion. Mysticism is a characteristic of religious response, and normally it is the consequence of religious response. The cultivation of mysticism as itself a religion is, however, as false a procedure as the practice of the forms and ceremonies of religion without any appreciation of the religion which they express. The response unique to religion is a mystical response; but mysticism is not necessarily a religious response. As we have seen, mysticism, beginning on the level of a religious response between personality and reality, may end in relinquishing both personality and reality and so may

cease to be religious. But the genuine mystic tone of a true religious response belongs to the awareness of the self that it is in the presence of that which far transcends itself because it is perfect and ultimate.

Religion at its most characteristic phase is a full, conscious and personal response. The nature of religious response at its highest reach is fellowship or communion. Such a response implies personality at both ends. The more intense the consciousness and the more complete the personality, the more perfect will the fellowship be. At its lowest stage religion is mutual response between personality and reality; at its highest stage it is communion between God and man. But however much higher the one stage may be than the other, both are stages on the one ascent, and the passage from the one to the other is made by a flight of continuous steps. From the scientist's response to an object regarded, consciously or unconsciously, as belonging to the ultimately real, to the saint's love of God, may seem a long journey; but the first position is on the route to the last. Religion craves an object that can be loved. The response between personality and reality, in which its lowest claims are met, must be lifted into loving fellowship in order to satisfy its fullest claims. Aristotle's conception of God as a being, whose one activity is pure contemplation, cannot satisfy religion. Nearer to the truth was Spinoza, who, beginning with substance as an object for intellectual scrutiny, ended with God; and expanded the merely intellectual response between mind and substance into the intellectual love wherewith God loves himself. The kind of response typical of religion, however, is found in personal communion and love between God and man.

Love, no less than faith, belongs to the religious response. But the love which is religious transcends emotion, just as the faith that is religious transcends intellect. Religious faith includes belief, trust and obedience as its expression on the intellectual, emotional and volitional sides. And religious love similarly includes

knowledge, desire and surrender as its corresponding expression on the intellectual, emotional and volitional sides. Love demands an ever fuller understanding of its object; it has a persistent and increasing desire for the presence and possession of the object loved; and it finds its fulfilment in yielding itself to the power of the object of its affection. Neither of these three expressions of love belongs to any single side of personality to the exclusion of the other sides. Each passes over into the other, so that surrender includes both desire and knowledge. Similarly the obedience of faith contains trust and belief. But neither faith nor love can be truly religious until they embrace all sides of personality. This, of course, must be so, just because religion is a response of the full personality. The faith and love which characterise the response must also express the fulness of the personality which makes the response.

By raising the nature of response to the level of communion we are still further committed to the proposition that the response from reality is a personal response. Love may be directed upon inanimate objects, and is, of course, commonly felt towards animals. And to distinguish sharply between such love and the love experienced between persons would be a mistake. The difference is one of degree rather than kind. But the difference is discernible. No one can feel for an inanimate thing the same love that can be felt for an animal. The difference in the response made by the object as a result of the love expressed towards it changes the nature of the experience. And this, again, is true when we make different animals the objects of love. It is not possible to feel towards a rabbit, for instance, the same love that could be felt towards a dog. Here, too, the difference in the response from the object changes the nature of the experience. Perhaps, further, for the majority of people, a difference is also discernible between the feeling for a cat and the feeling for a dog. There is a mutual companionship easily possible in the one case and very rare in the other.

Or, to take a more definite example, the normal feeling usually experienced towards a favourite cow and a favourite horse would be appreciably different in character. And the difference would depend in large part upon the different answering response natural to the different animals. In like manner when we pass from the love of animals to the love of people, a marked change is found in the experience; and this, again, is due in large measure to the new quality in the answering response. The kind of friendship natural at this level is not possible when an animal is the object of affection. Instances of passionate devotion to animals are not uncommon, but the exaggerated affection felt by a person for an animal is due to personification and is the result of some baulking of the natural outlet of love between persons, and especially between man, woman and child. Love of animals is right, natural and normal, and the lack of it betokens some defect in character. But the feeling of the same love for animals that is felt for persons is a form of mental disease. The experience of love should normally be qualified by the responsiveness possible from the beloved object.

The love which is typical of religion is a love of fellowship and communion. The kind of fellowship which we know is that which, beginning with the beginnings of sentiency, passes through the grades of increasing responsiveness until in the higher animals it reaches a phase that foreshadows its culmination in personal friendship. But only in the relation of person to person do we find that quality of response which can rightly be called fellowship and communion. When such terms as love, comradeship, friendship, companionship are used to describe a relationship between a person and an animal it is because there is experienced the beginning of that feeling which rightly belongs to human fellowship. It is sufficiently like human friendship for the name to be extended to include animal friendship, but the norm of friendship must always be a relationship between person

and person. And the communion experienced in religion is a perfection of that experience which begins on the level of personality. The response which belongs to religion, that is to say, is not the summation of all the responses experienced towards sentient being from humanity downwards. Religious response lies upon the higher level already anticipated in human fellowship. It is the completion of the chain of increasing responsiveness. And still the difference in the experience is due, in part at least, to the different responsiveness from the object to the subject.

The object of religious response must be able to respond to human love more fully and perfectly than could a human person. And such response would not be possible unless the object were more than human personality. Just as the lack of human personality qualifies the response of an animal to human love, so the possession of perfect personality qualifies the response of the object of religious love. Religion describes the nature of this mutual response between subject and object as communion and thereby affirms that the nature of the object is personal. By communion is meant the perfection of that relationship which can only exist between person and person. But this relationship is truly and fully possible only when personality is perfect. For religion to become itself, therefore, reality must be of the nature of perfect personality. And the relationship established between human personality and perfect personality works out towards the perfection of human personality.

It is necessary at this point, and before further development of the argument is attempted, to inquire a little into the implications involved in the assumption that reality is personal and that religion is communion between personality and reality. There is an important distinction which may be drawn, and from now onward ought to be recognised, between reality as personality and reality as personal.[1] If we define reality as personality, then we

[1] Webb, "God and Personality," Lect. III.

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may be excluding human personality from ultimate reality. Reality cannot be perfect personality and that only, if it is to include within itself innumerable imperfect personalities. If we mean by reality that which includes our own personalities as essential to itself, then we must not define it as personality. But the refusal to define reality as personality does not lead to the denial of reality to personality. The reverse is the truth. It is only by refusing to identify reality with perfect personality that we can secure any place in reality for imperfect personalities. Moreover, our rejection of the definition of reality as personality does not carry with it the denial of the personality of God. Certainly by defining reality as personality we may say that God is reality and therefore personality. Such a device, however, makes room for God at the expense of everything else. But it does not in truth allow enough room for God. God must not only have enough room in which to be, but enough room in which to act. A dynamic conception of God requires a wider definition than a static. This is the old difficulty of the atomists. When they defined reality as matter, then they allowed no vacant spaces in which matter could move. Similarly, an active God, so to say, requires a reality that is bigger than himself. The reality needed by God must not be beyond his control. It must be dependent upon him for its reality. But it must not be so small as to confine him. It must be big enough to express him. Reality is God, but God is both himself and also his field of operation. God without a field of operation would not be a Living God. Reality is God *plus* God's field. Since the character of God is personal (though his nature may be supra-personal) reality is personal. But reality is not merely personality; it is not merely perfect personality. Personality is not a restricted conception. It is itself together with all its relationships and responses and reactions; and all these take it outside of itself. Personality is itself together with its sphere in which it has opportunity to be itself. This is the truth in Lotze's contention

that self requires not-self. But the not-self required is not necessarily of the nature of non-self or anti-self; rather it needs to be continuous with the nature of self—a wider sphere congenial to the self.

Reality, then, is personal, but is more than personality. It is by being more than personality that it is able to contain both human personalities and also the physical universe. The universe is part of God's field. Human personalities are real within that field. To be within the field of God's influence is to stand in relationship with God. And the proper relationship between man and God is attained in the religious response of communion and love. The reality of human personality increases with the development of personality and with the experience of divine communion.

In the progress of personality towards perfection on the one part, and the increase of fellowship with God on the other part, we have two co-ordinated and inter-dependent series. The measure of reality belonging to any entity may be found in the adequacy and rightness of the relation between that entity and the centre of reality in God. Reality may, therefore, be described as communion. Communion includes personalities and includes also all that is necessary to achieve and sustain communion between personalities. The universe is dependent upon God as the field within which he achieves reconciliation between himself and human personalities. In other words, the key to reality is found in right-relatedness. But manifold relationships are only possible within a system if there be some centre to which all relationships converge. We cannot say that A's reality is found in its relation to B, and B's in its relation to A. Nor can we say that B's reality is found in its relation to C, and C's reality in its relation to D, and so on indefinitely. At last we must reach a term whose nature is such that relation with it gives reality. The centre of the system of reality is God. And right-relationship to God constitutes reality. It is the relationship of dependence upon God that gives

the universe its reality. It is the relationship of communion between the soul and God that gives to the soul its increasing hold upon reality, not merely as a part or product of nature, but as a free personality. The right relationship between personality and reality is one of faith, love and communion. When this relationship is distorted or destroyed, then whatever so vitiates the proper relationship is sin, and the consequence of the broken relationship is, in so far as it continues unrepaired, a dissolution of personality terminating eventually in its cessation. "The wages of sin is death." God, however, is continually endeavouring to re-establish that right relationship between himself and the soul, so that the soul standing in that right relationship may grow in personality and attain to that measure of reality which is called eternal life.

Such a view of reality as a communion of personalities differs radically from McTaggart's conception of "a college of souls." [1] That theory belongs to the group of those theories already criticised as subjective. We do not there get to a God beyond the community of ourselves. God is "the common of souls." Along this line God is reached as the final goal of the evolutionary process and stands as the highest product of that process. He is the one further stage possible after personality has been reached in man. This position, however, makes God dependent upon the universe. The universe, so to say, becomes the creator, and God its most perfect creature. But such a conception of God is, of course, repugnant to all normal religion. For typical religious experience God is ultimate, and all else dependent upon him. The view here presented, however, differs fundamentally from McTaggart's view and does not equate God with the communion of saints.

God, then, is not to be conceived as the totality of souls in communion with one another. But neither is he to be thought of as one personality amongst an innumer-

[1] McTaggart, "Some Dogmas of Religion."

able company of persons. God enters into personal relationship with all souls, and therein is our hope of salvation. God responds in communion and love to the personality that adopts a religious attitude towards him. But God, even although we might prefer to call him personal rather than supra-personal, is distinct and apart from the category of human personalities. Not only is he perfectly personal, while we are imperfect personalities, but he is also ultimate, the centre of reality, that upon which all else, including the universe and our souls, depends. We may develop to the perfection of our personality, but even so we should not have gained reality in our own right. The reality of our perfected personalities would still rest upon our communion with God as the centre of reality. God is the source of all, the life-giver, the creator of the world. "In him and through him and to him are all things." God is all in all. "In him we live and move and have our being." Never can we win and hold eternal life in virtue of our own nature. "Eternal life is the gift of God." Our reality depends for ever upon our communion with God.

A theory of reality which finds the centre of the system in a personal God is very different, no doubt, from any theory hitherto adumbrated by science or philosophy. It is a dynamic reality, and for that reason, less easily measurable than a static reality. But by being dynamic it is able to include those things which, although they can find no place in a static reality, are nevertheless the realities of experience. Also, as a system, reality so conceived is an open system. For that reason it is less calculable than a closed system. But it is by leaving the system open that we are able to include those recalcitrant and irreducible factors which experience affirms to be real, but which science and philosophy are compelled to eliminate from any and every closed system which they may construct. Nevertheless, such a view of reality is not incompatible with the requirements of science and philosophy. According to this view reality is a system,

it has a character, and it conforms to a principle. Admittedly, the principle is not a formula, the character is non-metrical, and the system supra-logical; but if this is the only kind of system which interprets reality truly, then other kinds of system, however useful for special purposes and however exact within prescribed limits, must be recognised as partial and as yielding only approximate knowledge of reality as it really is. Philosophy seeks a system which is self-consistent, science one which is metrical and calculable. Religion also seeks a system, but one which is personal in nature. And since all are studying the same reality, the systems must be found to work together at last. And science and philosophy are indispensable to the full understanding of the whole, although their systems may have to be transcended in order to include all that belongs to the ultimately real.

CHAPTER III

RESPONSE AS AN INDEX OF PERSONALITY

PERSONALITY is a consequence of social relationships. Apart from society, character cannot be formed or personality developed. A child growing from infancy in a jungle apart from civilisation (if that were possible) would resemble a wild animal more than a human being in its reactions. But the resemblance to a wild animal would be more marked in the absence of human attributes than in the possession of true animal nature. Animals do not live solitary and apart from their kind. Their nature resembles man's in its gregariousness. But the gregariousness of animals does not produce in them any trace of personality. The association of the imaginary child with a herd of animals (for instance, his inclusion in a family of monkeys) would not in any way compensate for the loss of human society. Domestic animals do unquestionably acquire a character and an individuality which suggests the rudiments of personality. But such traits as suggest personality are acquired, not from their own gregariousness within their own species, but entirely by association with man. The character so developed may be almost lost if the contact with man is broken for a long period. The responsiveness to human influence is almost obliterated after continuous separation. Horses that have learnt to respond correctly to a word and have acquired habits of regular and intelligent behaviour, are found to have become indifferent to any appeal after a considerable period of grazing in fields unfrequented by men. When restored to the old conditions they are found to have lost the adaptation to a daily routine and the intelligent anticipation of courses of action. After isolation the responsiveness of animals to man and to man's needs and ways is always noticeably weakened. Apart

from human society there appears to be no possibility either of gaining or of retaining personality, whether in man or, at an embryonic stage, in animals. Solitary confinement in the case of men has the same nullifying effect upon responsiveness that exclusion from human society has upon domestic animals. Both the beginning and the completing of personality, it must therefore be concluded, depend upon human society. The picture drawn by Mr. Bernard Shaw in his play *Back to Methuselah*, appears at this point to be psychologically untrue. The development of the ancients in complete solitude and isolation from all effects of civilisation appears to be an impossibility if taken as indicating a line of advance by which human nature can reach perfection. Such utter loneliness could only produce the dissolution of personality. Coleridge is nearer the truth when in his poem "The Visit of the Gods," written in imitation of Schiller, he says: "Never, believe me, appear the immortals, never alone."

Personality is a capacity to respond. But response alone is not a sufficient qualification. Forms of life very low in the scale and far beneath the level of personality make a definite response to stimulation. All life persists by response to environment. The continuous cessation of response is what we call death. All life is responsive; but all life is not personality. Yet in defining personality as response, the continuity between the highest product of life and all the lower forms is made clear. Personality is, so to say, a new creation, just as life itself is a new creation. But new creations are not achieved by ignoring or cancelling all that has gone before, as if that were a mistake, or at best a futility. A new creation, or emergent value, is produced by continuing the former work in the new work.[1] Personality does not differ from all other life as something alien or antithetical. Personality is life at its highest grade. The response which qualifies all life belongs to personality also. But person-

[1] Lloyd Morgan, "Emergent Evolution."

ality has a certain unique kind of response. Man has most of the responses which belong to the animals. In some, notably smell, he is behind them; but his kinship with the beasts of the earth is close. What distinguishes man from the mere brute is the nature of the objects to which he responds. Response may, therefore, be made an index of personality because there is a kind of response which is unique to the personal level of life. And the distinction between this and every other form of response is to be found in the difference of the object of response.

The lowest forms of life respond to their environment, but not to the total environment. The object of response is the proximate environment only. But it is not the whole even of the close surroundings that a rudimentary organism responds to. The object of response is no more than perhaps a single feature in the immediate environment. Certain bacteria, for instance, when exposed to light react by making random motions until by some happy chance shade is reached, after which they become quiescent once more. But higher life-forms make more complex reactions, and some of the elaborate chain-instincts appear. The environment responded to is widened, and (in an instinctive rather than an intelligent manner) the future is included with the present, food being provided for the young who may never be seen by the parents. Later, intelligence comes to play upon the framework of action provided by instinct, and with repetition the response is made to fit more perfectly into the environment. Intelligence, at first the mere subordinate to instinct, comes at last to measure up the environment and to calculate a suitable adjustment. But all through the long line of advance the object responded to is becoming larger and is being more truly understood.[1]

It is no part of the present purpose to trace in detail the gradual ascent of mind. The one question that concerns us relates to the nature of the response which char-

[1] *Cf.* Hobhouse, "Mind in Evolution" and "Development and Purpose."

acterises personality. Wherein must we seek the differentia which separates the personal from the non-personal? The answer to that question, if forthcoming, will aid the understanding of personality and also of reality. And the answer must be sought in the nature of the object. The environment responded to by personality is greater than that responded to by non-personal centres of life. One distinction between the object of response for personal and for non-personal subjects, therefore, might be found in the fuller perception of inter-relatedness between the parts. Another distinction might be found in the blending of memory with anticipation in present experience so that time is regarded consciously or unconsciously as a continuum. A further distinction might be found in the fact that the non-personal centre responds only to environment, whereas the personal subject responds also to the values in the environment. Or, again, we might draw a distinction between response to a limited environment, however wide the bounds, and response to reality as a whole. It does not, perhaps, matter which quality we single out as a mark of personality. Each characteristic indicates something in the nature of personality when, somehow or other, personality has already arisen. More important, however, is the inquiry how personality can come into being at all. That personality responds to objects of a certain distinctive quality tells us something about personality, but we are still entitled also to ask how a personal centre of consciousness can become the subject of a response to an object different in nature from any other object responded to by vital centres.

Let us ask, then, first, what is the kind of object responded to by personality; and afterwards, let us ask further, how a mere centre of consciousness comes to make such a response and so become a personal centre? An answer to the first question is suggested by tracing the differences in the object responded to by the subject as the subject responding reaches different levels upon

the ascending scale of development. By the object of response in this connection we must mean the total environment to which, from first to last, response is made by the centre of consciousness examined. For instance, the object of response for a bee is a world that contains colour and smell from flowers, pressure of air in the wind, warmth from the sun, a consciousness of the hive as a constant centre of attraction, a community feeling in reference to the other members of the swarm, and a sense of enmity against dangerous entities. But these features in the environment would not be perceived as what we know them to be. They would merely stand as stimulants leading to certain definite reactions. All the rest of the environment would be a blank. If we passed lower in the scale of life, the environment responded to would be more restricted still. The amœba can have little response beyond the differentiated reaction to food which can be absorbed, and non-food which may have to be avoided. But passing the other way, and coming to the domestic animals, the sphere of response is considerably widened. And, what is equally important, in some cases (notably the horse and the dog) is capable of much greater extension under the influence of man. A horse, for instance, may learn to respond to an environment which contains such nice discriminations as changes in the tone of voice and expression of face. A different reaction to different tones can be registered by the changed beating of the heart. But such fine responses and recognitions are only possible when there are present in the environment factors which induce affection. The encouragement of affection, however, leads to an enlargement of the object of response by a more exact and detailed analysis of the environment. What might otherwise have been a blur with but a few prominent features becomes a more meaningful and recognisable object. But still on this level of response represented by the intelligence possible to a horse, the environment is markedly circumscribed and never rises

far above the ground, perhaps not far enough to include tops of trees or anything too high to reach. Anticipation, too, does not extend beyond the completion of one series of events after the first event of the series has occurred.

How much wider man's environment is than that of even the dog, it is difficult to appreciate. But it is this widened environment which constitutes one of the factors in personality. Personality, however, may arise before the object of response has been widened to include the whole environment, as is proved by the occurrence of the rudiments of personality in dogs, and possibly in horses. Also, of course, we, as human, do not begin our personal life with a response to more than a small field. But a certain quality of fulness and differentiation is necessary in the environment in order that personality may be possible in the subject responding. And the ultimate goal of this progressive increase in the fulness of the environment must be nothing less than reality as a whole. The environment reacted to by perfect personality would thus be the complete environment. But this gradual enlargement of the environment is not essentially a matter of dimensions, but rather of understanding. The enlarged sphere is certainly necessary to a completer understanding. But beyond a certain point, spacial environment may cease to count any further. What matters, then, is not that we should be in proximity with the whole, but that we should attain to an understanding of the whole. Personality is a response to the full environment when it is a response to that environment fully understood. We cannot react to the universe as a totality, but we can respond to the character of the universe. We cannot adjust ourselves to reality as a summation of all that exists, but we can adapt ourselves to the nature of reality as a whole. What distinguishes the response of the highly developed domestic animal from the response of a neglected or untrained animal is not a spacial enlargement, but an increase of

meaning. It is the quality in the object—for instance, the different intention discernible in varying tones of voice and expressions of face—which makes the response of an animal almost personal. And similarly the perfect response of personality is a response which is directed upon a reality the quality or meaning of which is understood.

But this is the reaction of perfect personality. How does personality acquire such a reaction? The answer to that question must be that, whether we consider incipient personality in animals, or developing personality in children, it is always in relationship with personality that personality arises. As has been shown already, personality is a product of human society and tends to disappear when contact with society is continuously broken. Personality is only possible as a result of response to some other personality. It is not, of course, necessary that the object of response should be exclusively personal. Much else besides personality must go to constitute the full object of response for every personal centre. But only in response to other personalities can there be learnt that type of response which, when directed upon reality as a whole, constitutes the consummation of personal development. The discernment of meaning and value in the full environment of human nature comes only as a result of social intercourse. It is handed on to us, and not won independently by us. The kind of object to which personality responds is an object given by personality, and with the increasing adequacy of the response made to the given object, there is a corresponding increase in the fulness of personality evolved in the subject. We are taught to appreciate beauty, to seek truth and to love righteousness. We learn to distinguish relationships and to trace order. The discovery of system is an end presented to us. There is about the object of response a quality of datum. It is not made by us, but presented to us. And in response to what is thus given we gain our souls.

The problem to be faced is contained in the question, Whence comes this given object? And one solution is that it is first thrown out from the mind unconsciously and afterwards received back again consciously. The uniformity sought in nature, for instance, may be a previous reflection of an unsuspected ego-complex. On this theory, personality would be acquired by conscious response to what has first been unconsciously projected. The givenness of the object would then mean its presentation to the conscious mind by the unconscious mind. But if this be so, we must draw either one or other of these alternative inferences. Either the object given by the unconscious is, at least in a measure, the truth about the reality upon which it is projected, or else we cannot know anything about that reality except that it is different from our own projections. If, on the one hand, the projection is partially true to the reality, then it is all one whether the object is thrown out by the mind or received from the outside world. But if, on the other hand, the object cannot be allowed any but subjective reference, then either environment is a creation of the human mind or else the human mind is no part in a systematic reality. In other words, the assumption that the object given has no resemblance to reality implies a denial of the initial postulate that reality is a systematic whole. And since that postulate is fundamental to all scientific and philosophic advance (not to mention artistic and ethical achievement) its rejection is only justified when the probabilities against it are overwhelming and irresistible. The matter, however, stands far otherwise. The principle of sufficient probability lays upon us the obligation to accept the systematic unity of reality.

Beginning, then, with that postulate and working downwards, it is inconceivable that the mind which is an integral organ in reality should be so constituted that it can only stand in relationship with an unreality of its own fabrication and not with the reality of which it is a factor. A system coheres into a unity by its interrelations, and

mind can only be an element in reality by standing in relationship with reality. If the object of response for personality is self-induced and not a part of reality, then the practice of such response can only produce unreality in the subject. The response must be qualified by the object. And the object of response for an integer in reality must be an object that is itself within the scope of reality. The response by means of which a subject is to gain reality must be a response directed upon reality. The givenness of the object of personal response must come, therefore, from reality to personality. But, once more, what qualifies the experience of response is not the magnitude of the object, but its character. It is the nature of the reality responded to that evokes personality in the subject responding.

Ultimately, then, personality is acquired from reality. Just as the animals can only reach to the beginnings of personality when personal factors enter into the object of their response, so, in the last analysis, man can only develop personality in so far as personality is included in the object of his response. The environment of human nature from first to last must contain personal qualities in order to evoke personality by means of response. These personal factors cannot come from a humanity that has yet to acquire them. They must be given in the object and responded to by centres of consciousness which in the response become personal, just as we see the centres of consciousness in animals beginning to respond in a personal way to our personal invitation. The quality of the response all through from the earliest dawnings of life to the full noontide of personality is the index of the advance made. To be fully personal is to respond to an environment which is reality understood in its character as God. As individuals, our progress towards the perfection of personality is made by the practice of numerous responses to human personalities higher than ourselves. Children respond to their parents, teachers and friends, and so acquire the measure of personality

which can be thus imparted. But such response is mediated, and ultimately all response must culminate in a personal God as the centre of reality. All individual centres of consciousness are sustained in their personality by a response, direct or indirect, made from them as subjects to the object in which personality is at once perfected and transcended. All life depends upon God as the life-giver, and all personality depends upon mutual response between centres of consciousness and God as the personal reality.

Though the response of the soul to God is often mediated, immediate response is, nevertheless, possible, and, in the experience of many, is actual. The most frequent method of direct response is the method of prayer. It is in and through prayer that communion, fellowship and love are most fully known. And it is when the immediate access of the soul to God is most frequent that the numerous indirect responses of life are discerned as mediated experiences of God's presence. Having found God at the heart of reality, we discover traces of him throughout the whole universe. Having heard the still small voice of God in the inner sanctuary of the spirit, we recognise his tones in the whole gamut of universal harmony. When God is the dominant fact in the object of our response, then the whole environment of life becomes expressive of the nature of God.

This response to a personal God at the heart of reality is called in the Gospels eternal life. Eternal life is the gift of God. It is given in the object of religious experience in order that it may be apprehended in the response made by the subject. Eternal life, that is to say, is a type of response the quality of which is conditioned by the object. There is life which is not eternal life, just as there are centres of consciousness which are not personal subjects. Eternal life is qualitative. It is life responsive to the nature of reality as God. To say that eternal life must be won by an effort of consciousness would be misleading if it were suggested thereby that

eternal life lies within the reach of consciousness and requires only the self-intensification of consciousness for its attainment. It is true that eternal life must be actively received, but, like personality itself (of which it is the highest experience), eternal life is given to the subject from the object. Consciousness can only become personality when the personal is given within the object of its response. It is only by response to what is personal that consciousness becomes personal. And, similarly, eternal life is not a character of life won by centres of consciousness. It is not won, but received. It depends upon capacity to respond, but its quality comes from the object responded to. At a certain stage of development, foreshadowed in some of the higher animals, the capacity to respond to personal factors is inherent. But it can only be actualised when personal factors are permanent elements in the environment. The mere capacity to respond conveys no new character to its possessor until the personal object is presented. Eternal life as the highest manifestation of personality depends (as personality itself depends) upon a constant response to the personal centre of reality.

Eternal life is both qualitative and graded. The fuller our response to God, the completer our reception of eternal life. To have eternal life is to be in relation with ultimate reality. The measure of our eternal life is the measure of our response to the things that are eternal. Truth, beauty, goodness, and love are things which belong to the eternities, and from them we derive the quality of eternity in our own lives. To be unresponsive to the heavenly things is to refuse the citizenship of the heavenly city. But the offer of life more abundant is made to all who will respond, and those who respond have here and now eternal life.

The opposite, however, must also be true. Those who refuse to respond to the eternal verities relinquish their hold upon reality. The whole nexus of reality is held together by relationships, and all the interdependencies are

caught together and centred in God. To stand in a wrong relationship with the reality whose nature is God must mean, therefore, the forfeiture of reality. Sin is false relationship; our heart is not right with God. And since God is life and light and love, to turn from God means hatred and darkness and, finally, death. The personality which is acquired in personal relationships may also be lost if all personal relationships are broken. And when, by persistent sin, self-centredness, unresponsiveness, and unreality, we negate our relationship with God as the nature of what is ultimately real, then we cease to have any lot or part in life and reality. By repudiating our dependence upon God we destroy ourselves, for we can have no existence in the system of reality except in dependence upon the centre of that system.

It is reasonable to hope that since reality fosters personality as congenial with itself it will not "cast as rubbish to the void" any single personality, however rudimentary its response to the eternal might be. But it is also reasonable to recognise the possibility of personality retrogressing, and even finally disintegrating. The nature of reality, however, is to cultivate a community of personalities all sustained in their interrelationships by an enduring response to itself as a personal centre. The more numerous and persistent the responses of the soul to the things which are spiritual and eternal, the greater will be the hold of the soul upon reality and of reality upon the soul. It is conceivable that the relations between the soul and the eternal values which give to the soul the attribute of eternal life may be sufficient to sustain the soul through the shock of physical death. The death which follows as the inevitable result of continuous sinfulness is, of course, not physical death, but spiritual death. It is the dissolution of personality, and may occur either before or after physical death or at the moment of physical death. Eternal life is the antithesis not of physical, but of spiritual death. It is the integra-

tion of personality. And it appears to be possible that this integration may be sufficient to insure the continuance of personality through physical death. But the close association of personality with the physical organism must mean that death is a crisis for personality. However, if reality is personal and personality real, then the cessation of personality must be a loss to reality and a denial of its inherent nature. So long as personality is increasing by attaining a fuller response to reality, it is reasonable to suppose that reality will secure such personality and further encourage its development. The nature of eternal life as response to eternal value does, therefore, carry some guarantee of immortality and life everlasting.

The hope of immortality, however, like all else that belongs to personality (and indeed to life itself) depends upon the nature of God as the centre of reality. If reality is life-force only, without distinction of quality and value, then reality abides so long as life persists, whether it be the life of man or of the microbe that causes the death of man, or of the worm that destroys his flesh, or of the "rose that never grows so red as on some buried Cæsar's grave." Life wins, and reality is vindicated. But if reality be qualified by values and characterised as personal, then the loss of values with the perishing of personalities is a diminution of reality. The reality of personality guarantees the support of reality according to the measure of the personality developed. But the hope of immortality is only well grounded when we go on to conceive of the nature of reality as the God of communion, fellowship and love. Then we may believe, with sufficient justification, that it is the character of reality to foster and safeguard personality as congenial to itself. We are only safe if human personality is held by God. There is no power that can snatch anything out of the Father's hands. God is the character of reality, and if it is the character of reality to sustain personality, then no unreality can have power to frustrate reality.

When we pass from the consideration of personality as real to the companion postulate of reality as personal, it is only a change in view-point that is required. The reality of personality lends support to the belief that reality is personal, while the personal quality of reality increases in turn the probability that personality is real. From personality we may work up to reality, or, beginning with reality, we may endeavour to include in it what is personal. At this point, therefore, we are able to leap to the other side of the relationship and inquire what is involved in the conception of reality as personal in character, and what are the probabilities in favour of such a belief?

The idea of God belongs in a special sense to religion, just as the idea of the absolute belongs to philosophy, and the idea of electrons to science. If it be asked what we mean by electrons, it is to science that we must go for the answer; or if the question be asked about the absolute, it is to philosophy that we must turn. In like manner, when we ask, What do we mean by God? we must look to religion for the answer. But the kind of answer given by religion always carries us into the domains of philosophy, science and art. Religion cannot rest content with a God peculiar to itself and restricted to its own confines. We cannot build a shrine to contain God and to shut him off from the world outside. The temple builders must ever recognise with Solomon that heaven and the heaven of the heavens cannot contain God. He is not to be made the prisoner of the tabernacle. There is no shielding God from the disturbances of science and philosophy. The attempt to shelter God within the sacredly guarded precincts of religion is profoundly mistaken. God so reduced becomes unreal, and, therefore, no god. That process leaves us with an idol in place of God, and our worship is then nothing better than refined idolatry. It is to religion, indeed, that we must look for the secret of God's character, but God is not the private possession of religion as a department

removed from science, philosophy and art. The God who is not God the creator and sustainer of all things, the giver of every good and perfect gift, the inspirer of every true thought, and the constrainer of every noble act, is too small to be the living God of religion. Let the danger be what it may, the God of religion must be also the God of science and philosophy. And if the God presented by religion cannot meet all the genuine needs of thought, desire and action, then religion must have failed to understand aright the true and living God.

When we seek to find in art, science and philosophy that common ground which provides God with a suitable standing place within each of their territories, we must not be satisfied with any position anywhere except at the very centre. God cannot be relegated to some unimportant or unexplored tract. The place of God must be suitable to the nature of God. God, to be the true God, must, as we have said, be in science, philosophy and art. But at the same time he must always be the God whose nature is known most fully in religious experience. When, with all this in mind, we look for that which is common to all these different but adjacent countries, we find that the one place where they all meet and occupy common ground is in the region of system. What is most vital and fundamental in art, science and philosophy is the underlying system, the principle of unity or wholeness. And religion, no less than science and philosophy, is seeking a system, a unity, a reconciliation, an atonement. The system of religion includes the minds, souls or personalities of men all ultimately at one with God and in harmony with each other. Religion is a complete coordination of responses and relationships. God gives the character to the system of religion so that to be at peace with God is to be at rest within the system of reality. And in like manner God must be the character of the systems of art, science and philosophy. God is the nature of reality. It is the character of God which forms the coordinating principle of wholeness in the ultimately real.

It is religion that discovers the meaning of God, and for religion God is personal. But for science and philosophy God is not necessarily personal. Indeed, the kind of system sought by the analytical and metrical methods of exact science is not a personal system. Have we, then, in positing that reality is personal, made an irreparable breach with science? The dilemma is here: for religion God must be personal and God must be reality; but, being reality, God must be present in science, yet, being personal, he is, seemingly, excluded from science. In meeting this dilemma we must remember that God is always one. There cannot be a God of science or of philosophy and a God of religion. The one and only God is the God of religion. Yet he must be the God of science and philosophy, too. But we must remember that attributes may be true of God without being restrictive of his nature. In our attempts to define God's nature we must beware of dictating to God that he shall go thus far and no farther. It is stupid as well as arrogant to forbid God to trespass beyond an appointed sphere. God may be truly, fully, perfectly personal, but, being God, may also be much more besides. Religion, at its highest, is committed to the belief in God as personal, but is not entitled to deny that God can also be much more than personal, and also much that is other than personal. While religion responds to God as perfectly personal, science and philosophy may be establishing a relationship with the same God as discovered within his field.

As we have seen, there are some centres of consciousness which are personal and some which are not. And there are some centres of consciousness which are beginning to acquire the rudiments of personal response. But all are dependent upon the same God. Although it is only by becoming personal that centres of consciousness can respond to the character of God, yet no life throughout the universe, and no part of the creation is out of relationship with God. God is life, and all life is sustained by him. God is creator, and all creation is upheld by

constant relationship with him as its centre. Throughout the whole there is the one system whose essential nature it is to be the personal God of religious response. But God, in being personal (indeed, in order to be personal), must have a field beyond his personal being, continuous with himself, but not personal as he is personal. The whole of this field depends upon the nature of God, and in a sense the whole field is God. But the whole is not equally God. The whole is not essentially and characteristically God, although God is in the whole.

It is within this field that the researches of science are carried on. The system is of God, and shows God's workings. The life is of God, and depends upon God. But God himself is beyond both, just as reality itself lies behind all limited systems. Bio-chemistry studies the life which depends upon God, but God himself is not the field wherein physical and mental series may be correlated. God is in his field, and the field is of God, but God is not the field. The God whose field of operation it is, is the personal God, known in himself only by personal response. Reality is personal, but it is not with reality as personal that science has to do. The province of science is with those aspects of the system which are metrical. Reality is personal, but philosophy can only reach that conclusion at the end of its speculations. The province of philosophy is with reality as a system for intellect, and only when it is found that reality cannot be so narrowed down to intellectual demands will philosophy be entitled to expand its postulate to include personality. Science does not study reality as a whole, but only definite aspects of reality. Philosophy studies reality as a whole, but only as it is related to intellect. Religion studies reality as a whole in its response to personality as a whole. But it is the one reality throughout whether studied by science, philosophy or religion, and its quality as systematic extends throughout its being. As metrical, it includes all the truth of science; as logical it includes all the truth of metaphysics, but only in its character as

personal can it be that all-inclusive system which comprehends in its ambit personalities and values.

Reality as personal is the domain of religion. The responsiveness of reality with which religion begins is, with increasing religious experience, further discriminated as the kind of response which is unique to personality. On the one side of the response we have seen developing personality, and have concluded that only the existence of personal factors in the object of response could evoke and sustain personality. On the other side of the response—that is, on the objective side—there is discovered by developing personality that kind of response which is unique to personal intercourse. The only response which could evoke, develop and sustain personality would have to be personal in character. A vital response could uphold life; a logical response could satisfy intellect; but only a personal response from the object could have upon the subject of response the effect which religion has upon those who truly adopt the religious attitude to reality as a whole. However much more than personal, or other than personal, God may be (indeed, must be), religion can only come to the completion of itself in an experience which is not only a response made by the fulness of human personality, but which is also a response received from a reality which, in its most essential being, is truly and perfectly personal.

When we ask ourselves whether the principle of sufficient probability permits us to assume that reality is essentially and characteristically personal in nature, we must not only show the suitability of such a theory to meet the case, but we must also demonstrate the advantage of such a theory over any other likely alternative. The only alternative theories offered are those which come from the various schools of philosophy. Science, as such, has no theory of reality. Science, of course, implies a metaphysic, but as we have already shown, there can be no conflict between science and religion, since science is dealing with those elements in

reality which lie in the field of a personal God, and not with the nature of God as personal. So long as the character of that field is not incompatible with the nature of God as its dominant, the study of his field only increases our knowledge of him and his ways. Religion is not directly concerned with the field, but with the nature of God, the dominant in that field, and only with the field as God's field of operation. Philosophy, however, unlike science, embraces all that is real, and, therefore, if reality is God and his field, philosophy, like religion, must include not only the field, but also its dominant. But for philosophy the nature of reality is a system of logical consistency—for religion it is a field with a personal dominant. The probabilities in favour of the religious metaphysic are to be found in its advantages. And the important advantages are these:

The religious theory is able to include personalities as integral parts of reality. The locus of human personalities, so to say, is the field of God's being. God is dominant, and all in the field is dependent upon him. All is held together in a system of interrelations. What we call physical, material or non-vital must be thought of as held in its place and sustained in its existence by a network of relationships with what is vital. All sentiency is dependent upon God as the perpetual source of life. Mind relates back to God as the mind of reality. Personality persists by mutual response between itself and the dominant as perfectly personal. The fuller its development the completer the response and the larger the degree of reality. At least reality will be communion within God's field between God and the family of perfected personalities. Religion thus includes personality as real, while philosophy has so far found no adequate place for personality in the absolute.

Again, with the reality of personality there is secured also the reality of values. All value has a personal reference, and lacking that reference ceases to be actual value. Philosophy tends to transcend personal values in

an impersonal absolute. And this can hardly be avoided while reality is tested by intellect alone. Values always stand in relation to personality and not merely to intellect. Their distinctive quality always goes beyond the intellect, and includes emotion and volition. We understand values by a response analogous to the religious response of a full harmonious personality. And any category which is less than personal must so mutilate values as in effect to destroy them. But the religious metaphysic, by using personality as its category, is able to include all values within the sphere of ultimate reality.

With these two advantages to its credit, religion may claim that the consequences of acceptance being what they are, the principle of sufficient probability makes the acceptance of a religious view of reality obligatory upon unprejudiced reason.

CHAPTER IV

RESPONSE AS THE BASIS AND AUTHORITY OF MORALS

At the higher stages of religious advance the association between religion and morality is very close. But it is only at the higher stages that the association is constant. Morality has not always been regarded as a necessary accompaniment of religion, and the links which now bind the one to the other were forged but slowly. The early failure to join the two resulted from the imperfect understanding of what was implicit in both. Once the connection has been established, however, it cannot again be severed, except at the cost of retrogression. The tendency of religion to grasp and hold morality as an ally is evident in all the great religions of the world. But, unfortunately, the type of morality adopted by religion is not always the highest type when judged by moral standards. Mohammedanism, Brahmanism, Confucianism and Buddhism are all defective on the ethical side; while Judaism only transcended the ceremonial requirements and reached the demands of righteousness by slow degrees. But in Judaism at last the foundations of righteousness were so well laid that upon them the Christian ethic was able to be built. Nowhere in the ancient world was the blending of religion with morality so completely effected as amongst the Jews. Apart from Judaism we find that morality is either divorced from religion (or at best but loosely associated) or else developed independently of religion. Several of the mystery religions show religion without morality, while in Stoicism and Epicureanism we find morality without religion. But only in close conjunction with morality can religion attain to the fulness of its own inherent nature.

The most satisfactory objective standard by means

of which religion may be graded is the ethical test. Examined in this light, Christianity is proved to be the loftiest form of religion. Its teaching is able to satisfy moral requirements as no other religious teaching is able to do. And, moreover, it is to Christianity that the study of ethics is indebted for the enunciations of the two main principles of moral theory—the infinite value of the individual, and the universal scope of moral obligation. The first principle implies, in the form given it by Kant, that every individual must be treated as an end in himself and never as a means only. The second principle leads to the other maxim expressed by Kant in the form that every right action must be capable of extension to the whole of humanity.[1]

The ethical sufficiency of the Christian religion is in a measure the confirmation of its general adequacy and validity. From the type of moral action to which a religion leads we may infer much about the truth and worth of the religion. Morals are not an independent growth which can be cultivated, as it were, from detached slips and cuttings. They are the fruit of the tree of life whose roots go down into the depths of reality. And only on that tree can they flourish. We may study the fruit, of course, without taking much notice of the branch and root. But only when the branch and root are sound and true can the best kind of fruit be produced. The fruits of the spirit are some evidence that the spirit is rooted in reality. In other words, a valid morality requires an adequate metaphysic. And Christianity could hardly have deduced sound ethics from false theories of life and reality.

It is when we get back to reality that we discover

[1] Kant, "Metaphysic of Morals"; translated by Abbott, "Kant's Theory of Ethics."

"Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (p. 38).

"So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only" (p. 47).

the nature of the close and inevitable ties which bind together true religion and true morality. It is, of course, both possible and profitable to make a theoretical study of morality without any initial postulate about religion. But if the view here advocated be at all in the line of truth, then, at last, morality must reach back to reality. And the kind of reality necessary for the truth of morality will be found to be the kind also necessary for the truth of religion. The mistake so often made, and repeated even by Sidgwick,[1] is to leap across from morality to religion at some nearer point. The consequence of this sudden leap from ethics to theology is seen in the failure to trace back morality to the ultimate. And that failure weakens its authority. Morality then appears to issue from religion instead of following direct from the nature of reality. To suggest that morality can go back behind itself a limited distance only, and then needs to move over to religion for support and ultimate contact with reality, is to cast doubt upon the genuineness of morality. The only proper method in ethics is to trace morality right back to reality and to inquire what the nature of reality must be if morality is to be real. That the nature of reality is such as morality demands that it should be is made all the more probable because the demand of religion is for a like nature. Morality and religion meet in the nature of reality, and, therefore, have affinity at every point. But the attempt to find their common holding in anything less than the ultimate is to weaken and distort the nature of both.

The failure to attain a right synthesis between morality and religion has been due to the failure on the part both of morality and religion to reach back to reality. But once morality and religion touch reality they clasp each other. The reality needed by both is of the same nature. The one confirms the other. Both issue from the same origin. Both are kin. But kinship may be long undiscovered between those who are closely related to one

[1] Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics," pp. 503-509.

another. If neither person has knowledge of an ancestral home or lineage, the common descent of both can be little better than a guess. But when each can trace an ancestry back to the one original family, then the relationship can no longer be doubted. That is how it came about that morality and religion, owing to ignorance of their common origin, could live so long as strangers, or, at best, as but occasional associates, although all the time they were of the one parentage. But once their birth and nurture had been discovered to come from the same ultimate home in reality, then they could no longer (except at loss to each other) deny or ignore their brotherhood.

It will be well, first to call to mind the gradual advance of morals from the level of group-morality to the height of universal ethics; and then, afterwards, to examine the ultimate character of moral obligation. In this way we shall best be able to approach the question: What is the nature of the ultimate as implied in morals? As we trace the development of morality we find that there is a gradually widening circle of reference recognised as belonging to the moral sphere. At one stage we find that obligation is conceived as limited to the tribe, and the tribe may be little more than an enlarged family. No member of another tribe has any rights within the territory of the tribe in question. Neither has any member of this tribe any rights outside the tribe. To be an outcast is to be rightless. But the morality which is circumscribed by the tribal boundaries does not leave those beyond in the position of moral neutrality. All without the sphere of moral reference are potential enemies, and the obligation to the tribe imposes the duty of enmity against the outsider. When the sphere of the tribe is enlarged to include many tribes in one nation, although the harshness of the moral code is modified, nevertheless the characteristics of group-morality remain. And this must be so while the circle of reference is still limited. The correlate to the precept "Thou shalt love

thy neighbour" is "Thou shalt hate thine enemy." The duty to serve your own nation carries with it the duty, on occasion, to destroy another nation. To shoot a compatriot is murder; to shoot a foreigner may be meritorious. One is a moral offence, the other a moral obligation.

The authority in group-morality is found in the unity of the group itself. National ethics derive their authority from the State, and the State itself has no obligations. Its own interest is its full right and its only duty. The basis of morality is not in human nature, but in membership of the State. To be outside the State is to be beyond the pale of moral claims. This doctrine, not uncommon to-day, is riddled with ethical fallacies. Although the doctrine may not be taught explicitly, yet it often lies concealed within much political and patriotic propaganda. The doctrine is not only unsound in theory, but is also self-destructive when consistently applied. Ethically, the rightlessness of the outsider reacts upon moral claims of the member within the group. If the foreigner, differing so little essentially from the compatriot, lacks moral right, then moral right must be extraneous and insecure. The ethical principle which is limited in its application cannot be founded on what is radical to human nature. Man may still remain what he is, and yet his moral rights may change. Their basis is not within him, but is dependent upon the supposed interests of the State. The authority of ethics is thus inevitably weakened when the foundation of ethics is limited.

When, however, a sufficient basis for ethics is sought, it is found that upon that basis must stand the rights of human nature as such. If the authority of morals is once allowed, then its dominion inevitably becomes absolute and universal. The only limits which morality can recognise are those which include every human being. The scope of obligation has to be extended to the uttermost, or else the true nature of duty must remain unfulfilled. The moral task of the present age is set by

the moral necessity to transcend nationalism in internationalism. The failure in this enterprise must mean the undermining of moral authority throughout the world. The essential nature of morality is such that it includes humanity in its sphere, and any limitation of morality means a change in its nature. Whenever the scope of ethical claims is circumscribed, then the basis of ethics is altered. The claims which are not universal cannot be absolute. The authority which is restricted is not moral authority, but some other authority based upon race or nation, or tribe, or alliance, but not upon what is essential and inherent in human nature.

Morality, once it is recognised, demands the whole world. Its two poles are those found in Christian ethics: the infinite value of each individual irrespective of nation, tribe, colour, sex, social position or heredity; and the universal scope of moral obligation including every individual as endowed with plenary moral rights. So alien is the notion of limits to morality that the universality of moral obligation implies a positive idea of extension and not any negative idea of setting bounds. The universality which includes mankind does not stop short with human nature, but reaches out still further in order to possess all that human nature is related to. It is not surprising that when the extension of ethics to the human race is not always admitted and rarely applied, the moral claims of animals should seem dubious. Any limitation of morality, however, is a contradiction of its nature. This must be so, because morality is a matter of right relationship and proper response.

A morally right action towards another person is that action which expresses a suitable response to that person. Morality, like religion, is concerned with the attitude of whole to whole. Thus, it is possible for an action to be formally correct but morally wrong. For instance, we may tell the truth, or pay a debt, or express gratitude for service; but the attitude of our personality as a whole may be that of antipathy, suspicion, distrust and

hatred. Morality includes more than the outward act, it looks to the response made by the personality as a whole. This is the meaning of the Christian teaching on the inwardness of morality. It is not enough to refrain from murder. The response of hatred is a false attitude of personality. Morality is right response from personality as a whole.

There is not only needed a moral response to individuals, but also to situations. The morally right line of action is that which results from a right response to the environment. It may, of course, be very difficult to regulate courses of action to meet highly complicated circumstances. But, whatever the circumstances may be, there is always a right response of full, harmonious personality; and whatever is included within that response is a morally right action. Morality is the attainment of a proper response. It is conditioned, therefore, both by the subject and by the object. Thus, there can be no object that lies outside the province of morality. The relationship between the human subject and the environment, either in whole or in part, is always either a right or a wrong relationship. And the subject is always affected by a wrong relationship. This must be so, because response is mutual; which means that the relationship is conditioned by both terms. The denial of moral claims to any object must, therefore, react upon the subject. Accordingly, the whole province of relationship is covered by morality. That means that there is a morally right response between men and animals. Indeed, it means that the sphere of moral relationships includes "all objects of all thought."

This wide embrace of morality is being slowly recognised. Animals have certain rights which, in this country at least, are secured by law. And beyond that we recognise something like duty towards nature. We say that it is a shame to neglect a garden, or ruthlessly to cut down trees, and so on. Of course, the right relationship to flowers and trees and fields is very different from

the right relationship to animals, and that, again, from the right relationship to persons. The nature of the relationship depends on the object, and also on the larger context of graded relationships to the whole environment. But no relationship can be quite indifferent morally.

The double question, however, must always arise: What is the right relationship or response in any given case, and why should the morally right attitude be adopted? And these questions drive us back at last upon ultimate reality. The object of a moral relationship is never isolated. It forms part of a larger whole. Life is never the following of a single allegiance. It is the balancing of many loyalties. The right relationship to any given object can only be fully understood when the position and significance of that object in its complete setting is known. Every relationship links up into the whole nexus of relationships and finally reaches reality. The morally right relationship at any time and in any place is that relationship which is in harmony with the general scheme of relationships between the subject and reality as a whole. But this response of personality as a whole to the nature of reality as a whole is only a right response when the subject responding is a full, integrated, harmonious personality. And such a personality is only attainable in response to reality conceived as God. All moral relationships lead back to reality and depend upon the nature of reality.

The only answer possible to the man who asks why he should obey duty or recognise moral obligation is this: that morality is in accord with the nature of ultimate being, and to ignore it is to lose hold upon reality. There is no other basis which is sufficient to uphold the authority of moral obligation. We may seek a foundation for morals in convention, expediency, general happiness, enlightened self-interest, or social health, but in no case is the moral imperative ultimate. And lacking the character of the ultimate, its authority ceases

to be absolute. But obligation which is not ultimate and absolute is not moral obligation. The numerous attempts to reduce morality to some non-moral basis must all fail to explain or account for the peculiar character of morality. The unique quality of morality belongs to the unique object to which ultimately it is related. The object of all moral response is, ultimately, reality as a whole. The awe, sanctity and reverence associated with the moral law are felt because the relationship is recognised, consciously or unconsciously, as having reality on the thither side. The absolute authority of moral obligation is this: that to be moral is to be rightly related to the nature of the ultimately real; while to be immoral is to go contrary to the nature of reality, and that means ceasing to be real.

Morality in leading up to reality as its final and complete object is positing the nature of reality as moral. Reality is a system of right relationships centring in God. And right relationship is moral relationship whenever the subject of the relationship is personal. The sequences and co-ordinations of science are relationships, but having no personal subject they are not moral. But wherever the subject is personal, whatever the nature of the object may be, the relationship between subject and object will be moral. In this sense reality could be the object of a moral relationship without itself being personality. The personality of the subject gives moral quality to right-relatedness irrespective of personal attributes in the object. For this reason morality does not stand or fall with the personal character of reality. The personal subject must enter into a complex of relationships with various objects in the environment and with the environment as a whole, whatever the nature of reality may be. The nature of the subject as personal necessitates relationships, and relationships may be adequate or inadequate adjustments, satisfactory or unsatisfactory adaptations, right or wrong attitudes to the total environment. And here,

without going further, are sufficient data for ethics to study. If reality were a system of relationships of an impersonal character such as science investigates, morality would still stand. Whatever else failed, the great moral verities would remain secure. So long as man is a personal subject of action, it is always "better being true than false, better being brave than cowardly, better being pure than licentious."

Morality, then, would stand unshaken even if reality were proved to lack all personal attributes; but it would not stand wholly unchanged. In that case the moral quality of the relationship between human personality and reality would belong entirely to the subjective side. And if the morality of man's fundamental relationship to reality comes entirely from the subjective side, then moral values must be subjective only and cannot inhere in reality. Goodness would then be reduced to making the best of life. It would still have obligation, but not ultimate obligation. All the authority would come from the human plane. It would be an authority deserving of respect, but it would not be the absolute authority which involves reverence, veneration and awe. The morality which remained unshaken would be a morality that had lost its uniquely moral tone. It would have been bereft of its ultimate nature, and in consequence would be reducible to some subjective principle, such as utility, enlightened self-interest, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Nevertheless, despite the change in its nature consequent upon the non-personal character of reality, morality would still rest secure. But this very stability would in effect be a challenge to the nature of reality as non-personal and non-moral. It would be a false reality, so to say, which included human personalities as organic to itself, but which could not itself rise to the height of their moral responses. The morality of humanity, imperfect though it might be, would, as it were, set an example to reality as a whole. Responses

which by issuing from a personal centre acquire a moral character are higher relationships than those which belong to a non-personal sphere. If reality is not a system of moral responses, but only a system of impersonal relationships, then a higher reality is conceivable than the actual reality. To be moral in face of such a reality is to be moral in spite of the nature of reality and in total disregard to the indifference of reality to moral issues. Such an attitude is, of course, possible and admirable, but it is a standing protest against the nature of the ultimate.

Morality requires personality. The subject of moral relationship must always be personal. But whether or not personality in the subject could develop apart from personal factors previously active in the object of relationship is a question which has been asked already. In answer to that question the probabilities in favour of a personal character in reality have been estimated and considered sufficient. And those same probabilities which support the personal, support also the moral response in the ultimate. And such response is necessary to morality if its unique nature is to be preserved. Morality reduced to a science of ethics may be a satisfactory analysis of conduct from an external standpoint; but moral experiences have a character which is unrecognised by the mere ethicist. There is in the moral consciousness of man an understanding of moral obligation as something that is absolute and ultimate. And that consciousness persists, despite theories which sever morality from reality. Intellectually, it may be believed that reality is indifferent to what is morally right and wrong; and even with full recognition of this intellectual belief, moral conduct would continue. But its continuance would reflect the unconscious affirmation made by personality as a whole that morality is real and that reality is moral.

The witness of the moral consciousness, expressed in the unique character of obligation as absolute and

ultimate, leads us to the verdict that moral response is in accord with the nature of reality. Reality is a system of relations centring in God. The nature of this system is not merely metrical, it is also personal. The nucleus of reality is a personal whole. This nucleus of reality is the God of religion. Being personal in nature, God enters into moral relationships. God is in relationship with the whole realm of being, and, since he himself is a personal subject, all his relationships are moral in character. This is true, not only of his relationships with human personalities, but also with all the objects of his mind whether personal or not. The presence of personality on one side of a relationship makes that relationship moral. On God's side, therefore, all relationships throughout the whole system of reality are moral. But the relationship between God and human personalities is vitiated on man's side by the refusal of a right response from man to God. In so far, however, as man does make a proper response to God, he develops in personality, and so becomes capable of a more perfect moral response both to God and to his neighbour. In making moral responses to his environment, whether in part or in whole, he is acting in harmony with the nature of reality. And the obligation to adopt moral responses issues from the conviction of the moral consciousness that right action is in accordance with the ultimate nature of things.

The moral consciousness which bears witness to the reality of moral values is closely akin to the religious consciousness which testifies to the personal character of reality. Both religion and morality require a response from the whole personality. The moral consciousness is not merely the volitional side of mind, any more than the religious consciousness is merely the emotional side. In both cases it is the unified personality which makes the response. The response of the moral consciousness is directed ultimately upon reality, since reality is the only seat for the absolute claims of moral obligation.

The reality which stands as object to the perfect and complete moral response must itself be morally conditioned in all its relationships and responses. The religious consciousness belongs to the same unitary personality as the moral consciousness. The only difference between the religious response and the moral response is that, whereas the one has for its ultimate object a reality that is morally conditioned, the other has a reality that is essentially personal in nature. But, in order that the relationships of reality as a subject of response may be moral in character, reality must be personal in nature. A moral response requires a personal subject. Thus religion comes to the support of morality just at the point where its uniquely moral quality is evident. Scientific methods of ethics ignore or deny the ultimate reference of obligation in morals. But religion recognises and confirms this as the essence of morality.

According to the principle already proposed as a test of reality, the moral conscience must be satisfied no less than the intellect. If we allow, as this principle demands, the expansion of the logical postulate to include not only the inherent needs of cognition, but the inherent needs of personality as a whole, then we are confronted with moral necessity as well as logical necessity. The logical necessity is readily admitted on all sides. But a moral necessity inherent in the nature of things appears to be dubious, not to say incredible. The advantage which the logical claim seems to have over the moral claim is, however, apparent only, and rests entirely upon the assumption that reality responds to intellect rather than to personality. That assumption contains, without question, a most important truth; but it also disguises an element of error. Put in another form, it ceases to support the inference that logical claims are alone valid. Instead of positing that reality must respond to intellect, let it be admitted that reality responds to intellect as a function of personality, and then the logical

claims will no longer exclude the moral and æsthetic claims.

A self-contradictory universe would be unacceptable to logic, because such a universe, if real, would be unknowable. And that conclusion would raise the problem of disparity between reality and mind. The reality to which mind is integral must be systematic. And, since it is inconceivable that mind is no part of reality, the system of reality must be allowed. Just as a leaf is an organic part of a tree, so is mind an organ of reality. And the leaf being what it is, perhaps an oak-leaf, then the nature of the whole tree can be inferred. The oak-leaf could not grow upon any but an oak-tree, and mind could not flourish in any kind of reality but a systematic, uniform reality. Other realities are conceivable, and other kinds of trees are existent; but as the oak-leaf could belong to none of those actual trees, neither could the mind belong to any of those conceivable realities. From the nature of mind as expressed in logical claims we infer the nature of the reality to which mind belongs. The logical claims, however, do not reflect the nature of mind as such, but only the nature of mind on its intellectual side. Mind as such is also reflected in the moral and in the æsthetic claims, and from these also we may infer something of the nature of the reality to which mind, as such (and not mind as merely cognitive) is integral.

Intellect as such is an abstraction. Intellect is not itself a complete organ functioning in a perfect body of reality. Intellect is merely an activity of an organ. Cognition is one mode of organic functioning; volition is another mode; and emotion yet another. Cognition is no more an organ of reality than emotion. The whole organ of which these are functions is the mind as a centre of consciousness. And the characteristic of mind as a centre of consciousness is its growth in organic unity and wholeness. The nature of the whole which in mind is coming into being is what we call personality.

Intellect is, therefore, a function of an evolving organic whole. Apart from the whole developing personality, intellect has no being. And, as a function of the whole, its nature is qualified by the nature of the whole. Intellect is an activity of an imperfect organic whole which is cognitive, emotional and volitional throughout its being. What is organic to reality as a perfect whole is not intellect, but the evolving personality of which intellect is a function. It is, therefore, personality which is integral to reality; and it is from personality as organic to the whole that we are to judge the nature of the whole. It is mind, or better, personality, that is to reality as a whole what the leaf is to the tree. Intellect is merely, as it were, the capacity of the leaf to absorb light.

If, then, reality must conform to the nature of personality on its intellectual side, it must equally conform to the nature of personality as moral. A reality that is non-moral is as contrary to the nature of personality as a reality that is self-contradictory. If reality is non-moral, then personality is not an essential element in reality. It is not possible to say that personality is the moral part of reality, for morality cannot be limited. In being moral, personality either is or is not in conformity with the nature of reality. That it is in conformity with its own nature as personal, though not with the nature of reality as a whole, is certainly a basis for morality, but only for the morality of expediency, utility, convention and so on. Morality as experienced by personality has the unique quality belonging to responses between personality and reality. But, apart from that, if reality were non-moral there would be no place for personality within reality. And the unreality of personality would be a greater problem than the moral nature of reality.

The moral conscience, then, points to an object just as the intellect does. Emotion, of course, is not independent of an object, but it is more subjective than

intellect or conscience. Its verdict is far from negligible when the nature of the object of experience is estimated. But its contribution is secondary. The establishment of objectivity must rest mainly with the moral and intellectual activities of mind. But both bear testimony to the nature of the object. The moral conscience is an experience which belongs normally to a response between person and person. Its extension to relationships between a personal subject and a non-personal object is only possible after a considerable advance has been made in moral response between persons. But long before the transition from personal to non-personal objects is recognised, an experience of moral response to reality is found. And the witness of moral experience is that this response is more intensely moral in quality than the response between man and man. The kind of object responded to when the moral consciousness is directed upon reality is a perfectly moral object.

It is in this experience that morality passes over into religion, and there the moral response becomes at once both a conviction of sin and an assurance of forgiveness. Morality may flourish apart from religion. But when it is true to itself and recognises its own unique nature, it reaches out to a religion that is based upon the nature of reality. Morality can only attain to its own ideal when it becomes actual in moral personality. No action can be called morally right or wrong, good or evil, without reference to all the relevant details in the environment; neither can it become more than formally moral without reference to the state of mind of the agent. But the motives effective at the time of moral choice and action depend upon the permanent character or personality of the subject making the moral response. Morality is, therefore, a proper response of the personality as a whole to the environment. And the environment which is the sphere of moral action cannot be limited: it is as wide as personal response can be. In this way morality loses itself at last in religion. The

truly moral man is he whose every action is in harmony with a full and perfect response of his personality to reality as a whole. And this response is religious. Morality is thus applied religion.

But ethical theory, as distinct from morality, may, quite legitimately, limit the scope of its study to the province of human relationships. And, provided the arbitrary limits imposed for convenience are always recognised, such specialised study is of great value. Morality, however, cannot be thus confined. In all studies of life, in whatever phase, the principle of continuity must be allowed to hold. There are no rigid demarcations in life. All real qualities overflow our categories. The theory of ethics may ignore religion, and the practice of morals may forget it. Yet religion lies close to morality in the ultimate. And this affinity can never be neglected by religion, except to its own detriment. On the one hand, the moral life is the condition of religious understanding; and on the other hand, true religion has always as its consequence a high moral integrity. Only the power of religion can enable us to lead a perfectly moral life; but only as we are moral in our life can we enter into the genuine experience of religion. This must be so, because both morality and religion require a response of a unified, integrated personality. But the development of personality depends, as we have seen, upon the personal factors in the object of response. The initiative, both for religion and morality, comes from the side of reality. Only when personality is being evoked in us by what is personal in reality can we become moral agents. Without personality there is no morality. Thus, morality depends upon the prior action of reality upon the human mind. In morality and religion we have two parallel and interacting series. But the first beginning must come from the object of religious response quickening personality in the subject. Afterwards, the further response from the subject to the object depends upon the moral

actions of developing personality. And moral actions result from religious responses. The inspiration and power for the moral life come first from the object, but only on the condition that the life is moral can any fuller knowledge and understanding of the object be gained. And without a perfect religious response to reality there cannot be either harmony and development of personality in the subject or the right evaluation of the object. And these are the two essential conditions of perfect morality.

Morality and religion, then, both require a response from personality as a whole; and morality at last becomes what religion also must be—a response to reality as a whole. The reality responded to by religion is conceived as personal whenever religion becomes true to its own inherent nature, and the reality responded to by morality must be conceived as moral whenever morality expresses what is its distinctive and essential character. In order to be moral, and to contain moral values, reality must be personal. There, again, morality rests on religion. To be moral, reality must itself not only receive but make responses. The kind of reality needed by morality is the kind already delineated as the reality sought by science, philosophy, art and religion. A system of inter-relations co-ordinated into a centre, and having a personal character, would be a reality making moral responses. God, as the principle, or nature, or nucleus of the system is related to every factor in the system; and all that is depends upon him and derives from him its meaning and value. God, as the dominant in the whole field of reality, being himself a personal subject, is able to make a moral response to the field of his being, although the field is non-personal. The lack of personality in the object is not destructive of morality in the response, provided the subject is personal. God's relationship to the whole universe is, therefore, a moral response. It is the response of a Creator to his creation. And the Creator cannot be conceived as devoid of

responsibility for his creation. God's relationship to the developing personalities within his field of being is also, of course, a moral response. And when we come in the next part of this book to study the nature of God we shall see that God is, so to say, a system or harmony within himself; that he is within his own nature both the perfect subject and perfect object of moral response.

PART III

THE RESPONSIVE OBJECT OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER I

CHRISTIAN MONOTHEISM AS THE CENTRE OF RESPONSE

WHENEVER religion passes from polytheism to monotheism it makes a new beginning upon a different plane of thought. And thereafter no compromise is possible between the higher and the lower types of belief. The one is the denial of the other. Religion is a continuous advance from animatism and animism at the one extreme to monotheism at the other; but at the stage where polytheism is transcended the change affects the whole quality of religion. The step forward at that point is irretrievable. To look back is treachery. Before the glimpse of the one God has been received, the many gods may stand as symbols of religious truth, partial and crude, no doubt, but capable of sustaining religion until a more adequate symbol is found. But once that new symbol has been found in the unity of God, then the many gods are no longer tokens of partial truth, but become at once false gods. To believe in God it is necessary to disbelieve in gods. An antagonism between monotheism and polytheism is, therefore, inevitable. The story of religion in the Old Testament affords an illustration of the constant and unabated opposition between the monotheism of the prophets and the idolatry and polytheism of the peasantry. Inspired by the monotheism of the eighth-century prophets—Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah—the Deuteronomic reformers were determined to establish and secure for ever the worship of the one God. To them it appeared that the only method which would be adequate to the situation was the dual policy of restricting all worship to the temple at Jerusalem and of destroying altogether the local shrines where the Baalim had been worshipped from earliest times. Whereas

formerly the many shrines had been the symbols of many gods, henceforth the one shrine was to become the symbol of the one God.

This practical expedient adopted by the reformers and carried into effect towards the end of the seventh century in the reign of Josiah, although inspired by the great prophetic movement, failed lamentably as an outward manifestation of the prophetic ideal of the divine unity. Like so many other organisations and institutions since those days, the reformed system expressed only what was incidental to the ideal and obscured what was essential. The prophets had revealed a qualitative monotheism, but the reformers had only understood a numerical monotheism. But it was possible to accept the numerical idea of unity in the Godhead without transcending the level of polytheistic religion. The simple change in numbers from many to one did not necessarily imply a changed conception of the character of God. The real distinction between polytheism and monotheism, however, is not a difference of number, but of nature. It is the *character* of the God of monotheism which lifts his worship above the level of all other worship. The mere belief in one God may be the result of poverty of imagination or lack of contact with any but a single local shrine. And the restriction of worship to one God does not preclude belief in the existence of other gods belonging to other tribes and other places. It is monolatry rather than monotheism that is reflected in the belief and practice of the Hebrews. There was, for instance, without question, a true God in Samaria, and while Ephraim dwelt in Samaria it was sin to worship any other God but Jahweh. But when the inhabitants were removed by the power of Assyria from the territory of Jahweh after the fall of Samaria, the obligation to worship Jahweh was no longer binding, since the power of Jahweh to help his worshippers was restricted to his own country. Jahweh worship was not, therefore, offered by the Israelites in Assyria. Instead, the religion of the Assyrians was

adopted, and in due course Jahweh was forgotten. Although the worship proper to the northern kingdom had been the worship of one God, this had not been true monotheism. In their hearts and minds the people had never risen above the level of the polytheism of the local shrines. And when a century later these shrines were ordered to be destroyed, the centralising of worship at Jerusalem only perpetuated the monolatry of earlier days. The monotheism of the prophets was a new and different religion requiring a new covenant and claiming the sacrifice of a broken and a contrite heart.

Just as the fall of Samaria led to the disappearance of Jahweh-worship amongst those taken captive to Assyria, so in like manner a cessation of Jahweh-worship amongst those taken captive to Babylon might have been the sequel to the fall of Jerusalem. That the earlier story was not repeated was due to the gradual acceptance by the people of the continuous witness borne by the later prophets to the true and qualitative monotheism first proclaimed by the eighth-century prophets, but subsequently misconceived by the seventh-century reformers. Amongst the greatest of those who followed in the train of the early monotheists was Jeremiah. For a time, apparently, he was hopeful that the Deuteronomic reform might lead to more spiritual ways of belief and worship. He soon discovered, however, that the new order failed to express the changed conception of God's nature and character. Accordingly, he was compelled to disapprove of the new reform in the mode of worship. In place of a reformed law, he gave the promise of a new covenant. Nothing less could be adequate to the new idea of God. God's relation with his people was not numerical, local and ceremonial; it was spiritual, universal and moral. Although Isaiah had taught the inviolability of Jerusalem on the ground that the temple was the habitation of Jahweh, Jeremiah was constrained to predict the inevitable destruction of Jerusalem as the necessary evidence that God was not restricted to a local habitation. The same

spiritual conception of God is taught during the exile by the unknown prophet and by the author of the servant songs.[1] Not only the unity but also the universality of God were seen to depend upon his character and nature as spiritual and righteous. Subsequent history, however, once more distorted the ideal. Just as the Deuteronomic reform had reduced the idea of spiritual unity to the level of numerical unity, so in like manner the later priestly school was to degrade the universality of God to the plane of nationality. God, indeed, was the God of the whole world. But he was first and last the God of the Jews; wherefore, his dominion over the world must lead to the world supremacy of the Jews under their Messiah. True monotheism was thus again spoilt by a failure to recognise that its essence was in its quality and character.

Monotheism, then, must mean spiritual religion. The supreme utterance of monotheism is to be found in the words: "God is a Spirit, and they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth." And this statement was given as the solution to the problem involved in localising and restricting God. Jerusalem stood too much for the numerical, local, ceremonial and national conception of the one God. True worship belonged neither to Mount Gerizim nor to Jerusalem. True religion belonged to the new covenant, which, being spiritual, was at once universal and individual. The foundation of Christianity is in spiritual monotheism; and only by clinging tenaciously to monotheism can we be Christian in our hearts and minds. In the proclamation, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord," Christianity confirms the qualitative monotheism of the prophets, while in the declaration already mentioned it perfects the conception. The monotheism of Christianity is qualitative not numerical. And the doctrine of the Godhead must be so developed as to remain true to this foundation. The interpretation of the Trinity, for instance, must not be allowed to degenerate to the

[1] Isaiah xl.-lv.

numerical level. Its meaning must be found in a qualitative monotheism. It is not destructive of the unity of God, but declaratory of the nature of divine unity. Monotheism rests upon the character of God.

It is the character of God also which distinguishes qualitative monotheism from the monotheism of both pantheism and deism. In pantheism, God is one; but the nature of God is not what a spiritual monotheism demands. The unity is still quantitative rather than qualitative. The identification of God with the world is only the limiting case of polytheism. In polytheism the gods may be identified with parts of nature, either with the heavenly bodies or with trees, rivers, mountains and other things on earth. In pantheism the whole of nature is substituted for its parts, and the God of the whole replaces the gods of the parts. But the change involved in substituting the whole for the parts implies only the reduction of many to one and does not necessarily imply a different essential conception of deity. The God of pantheism is unable to rise sufficiently above the level of numerical unity to attain to that spiritual character which is essential to true monotheism. Similarly with deism, there is no radical change in the conception of God. Its God is one; but what distinguishes it from polytheism and pantheism is rather the locus than the nature of God. The habitation of polytheistic gods is in some place of nature, or at some shrine, or within some image. The habitation of a pantheistic God is in the totality of nature. The habitation of a deistic God is remote from nature. But character is not essential to the idea of God in deism. We are still on the wrong side of the gulf and monotheism lies beyond.

The conception of God which is typical of religion in its highest and purest form is what we have distinguished as qualitative monotheism. We have not to find a place in reality for a merely numerical monotheism. That would not serve our purpose. And, moreover, pantheism and deism have already found their own place in something

that falls short of reality as a whole. Nothing will fully satisfy the religious need, however, except the assurance that the God whose nature is found in monotheism proper is the heart of reality. The God of monotheism must have being in the ultimate reality and must also be the dominant factor in that ultimate reality. The method of philosophy is first to frame a theory of reality and afterwards to ask what place can be found for God, and how God's nature will be qualified by occupying such a place in such a reality? But a metaphysic of religion reverses this procedure and begins with what is essential to God, and inquires afterwards what must be the nature of the reality whose centre is in such a God? But both methods must meet if they are true. Science and philosophy from the one side, and religion from the other, are penetrating into the same reality. But, as in the construction of a tunnel when the boring is begun from both sides of the mountain, the actual meeting of the parties is only possible at the completion of the task; so here the building of one line right through from science to religion will be the final far-off achievement. Meanwhile, however, calculations can be made from both ends in order to ascertain the likelihood of a meeting being effected. And in the light of these reckonings the direction from one side or the other may be corrected from time to time.

When we move onwards from the side of a religious metaphysic towards the centre of reality, it is with philosophy rather than with science that we must expect first to compare findings. And as the matter stands at present, philosophy and religion do not appear to be moving towards the same centre. Neither monism nor pluralism, for instance, seem to be pointing in the right direction. Pluralism is unsatisfactory to the religious consciousness because it cannot make the God of monotheism ultimate in reality. The place of dominance has to be shared. The conflict of good and evil cannot be reconciled. God is not absolute in his domain. But equally unsatisfactory to religion is the philosophy of monism. In that setting we

may make God the absolute if we choose, but only by denying to him that character which distinguishes monotheism as the highest type of religious belief. Or, if we retain the character of God, then we must be content that God should be less than the ultimate. For, in monism, only the absolute is completely and ultimately real. And since God for monism is less than the absolute he cannot be the ultimately real. The character of God involves a degree of finitude and limitation and, therefore, according to the standard of monism, God must be, in a measure, unreal. The dilemma presented by monism is this, either God must be characterless or else he must be less than ultimate reality. And this dilemma is intolerable to religion.

But in rejecting this or that system of philosophy, religion is not declaring against philosophy as such, or pretending to have no need of the help which philosophy can give. Religion is entitled to propound its problem to philosophy and may expect philosophy to devote its best talents to elucidating the difficulty. It is not otherwise as between science and philosophy. Science is always free to pass on to philosophy its unresolved perplexities. And religion may claim the same right to offer material for philosophy to deal with. The right to demand of philosophy a just estimation of religious thought arises from the assumption that the religious consciousness, like the moral consciousness, is an experience of personality as a whole in relation with reality as a whole. Its findings must, therefore, be relevant and, indeed, very pertinent to any study of the nature of reality. They could only be dismissed as irrelevant on the assumption that reality is knowable only by intellect and not rather by harmonised and developed personality. And this assumption must be continually called in question. Just as the advance of science has rendered much philosophy obsolete, so likewise the progress of religious thought may sometimes call for the rejection on the part of philosophy of some of its theories. There are, of course, times when both science and religion must defer to the ruling of philos-

ophy. But there are times when philosophy must submit to the authority of religion no less than to the authority of science. Allowing, then, the function of personality in interpreting reality, what kind of reality will satisfy, not merely the intellectual consciousness, but the æsthetic consciousness too and also the moral and religious consciousness?

The detailed construction and criticism of theories of reality is the province of philosophy proper. That task need not be undertaken here. Certain suggestions, however, may be offered as to the nature of reality if it is to satisfy at once scientific, æsthetic, moral and religious requirements. The primary demand from all quarters is for a system. But systems differ in kind, and it is not necessary to posit of reality the kind of system that science would accept. If we can conceive a kind of system that would meet the needs of morality and religion we may be able to indicate how the system of science can form a branch of the completer system and so be real without being the whole reality. The suggestion put forward is this: that reality is an organic system and has a character distinctive of its being. This character, or principle of wholeness, or centre of being, is what the religious consciousness claims as personal in nature and what the moral consciousness claims as moral in nature. The nature of reality as an organic system is what we call God. God is not the totality of existence, yet he permeates and dominates all being, just as mind informs the whole of the physical body. But God, to be personal and moral, must have scope for relationship and response. This necessity is characteristic of every organic unity. It is of the essence of an organism to respond as a whole to its environment. An organism is not a self-contained, inclusive, unrelated centre. Its nature is not wholly internal. It goes out of itself; and in its capacity of response to environment can be found an index of its level in the scale of organic development. In like manner God, in order that he may be personal and moral, must be a

centre of relationships and responses. But there is this difference between God as the supreme, all-inclusive, organic system and other subordinate organisms: whereas finite organisms respond to independent objects, the objects of God's relationship and response must be dependent upon his being, nature and character. Reality is a system in which all is dependent upon God as its centre. But that does not mean that God is the totality of dependent existence. He is that upon which the totality depends. Reality is God *plus* all that depends upon the nature of God. But to be dependent upon God is not to be God. The universe is dependent upon God, but is not God. The universe is the field of God's operation, the sphere of relationship and response, the correlate of his personal and moral nature, the extension of his being beyond his essential self-hood, the creation of his mind, the expression of his character—but the universe is not God.

God dominates the whole because, not being the whole, he stands within the whole as the centre of relationships, the support of all existences, the source of all consciousness. God is the dominant in the dependent field of being, and as such he is ultimate and absolute reality. He is ultimate and absolute, however, not at the expense of his character (as monism would have it), but in virtue of his character. It is because God is what he is that he is the essence of all reality. Only by being the God of qualitative monotheism could he be the centre of all relations and responses. The God who in himself is qualified by his nature and character to be the very foundation of all reality is the God who is the quest of all religion. The God who is perfect in all the relationships and responses sustained by him throughout all existence is the God who is the ultimate of the moral consciousness. The scope of science is found in the examination by analysis and measurement of that field of God which we call the universe, which is dependent on God, informed by God and expressive of God, but

which is not God. The sphere of æsthetics is the study of the same universe, but in its non-metrical, qualitative and synthetic nature. The task of philosophy is the co-ordination of all the knowledge of religion, morality, science and æsthetic with a view to the discovery of the one reality that is in all and through all and over all.

Although religion focusses upon God as the centre of all being, it understands that God is everywhere—that in him and through him and to him are all things. The universe as God's field of operation, as the creation of his mind, and as the vehicle of his presence, forms part of the object of religion. But the universe for religion is always the consequence of God. The desire of religion is for God only; but God being the fulness that filleth all things, all things become expressive of God. The cosmic emotion, conspicuous in mystical experience and familiar to many whose connection with formal religion is but slight, is an essential element in the religious consciousness. But in the full and perfect religious response it is secondary and derivative and receives a deeper significance as a feature of the soul's response to God himself. And just as religion, by focussing upon God, gives larger meaning to the cosmic emotion, so, too, a genuine religion should inspire a passion for all that belongs to God and an intense interest in all that adds to the knowledge of God and of his ways. Neither philosophy, art nor science can be matters of indifference to the seeker after God. All have something to tell of him, and all must be listened to as revealers of his truth.

But since God is not the field of his activity (though he is in the field and the field depends wholly upon him) there must be some difference between God in his essential being and the universe which rests upon him. The distinction between what is essentially God and what is dependent upon God may be found in the space-time continuum. To the universe the space-time continuum is radical. If we subtract time and space from the universe, then no universe will be left. The universe is

essentially a durational-extension. But the God upon whom the universe depends is not, like the universe, a being in time and space. The attribute of eternity places God above time, while the attribute of infinity places him beyond space. Eternity is not endless time, neither is infinity unlimited space. The infinite and eternal God is unrestricted by the conditions of space-time existence. Only as himself outside of the space-time continuum could God sustain the universe in space and through time. The being of God is not the kind of being which the universe possesses. If, as is sometimes suggested, the term existence be arbitrarily limited to existence in space and time, then, although God enters into space and time, his essential being is outside of such existence. In that case reality would consist on the one hand of existence in space and time and on the other hand of being unrestricted by space and time. To be beyond existence, in this sense of the term, would not necessarily mean to be unreal, but might mean to be more real than existence. Such limitation of meaning, however, is likely to lead to confusion, and it seems better to say that there are two kinds of existence—existence in space and time, and existence unconditioned by space and time. The existence of God is then of the second kind.

When we say that God is unrestricted we must mean that he is not shut up within the space-time continuum. But if God is unrestricted we must also mean that he is not shut out from the space-time continuum. The universe of space and time would be equally a limitation of God's nature and being whether it locked him in or locked him out. But God is not, so to say, imprisoned in eternity and unable, in the poetry of an early myth, to walk in the garden in the cool of the evening. Rather we must say that the outgoings of the morning and the evening praise him, and that he it is who is the Maker of the seven stars and Orion. To think of God as other than immanent is to conceive of his eternity and infinity

under temporal and spacial forms, as if eternity were a period at the end of time and infinity a territory bounded by space. It is because God is eternal and infinite that he can enter into time and space. The transcendence of God is not the antithesis of his immanence. God is transcendent because his immanence in space and time is not the limitation of his being to the conditions of space and time. Unless God were transcendent he could not be immanent in the universe, for he would then be identical with the universe. But God is not the universe. The universe is the field of God's immanence, while God himself is the dominant of the field, not its mere totality.

God, whose essential being is infinite and eternal, is also personal and moral. The personal and moral nature, as we know it in humanity, is operative upon the plane of space and time. The inherent development of personal and moral nature runs side by side with achievement won under the conditions set by space and time. But the character of moral personality places it upon the side of the infinite and eternal. Its being is not of the stuff of the universe. Space and time are irrelevant to its essence. Yet space and time appear to be necessary as a sphere of activity, or region of relationship and response, over against which the moral and personal self may come into being and grow to perfection. That such a mode of existence as the space-time continuum is the only possible correlate of the personal God is more than we can say. Conceivably the modes of existence possible as fields of operation for a personal and moral God are numberless. Modes conditioned otherwise than by space and time might equally well emerge from God's being as dependent on him and dominated by him. The only mode known to us, however, is the space-time continuum dependent on and dominated by the infinite and eternal God. And within the province of space and time we do find conditions set which by their nature are conducive to the development of moral personality. Not

that the conditions make such growth easy. Often the reverse is true. And not that in themselves alone such conditions are adequate for the development of personality. But immanent within these conditions is God unconditioned by space and time. And the setting over against each other of the conditions of space and time and the character of the infinite and eternal may lead to the development of personality by means of a proper response to God and a right relationship to the universe.

The use of the universe as a sphere within which moral personality may develop need not imply that the universe has no other meaning and significance than as a mean to this specific end. The complexity of the end would certainly necessitate much variety in the means. But probably the universe as ordered to that sole purpose would be very different from what it is, and might be less valuable to personality as a whole on account of its narrowed nature. The universe is not merely the schoolroom for man's education. Much less is it the playground for his amusement. It is neither a museum to satisfy his curiosity nor a picture gallery to stimulate his imagination. Only when man abrogates the claim to a central position in the universe can he begin to understand the universe as it is. The effectiveness of the world as a vale of soul-making is due to the very fact that man is not its centre, and that it does not exist just for man's sake. The universe has its centre not in man but in God. It depends, not upon the nature of man, but upon the nature of God. Much in the universe baffles the mind of man, much lacks utility as judged by man's standards, and some things there are that offend man's ideas, so contrary do they seem to all that is essential to man's life and progress. These features forbid any self-centred interpretation of the world in which we live. It is when we approach the world forgetful of ourselves and mindful only of that which is presented to us that we discover in nature a meaning and value which are not dependent upon our own minds. And such values can

be all the better appreciated by us at their true worth just because they can never belong to us. Only as we learn to rejoice in good things without coveting them as our own possession can we set our affections on things which are above.

The character of nature as independent of man and of his needs is the very quality which equips nature for the task of soul-making. Nature's independence of man is its dependence upon God. The independence of nature is evidence of its objectivity. The universe is not the creation of man's desire or need. And the objectivity of nature carries with it the objectivity of its character, system and centre. If it is itself objective, though dependent, how much more must that on which it depends be objective. The objective existence of God as the centre of relationships in the universe, as the principle of its unity, as the nature of its system, is assured. But God is more than the centre of the physical universe. For within the universe we find not only relationships between physical elements and entities, but also responses between centres of consciousness and their environments, and between themselves and other similar centres. We find these vital responses culminating in personal responses. And these responses of life and personality are factors in reality. The universe which depends on God contains personalities whose origin and growth also depend on God as a centre of response. The God of the universe must, therefore, be more than the centre of the physical universe. He must also be the centre of the moral and personal individuals who, while within the physical universe, nevertheless begin to share a mode of existence unrestricted by the space-time continuum.

It is usual to teach that the universe is contingent and not necessary to the being and nature of God. And it may be allowed that this physical universe of space and time is not the only mode in which God's field can exist. Moreover, God is essentially himself without reference

to his field of operation. But at the same time it may be held that God is himeslf plus a congenial field of being. It is God's nature not only to be himself, but to go out from himself, to express himself, to reveal himself, to respond to himself and to that which he himself sustains over against himself. It is God's nature to exist not only in his essential being, but also in some mode continuous with his being. And while it may not be necessary that this mode should be a space-time continuum, yet, since this is the mode that has been adopted by God, it may be inferred that the nature of durational and extended existence is continuous with and not contrary to the essential existence of God as eternal and infinite. In learning to understand the universe of space and time we are gaining knowledge of God. But this will not be the whole knowledge of God, and it need not be knowledge of what is most typical and characteristic of God. A great artist may do many things that become him and express him and lead to a true understanding of what he is, but in his paintings he may show his highest and truest nature. Or, as in the case of Benjamin Haydon, whose best work was not in pictures but in his autobiography and diary, although a man seeks self-expression in art, his character may be revealed most truly and fully in literature, or in some other sphere. Thoreau made pencils, but he revealed himself most truly in "Walden." Spinoza made lenses, Paul the Apostle made tents, and so on. Numerous instances may be cited to illustrate the truth that personal nature is expressed in varying degrees of fulness through its diverse operations. And so it is with a personal God. All that he does teaches us something of what he is, but all does not equally declare his nature. And his nature may be such that not in any part of his creation is he so truly expressive of his essential being as in personal response with growing personalities.

God is the nature of that system which science discovers in detail, which philosophy constructs in outline,

and which the arts express in miniature and by transposition. But God is not merely the centre of a system of metrical relationships, nor of logical relationships, nor of qualitative relationships. He is that, but more characteristically he is the centre of vital, and especially of personal, responses. But there is only one God, and one vast system dependent upon him as its informing nature. God who sustains all the relationships which constitute the existence of the universe—God who by his nature makes the universe a sphere not of coincidences but of uniformities—God whose existence at its centre gives to the universe the quality and character of being an organic whole and not a mere totality—God who is revealed in varying degrees throughout the universe—is revealed most fully as the centre of moral and personal response. It is one God who is all this. And only by being conceived in terms of the highest category required can God fulfil the function of deity at all the different levels of existence. The higher includes the lower, the spiritual the material, the personal the physical. The one God who is not only the God of the universe as a space-time continuum, but of the whole reality including every being and every mode of existence, must be the spiritual God of qualitative monotheism.

The attributes of the one God of Christian monotheism follow from his essential nature as a centre of relations and responses. Personal he must be in order to evoke and maintain personal responses between himself and awaking and growing personalities. Righteous he must be in order to sustain the moral response directed upon reality as a whole. As eternal he is not restricted by time, as infinite he is not limited by space. He is omnipresent in the sense that the whole universe is in varying degrees the expression of his nature and character. He is omniscient, for he is the mind of reality and outside of his mind there can be no existence of any kind. He is omnipotent because the whole universe depends upon him. He is Creator because the world is the extension of

his being under the mode of the space-time continuum. The holiness of God attaches to his nature as ultimate and absolute reality. But while religion conceives of God under all these familiar attributes, it thinks of him chiefly in his character of Fatherhood and Saviourhood.

God is the Father of our souls and not merely the Creator of our souls in the sense in which he is the Creator of all the world besides. It is he and he only who can call forth from us that response to the personal in himself whereby we acquire our personality. Having created us as parts of the universe, he begets us as sons of himself. When we respond to the call of God upon us we become persons, and according to the measure of the response which we make to the God of reality we attain to real personality. In that response to the initiative of the infinite and eternal Spirit we are lifted above the environment of space and time and share also in the life of the Spirit. Our environment is enlarged to include the spiritual as well as the temporal and spacial, and in response to the things of the Spirit we become integral to the system of the eternal and infinite.

The correlate of Fatherhood is Saviourhood. There is no precise distinction between the two attitudes of God towards us. In calling us to respond to the personal, God is beginning to save us from the existence which is merely response to non-personal objects. The whole nurture of Fatherhood is also the activity of Saviourhood. When, however, we think of God as Saviour instead of thinking of him as Father, we refer to the attitude of God towards us when we fail to respond to him as we should. Our advance from the level of existence as centres of consciousness to the level of existence as subjects of response to the divine object is broken by innumerable lapses. Even after we have learnt by response something of the nature of the object which evokes our response, we often enough respond to some lower object in preference to the highest. We often try to make self the centre of our life, instead of cultivating

the God-centred life. We sometimes make a deliberate refusal to the further calls of reality upon our souls. We yield to the pleasure of self and ignore the reality of God. And then God seeks to save us. He works to restore us. He comes to renew our being. He becomes the Redeemer of our souls from sin and death. For, to turn our faces against the reality that challenges us is to go the way of unreality. But reality will not let us escape from its hold or sink to some lower stage of existence than that for which we are destined. The God who is our Father when we respond, is thus our Saviour when we fail to respond.

CHAPTER II

THE DIVINE TRIUNITY AS AN ETERNAL RESPONSE

God is a unity. The attribute of unity is essential to the highest conception of deity. The reality which as a system is God must be one. Whatever else may be believed about the nature of God, unity must be accepted first; and nothing can be allowed to be true of God which conflicts with that unity. But the bare assertion of unity is insufficient. At once it must be asked, What kind of unity is meant? There is mathematical unity which excludes diversity, and there is organic unity which co-ordinates differences. The unity of reality as a systematic whole is to be thought of not as a logical unity of non-contradiction. That conception is too formal. It must be thought of as a personal unity of harmonious response. The unity of the Godhead is a qualitative unity. It is the singleness which belongs to perfectly balanced character. The singlemindedness of developed personality represents the type of qualitative unity which must be attributed to God. Such unity is distinct from totality. The oneness of reality is not a summation of all its integers. It is its character as a system. There is a difference between a totality and a whole. A whole is a totality, but a totality is not a whole. What makes a totality a whole is a quality or character, a principle of unity or an organic nature. A totality is analysable by science. And a whole, since it is a totality, may also be examined by the method of analysis. But in that case what is investigated is the nature of the totality and not the nature of the whole. The character of wholeness is unanalysable. This does not mean that the whole is incapable of scientific study, but only that the special method of analysis is here, in the nature of the case, inapplicable. Reality as a whole

has a character or quality which cannot be reduced to lower terms. It is ultimate and unanalysable into elements or factors. It cannot be explained in terms of anything lower than itself. The wholeness of reality is the unity of the Godhead.

Christian monotheism has been at pains to distinguish the unity of the Godhead from mathematical and logical unity on the one hand and from totality on the other. The particular word used in the history of doctrine to describe the qualitative nature of the divine unity is the "Trinity." Recently the word triunity has sometimes been preferred, and it has the advantage of emphasising the fundamental unity. The Holy Trinity is the kind of unity possessed by God as a personal whole. The idea of the Trinity is in no sense numerical, but entirely qualitative. Its function is to define the unity as a unity of character. "So are we forbidden by the Catholic Religion to say there be three Gods or three Lords." It is because the unity is not numerical but qualitative that it can be a trinity. But a non-numerical unity cannot be a numerical trinity. The connotation of triunity must be a quality or character constituting a unity or whole. The quality in the unity expressed by the Trinity is the quality of response. The meaning of triunity is that the nature of the divine unity is responsive. Just as response is the index of personality in man, so it is the essential mark of the personal wholeness of reality conceived as God. A triune God is a God whose nature it is to respond as a personal whole.

The doctrine of the Trinity affirms, then, that response is the essence of the nature of God. God does not merely become responsive to the universe of his creation and to centres of consciousness within the universe. He does not acquire through creation a character which apart from creation he did not or could not have. Creation does not make God; neither does God, so to say, make himself by means of the creation. Creation is an extension in space and a persistence

through time of what God is essentially in his infinite and eternal being. The universe is continuous with God; and what God is in the universe he is so there, because he is so first and essentially in his own nature. God responds within his creation, because it is his character to respond and evoke response. Apart from the particular field of his operation, which we call the space-time continuum, and within himself as the dominant of this or any other mode of existence, God is responsive. The character of the nucleus of all reality is personal response. The nature of God, that is to say, is not only a system of relationships, although it is that. God must also be the centre of all personal responses throughout the universe. And it is to this necessity that the doctrine of the Trinity bears witness.

The kind of response which belongs to the nature of God is the response of a perfect and personal whole. The essentially personal character of the divine response is described as a relationship of Father to Son. Eternally within his own being God is perfectly responsive to himself. The nature of reality as a system of relations and responses must be perfect relationship and perfect response. Everything in reality depends upon the nature of the centre of reality in God. There could not be systematic relations and perfect responses within the universe unless these were essential to the nature of reality at its core. Eternally, God's nature is perfect personal response, the response of perfect Father to perfect Son. Thus, when God calls to man as a Father to a child, he is expressing his eternal nature. That is no new character in God which needed man for its achievement. In the divine Fatherhood, God is extending to man the response which is his own true and abiding character. And in responding to the call of God's Fatherhood man is not yielding to a quality which his own need has produced. He is responding to the essential nature of reality. Before ever God responds to man, God responds to God. The response of God to man is part

of the continuation of God's being into his field of creation.

Within his eternal being God is at once the subject of response and the object of response and also the response itself. The response, of course, is impossible apart from the subject and object, but equally impossible is either subject or object without response between them. All are equally real and equally necessary. As the subject of response, God is the eternal Father; as the object, he is the eternal Son; as the response, he is the eternal Spirit. Within himself, therefore, God is a perfect system of personal response. We may thus legitimately speak of God as three persons. The subject of response is personal, the object is personal and, of course, the response is a personal response. But when we speak of God in three persons we emphatically do not mean God as three personalities. That idea at once takes us back from the trinity of character to the trinity of number. We drop below the level of qualitative monotheism to the level of tritheism. Whatever may be the difficulties involved in the conception of the personal nature of God, they are slight compared with the problems raised when we conceive of three centres of personal response. God is essentially three persons. There is, to use the customary terms, an essential as well as an economic Trinity. The threefoldness of God's being is not solely a matter of aspects of the Godhead. We may, indeed, conceive of God under one or other aspect as Father, Son or Holy Spirit, but the character of God as eternally responsive to himself is prior to our conception of him under these aspects. The difficulty of the docrine is due to the disparity between the essential and economic Trinity. What God is in himself may be disguised by what he is looked upon as being when regarded under separate aspects of his being. When, from the human end we regard God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, we tend to think of three separate centres of response rather than of one system of inter-

response. Then there arises the artificial problem of the personality of the Holy Spirit.

In the essential Trinity God is subject, object and response: Father, Son and Holy Spirit, "and neither is afore nor after other." The response is as personal as the subject or object. But the response, like both the subject and the object, is not a personality. To conceive of either as a separate personality is to isolate from the wholeness of God what is essential to that wholeness. God is a unity, not three unities. God is at once Father, Son and Holy Spirit. There is no Father apart from the unity of God: no Son and no Spirit except within that unity. Even if we speak of God as a personality rather than as personal, it is the unity that we so designate. If we speak of the personality of the Holy Spirit we must speak also of the personality of the eternal Son. But, in that case, the personality of God cannot but be identified with the personality of the Father as distinct from the Son and Holy Spirit, and we are thus committed to belief in a God who is three personalities. But the doctrine of the three persons does not mean that God is three personalities. It means that God is within his own nature responsive. By person we mean a factor or element in the experience of response. God eternally experiences himself. He perfectly knows himself, perfectly loves himself and is perfectly obedient to his own inherent nature. That experience, wherein God as a harmonious and complete whole perfectly knows, loves and obeys himself, is the experience of his triunity. It is a personal experience. It could not be less than personal without failing to be comprehensive. Within that personal experience is included the subject, the object and the response; and each is personal in character. Whether the whole is described as personality or as personal or as supra-personal is merely a question of terminology. Perhaps personal is the best term to use; yet, whichever term be used to describe the nature of God as a unity, it must be a misuse of terms to

describe as a personality the response wherein God as subject experiences God as object.

The Holy Spirit is a person, just as the Son and the Father are persons, because the Holy Spirit is integral to the personal experience and response. But the Holy Spirit cannot be isolated from the Godhead. The Holy Spirit is personal, because it is essential to a personal God; but except as essential to the nature of God the Holy Spirit can have no existence or meaning. Similarly, with the Father and the Son; each is real in God just as God is real in each; but neither has any reality except as essential to the character and being of God. The separation between the elements of Godhead, leading as it often does to the idea of three individual beings co-existing and co-operating, is the result of an uncritical imagination playing upon a reality that requires other symbols for its representation. Symbols we must have. Imagination is necessary to constructive experience. But symbols and images must be recognised for what they are, and criticised according to their fitness and truthfulness. Not infrequently, in the interests of fuller truth, images and symbols which have become customary must be rejected. And then it will often seem that the foundations of faith are being destroyed, whereas it is only the imagination that is being corrected. Especially when thinking of the Trinity is our imagination likely to disguise the truth. But what we must believe in is the truth about God and not our own imaginations, formed probably in childhood and coming from pictorial representations of biblical literalism rather than from any genuine spiritual experience. Our imagination of the Trinity must not be allowed to rob us of the grand conception of the character of God as essentially responsive personal experience.

The problem of the personality of the Holy Spirit is a problem for the imagination only and not for faith or experience. The analogy which we draw between the divine nature and a full and perfect response of Father

and Son provides us with two vivid images, but yields no image at all that can represent the experience itself, though this is as real and as necessary to the nature of God as either the subject or object of the mutual response. The imagination having then two distinct images, each with an essentially personal content, pictures the Godhead as two personalities, almost as two individuals, indeed sometimes, be it confessed, as two men. By such misuse of the imagination we break the second commandment. We come near to the anthropomorphism which, as we saw at the beginning, was ridiculed and rejected by Xenophanes. It is a relapse from monotheism and a contradiction of triunity. It is not even a mathematical trinity. It is a form of bitheism. The imagination which has fashioned these two pictures is impotent to form a similar picture of the Holy Spirit. Hence, for imagination, the Holy Spirit seems less actual, less important, less significant than the Father or Son. And being unable to fashion a vivid picture of a third individual, the imagination propounds the difficulty of the personality of the Holy Spirit. But the difficulty is altogether unreal and arises entirely from a misuse of the imagination. The reality of the Holy Spirit is no problem either for faith or for experience. The God of faith and experience is one God, personal and responsive, both in his attitude to man and to creation generally, and also inherently within his own being. The real object of religious faith and experience is a responsive whole, a divine triunity.

The essential nature of God is found, then, in personal response. But what God is essentially in himself he is also throughout the entire field of his operation. The field is continuous with the nature of God and is dominated by the character of God. God does not change his nature by going out into his field. God remains in himself eternally what it is his nature to be. But under a "mode" his nature is expressed throughout the field. In the universe of our experience the

nature of God is continued outward from its nucleus in God himself into the mode of space and time. In his field, the object of the divine response goes out beyond the nucleus and fills the whole field. Thus, the object of God's response is more than God himself; it is also God's field. The eternal response of God the Father to God the Son is extended to include, in the secondary sense, the universe. The universe is, therefore, created through the Son. As the object goes out from God as nucleus into the field of God, it is creative there of a further object for God. And to that created object also God responds by the Holy Spirit. The world is made through the Son and is sustained by the Spirit. The world is the outpouring of God beyond his essential being into the field of his being. The world is the correlate of God under the conditions of space and time.

The world is the object of God, responded to by God, and permeated with God's being. But the world is not God; it is only a particular mode of God's field. The world is continuous with the eternal object of God's essential response; but it is not identical with that object. The world is wholly within God's field, and God is everywhere present throughout the field; but the world is not equally expressive of God's essential nature throughout its whole extent. The world is a graded manifestation of God as its dominant. At some levels it lies close to the nature of God; at others it falls far below what is characteristic of its dominant. It is altogether divine without being equally divine at all points. God in his field cannot be as fully and characteristically himself as in his own essential and central being. There is a marked gradation between God and the universe. And that gradation, begun with the universe, continues through the universe. God is not present in the same measure in all places or at all times. The approximation of the extended object of response to the essential object in God varies at different points. Here the resemblance of some aspect to the character

of the eternal Son is close; but there it is remote in the extreme. Here the response through the Spirit is comparable to the response of the personal God; but there the Spirit is manifest only in orderly relationships. And we learn to find God by discriminating between the levels of his manifestation: our quest is for the fullest and truest expression of God in the universe.

The principle of gradation implies that somewhere we find a culmination. Passing from the level of the inorganic we come to the organic, and thence to the stage of consciousness, and through consciousness to pesonality. The Spirit which at the lowest level is the principle of relationship and uniformity is the same Spirit which at its highest reaches bears witness with our spirit that we are the sons of God. When the object of the Spirit's influence becomes personal, then it becomes more akin to the eternal object of the Holy Spirit. And the likeness between a personal object of response and the eternal object will become closer as the personal develops towards perfection. It is in perfect personality that we should come nearest to the nature of the eternal Son, the object of God the Father's eternal response through the Holy Spirit. The God who is manifest by degrees through the whole universe which he dominates would be revealed most fully in the perfect personality. The response of God as Father to perfect personality would be most like the response of God to the eternal Son. God, who is revealed everywhere in a measure, can be fully revealed only at the level of perfect personality.

It is not only conceivable, but highly probable, that God, in manifesting himself through his universe, should at one point make the fullest revelation possible under the conditions of the universe. That revelation is made in the incarnation of Jesus Christ. In him the whole universe touches God the Son. Because the nature and character of Christ are of the same essential quality as the nature and character of the eternal Son, the response

of God to Christ is identical with the response of the Father to the Son within the eternal Godhead. The world was made by the Word. The world is the throwing out to varying distances of the object centring in God himself. But in Christ the world is, so to say, at no distance from God. Here is the point where God and the universe blend and merge into one. At this moment time touches eternity: on this sight space is caught into infinity. What everywhere else is relative becomes here absolute. What is everywhere else a matter of degree is here an identity. The world is continuous with God, because in Christ it passes over into God. In him the eternal and infinite object takes the conditions of space and time. What in the Holy Trinity is the personal object, by accepting the environment of a space-time continuum becomes a personality. By emptying himself of his glory, the eternal Son becomes the incarnate Son. The response of God to Christ is, therefore, the same as the response of the Father to the Son in the eternal being of God. The universe as the object of God's response is summed up in Christ. The response of God to Christ is more congenial to the nature of God, and is more fully expressive of his true character than any other response to the universe, either in part or in whole. All else is at a lower grade, and the response from God to every other part is, therefore, conditioned by the nature of the object. Only in Christ is the nature of the object suitable to receive the full and perfect response from God. Perfect personality alone is capable of standing in such relationship with God.

The most perfect response of God to his universe is the response to Christ as the only begotten Son of the Father. And the only perfect response from the universe to God is the response of Christ. In Christ the whole world makes its only fitting answer to the call of God. All the relationships and responses throughout the world find their consummation in Christ. Christ is the world's

meaning for God. In Christ the world realises itself in the eternal purpose of God. Christ is the world offering itself to God in the one and only perfect oblation possible to it. Christ is the concentrated reality of the universe. All else is graded reality and is real in so far as it belongs to that system of existence which has its dominant principle in him. To be in Christ is to have reality. To respond to God through Christ is to fit into the true system of being. And only by so doing can we partake of the nature of the eternal and infinite. Our reality depends upon our right relationship with the centre of reality in God. Only in Christ is that relationship perfect. Only in the measure in which our relationship to God is through Christ can we share in eternal life.

The incarnate Son, being the most perfect object of God's response, sums up in himself the nature and meaning of the universe as a system. But Christ has meaning and value for God prior to the purpose of God in Christ for man. In Christ God meets himself in his field. Going out from himself into his field, he comes back to himself through Christ. The Spirit, which is abroad throughout the universe and at home in the inner being of God, comes to its own again when it descends upon Christ. The nature of Christ is the genuine nature of the authentic object of the Spirit's activity. In him the Spirit comes to rest. The dependence of the universe upon God is always through Christ. Through Christ the Spirit goes out into the creation to sustain it, and through Christ it comes back to hold all things together in the power of God. Christ has thus prior meaning for God before ever he has a meaning for man; wherefore, the meaning he has for man must be derived from his meaning for God. For God Christ means the summing up of all things under one head, the completion and perfection of the whole universe, the principle and character which makes the universe a system or whole, and such a system or whole as can stand as a fitting object of response for a personal and righteous God. And

because Christ means this to God, he means for us the reconciliation of our personalities to the perfect and personal God. In so far as we are rightly related to Christ as the principle of the universal system, we are rightly related to God as the principle of unity and character in the system of absolute reality. And the purpose of God in Christ for man is the attainment of this perfect response to the nature of the ultimate. Christ's function is, therefore, essentially that of atonement.

Apart from any sin on man's part, the atonement, or systematised harmony of the world, would have been effected by the incarnate Son. The law of this universe of space and time is development or evolution. Personality begins at the very lowest level of rudimentary response to personal factors in the environment, and grows by slow degrees until at last it is able to respond to the personal nature of reality as a whole. This advance of numerous personalities in the universe towards their own perfection must be dominated and coordinated by an ideal of perfect personality. But only as that ideal became actual in the universe would the universe be able to stand to God as the realisation of its inherent purpose. As soon as the universe is systematised under one inherent purpose, then its internal development moves towards a proper relationship to its dominant centre. The stage-by-stage advance towards perfect personality and perfect response would need to be regulated by response to a perfect personality realised within the universe, even if that advance were throughout steady and uniform. But the story of mankind is one of constant regression from higher to lower levels. And this return to a lower stage of response after a higher stage has been discovered is what we call sin. The law of growth sets the problem of perfection, or, in religious language, sanctification. And this would have needed an incarnation of the object of God's response in order that man might become a part of that perfect

and eternal object. But the fact of sin creates the necessity for reconciliation to be effected before the normal process of sanctification can be restored.

Except for the fact of sin, atonement would mean the gradual development of personality and its adaptation to the system of reality. The presence of sin constitutes a prior need to restore personality to the line of normal growth. In a world free from sin atonement might have been effected through the magnetism of personal example. But in a fallen world, where personality is prone to retrogression, more than the presentation of the ideal in actual form was needed. The atonement is only effective when the habit of sin has been broken. In Christ, the perfect object of God's response, what is shown is not an ideal of personality in isolation, but an ideal personality in the midst of the world's sin. In revealing the object of his fullest and most characteristic response as the epitome of the universe, God had also to reveal his response to the universe that had defiantly turned from him and tried to destroy the nature and meaning of the systematic whole. Whereas in Christ the universe makes its perfect response, in sinful man it refuses to respond to the demands of the whole, and seeks instead to set up independent ends and to form relations upon a lower level than that required by reality as a whole. It was the presence of sin in the world which led to the crucifixion of the incarnate Son. Except for man's sin Christ would have been welcomed as the Captain of our salvation; because of sin he was rejected, just as all the claims and calls of the divine are always rejected by sinful mankind. Man's habit of refusing the demands and appeals of reality could only result in the refusal of the supreme demand and appeal made through perfect personality.

The person of Christ is the revelation of God the Son to those who, having been restored to the normal line of development, are of the number of those who are being saved by being perfected in personality and in

responsiveness. The cross of Christ is the revelation of God the Son to those who are resisting and denying the urge to the integration of the self and the adaptation of the self to the complete environment. The cross reveals both God's attitude to sin and also sin's effect upon God. The nature of sin is the direct opposite of the nature of God. It means, in so far as it dominates, the destruction of God. And that truth is sin's judgment. The condemnation of sin is to be found in its very nature as the destruction of all that God is. It means the disruption of the system of reality; it means the dissolution of reality as moral and personal; it means the denial of mutual response between reality and developing personality; it means opposition to the power which sustains all life and existence. In the cross there is shown at once the purpose of God for man and, by contrast, the nature of sin as the frustration of that purpose. The cross is God's attempt to win man back from the way of self-centredness and spiritual death to the way of God-centredness and eternal life. To be in organic harmony with reality as a whole is to be fully and truly real: to be out of harmony is to fall away from the system of reality and to become an evil within the whole. The sin of man is the disease of the organic unity of being. The cross reveals sin as the cancerous growth that destroys the spiritual life of the universe. Sin cannot, of course, destroy the eternal and infinite God, because it cannot enter into the essence of his absolute being. His holiness repels it. Within the Godhead is the perfect harmony and response of the Holy Trinity. But in the universe as part of God's field, sin, in so far as it becomes dominant, destroys God. In the cross sin is destroying God in the universe. But also there, in the cross, from the point of view of finality, sin is itself being destroyed.

The universe is an *achieved* relationship and response: the essential Trinity is an *eternal* relationship and response. In space and time there is being built up by

degrees a system which in nature and character will have the same quality as that which is distinctive of the essential being of eternal and infinite God. As harmony, uniformity and system are gradually evolved, so the universe will acquire more and more the nature of ultimate reality. That this evolution should be a slow growth from the lowest forms up to the completest whole is an indispensable condition of existence under the mode of the space-time continuum. Accordingly, it is not the slow growth from lower to higher that is contrary to the purpose of God. What constitutes the element of evil in the world is the deliberate refusal of man to make the advance from lower to higher stages of the moral and spiritual life. This is the element which has to be subdued. And the atonement is the work of God in overcoming the evil in the world and restoring all to the order of normal advance towards the perfection of personality. To be restored to the order and harmony of God's purpose is eternal life. To deviate from right relationship with the centre of all life and existence is to go the way of unreality and to perish.

The universe acquires the nature of the infinite and eternal in so far as it approaches to the character and quality of the triune God. In some phases the universe belongs to the plane of space and time. Some relationships are essentially spacial and temporal. They stand at the extreme reach of the continuity from God as centre into that mode of his field which is our universe. Such relationships bear resemblance to the eternal response, but are, so to say, the dilution of that response within the fluid of space and time. The universe reaches nearer to its centre and acquires more of the nature of the eternal response which characterises God when within its sphere personality arises and develops towards perfection. For while the emergence of personality carries with it the risk of discord and disruption within the universal order of relationships it also gives the possibility of higher relationships akin in nature to the

divine response within the Holy Trinity. It is in personality that the universe reaches above itself and begins to touch an order and system where temporal and spacial conditions are no longer essential. In personality, the universe attains the quality of the eternal and infinite. The ultimate reality of the universe turns upon the development within it of personalities who will share in the harmony of personal response which is characteristic of God as the centre of the systematic whole of reality. The purpose of God for man is the sharing in this divine harmony of response, or, to use the religious phrase, in the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, or, again, to become members in the body of Christ.

Since the nature of God is personal response, it is in fellowship and communion that we partake of that nature and so acquire reality, or, in the language of religion, eternal life. To be in Christ is to be an organic member of that complete and perfect whole which is the object of God's response: it is to share in that fellowship of the Holy Spirit which belongs to the response of God the Father to God the Son. To be in Christ is to share in the reality of the eternal Son; it is to be held in the response with which God holds together all reality into one harmonious whole; it is to partake of the nature of the triune God. And this is fully possible only for perfect personality. Wherefore, God within his universe is training us for this fellowship with himself. Only under the conditions of space and time could we learn to understand and voluntarily to respond to the nature of the infinite and eternal God. Our training must be gradual, since our appreciation of the highest requires knowledge of an ascending scale of values. In the universe as a mode of God's field, we are led by degrees of divinity from the circumference to the centre. All degrees are degrees of God, but all are not equally God. By discovery of what is less and more divine in God's field we come to an understanding of what God must be as the dominant and nucleus of the field. And the one fact in

the whole universe which brings us nearest to the nature of God is the person of Christ.

In conceiving Christ as the fullest degree of divinity within the universe, we have given to him the only fitting place in this scheme; but we have not said all that must be said in order to explain his nature and function. The relationship of Christ to the universe is not complete and self-contained. It implies also a relationship to God upon whom the whole universe depends. And since Christ is supreme in the universe, the relationship between Christ and God must be unique. And here it is that we approach what seems to be the real problem of the Trinity. The supposed difficulty of explaining the personality of the Holy Spirit is a gratuitous and artificial problem arising from an uncritical use of the imagination and from a misconception of the character of the Trinity. The real problem is the relationship between the incarnate Son and the eternal Son. What is involved in the personal Son becoming a personality amongst other personalities within the universe?

If we distinguish between the personality and the personal nature of God (as for the sake of clarity we may do), then it must be understood that the difference is one of degree and not of kind, and that the personal is a higher degree of personality. The personal God is more, not less, than personality. And God is more than personality as we know it, because he is not subject to those limitations which attach to all finite personalities. The essence of personality is response to reality, in part or in whole. But the essence of deity is the perfect response which is the constitutive of the being of reality as a system. The centre of response for personalities is, therefore, a single point within the field of God, while the centre of response for God is within the essential being which sustains the whole field. Limited personalities, that is to say, have their being within the being of the infinite and eternal God whose character is moral and personal. Personality, therefore, is subject to

limitations which are not present to the personal as such. But the personal which lies beyond these limitations may become personality by accepting these limitations. That change from the purely personal condition to the condition of personality involves no qualitative or essential change in the character and nature of the personal, but only the restriction of the personal within those limits essential to personality. Perfect response to reality as a whole may proceed alike from the divinely personal or from human personality. The difference is only a difference in the centre from which the perfect response is made.

The limitations which constitute the difference between the personal in God and perfect personality in man are accepted by God in the incarnation. That is the meaning of the kenosis or self-emptying of the eternal Son. The kenosis is the self-limiting of the personal in order to take the form of personality. From that new centre within the field of God, the eternal Son achieves a response to God which is as perfect in quality as the response made aforetime from within the very essence of God's being. The perfectly personal must always have been potentially perfect personality. In Christ the personal God becomes personality by imposing willingly upon himself conditions, which, although they do not belong to his essential being, must belong to his manifestation as personality within his field. Personality is not uncongenial to God. It is merely a self-limitation of God. But the whole universe is a divine self-limitation. The existence of God in the universe in degrees of divinity is a graded limitation determined by God himself. And the limitation within the universe which is least restrictive of God's nature is the limitation of perfect personality. In Christ, therefore, God is supremely manifest.

But the manifestation in Christ is continuous with the graded revelation of God throughout the world. The universe is made through the Son. It is all permeated

with his presence and is all related to God through the Holy Spirit. God responds to every part and to the whole with that response which is fitting as between such a subject and such varying objects. But the response which is most characteristic of his essential being is the response to the perfect personality of Christ. Christ is related to the whole universe as a culmination is related to a whole preceding series of events. Christ is continuous with creation, but he is also unique as creation's climax and goal. The eternal Son, through whom the world was made, becomes in Jesus Christ a personality within that world. It is Christ the eternal Son, not Christ the incarnate Son, through whom all things were made. The uniqueness of Christ amongst personalities lies in his qualitative identity with the eternal Son. The nature of the response between God and Christ is the nature of the response of Father to Son within the triune God. Other personalities grow into this response as they grow in likeness to Christ. But Christ experienced this perfect response continuously within the Godhead. And as the incarnate Son he receives from God and returns to God a response which is qualitatively the same as the eternal response within the Godhead. But when it is said that the response of God to Christ is qualitatively identical with the response of the eternal subject to the eternal object within the Holy Trinity that does not, of course, mean that the eternal object of God's response is, so to say, confined exclusively to the incarnate Son. The whole universe is also included as an extension of the eternal object of the divine response. Although it is only when directed upon Christ that the response is fully characteristic, yet the response is also directed upon all objects throughout the universe, and its quality is appropriate to the distinctive nature of each. And, moreover, since the personal is more than personality, the whole of what belongs to the personal object of response within the Godhead cannot be contained within the accepted limits of personality. God is still within

himself essentially a harmony of response or a fellowship of love, although he goes outside of himself as nucleus and into his field in the response that he makes to his universe and to his Son incarnate therein. The incarnation expresses, it does not change, the nature of God.

The resurrection of Christ is the manifestation of the abiding reality of perfect mutual response between God and every centre of personality. To be rightly related to God is to be integrated into the system of reality. The evil in the world results from either a refusal or a failure to enter into right relations with the nature of reality. But evil cannot destroy reality. All to which God responds and all that perfectly responds to God is part of reality, and is, therefore, eternal. The existence of evil within reality is essentially temporary, because its nature is the opposite of the nature of reality. Its tendency is always towards extermination. Being opposed to reality it seeks to get outside the system of demands and counter-demands which constitutes the nature of reality. But to get outside reality is to perish. Evil may hamper and impede the uniform and regular development within the universe, but it cannot destroy the system of perfect response which belongs to the ultimately real. The resurrection is the assertion of eternal reality against temporary evil. The reality of the perfect response between Christ and God could not be destroyed by evil. For one brief moment upon the cross the response might seem to be interrupted, but in that temporary disturbance evil had done its utmost to break the system of harmonious response which centres in God. The resurrection proclaims the eternal reality of the response experienced in divine fellowship. But the evil which can effect within reality such havoc as is seen in the crucifixion of the incarnate Son is, despite its consequences, allowed to continue in existence, because it is the nature of reality to adapt all things to the requirements of its own organic order of being. The

crucifixion shows that, whatever the cost, reality will subdue the evil. The resurrection shows the triumph won. If atonement were not an essential attribute of God's nature, evil could have no existence at all. Its very antagonism against life and reality would be at once its death and non-existence. But reality seeks to bring all into a complete unity, and by so doing it will at last bring good out of evil. The tolerance of evil, however, means crucifixion before resurrection.

At the ascension the incarnate Son returned into the eternal Son. Yet in value and meaning the incarnation is an enduring event. The personality assumed by the personal Son cannot be thought of as terminating at the ascension. The personal had always included personality within itself, at least as potential. And that personality had become actual in the incarnation. Wherefore, since the eternal Son can never cease to have been once and for all incarnate, what was achieved thereby must persist in his being. The personality that was actual in Jesus Christ is constant within the ambit of the eternal Son. What was once real in time and space cannot become less than real in eternity and infinity. The Christ that we know in the personality of Jesus is an eternal reality within the being of God. Christ is for ever the quality and character of God. In being more than Christ incarnate, and more than Christ risen, ascended and glorified, God is not other than or different from Christ. God is eternally what Christ is, and Christ is eternally the nature of God.

We must conclude this chapter, however, on the note sounded at the beginning. "The Lord thy God is one Lord." God is essentially a unity. But his nature is the unity of system and fulness, not the unity of singleness and monotony. In ethical monotheism we reach a conception of God which must never be denied. The richness of God's being, the fellowship, communion and love which belong to the nature of God ought to be kept always before our minds. And this the doctrine of the

Trinity is meant to do. But all is spoilt, and the value of the conception lost if the unity is not made fundamental. The unity is qualified, but the quality is a quality possible only in a unity. Monotheism is the substantive, the Trinity is adjectival. This is the meaning of the divine triunity. All our thinking about the Father, Son and Holy Spirit must be regulated by the principle that the Trinity is the character of monotheism, and that which is fundamental is the harmonious unity of the fulness of God. The unity must not be destroyed by our manner of conceiving of the risen Lord. The unity must be preserved when we think of the incarnate Son, no less than when we think of the eternal Son. The universe as God's creation must not be so interpreted that it is incompatible with the nature of God as harmonious relationship and response. The only element in existence which does break up the perfect unity of organised relationship and communion is what we call evil. And evil will be done away, that God may be all in all.

When we accept the principle of harmonious unity in the Godhead we shall be saved from some of the difficulties that arise as a result of drawing distinctions which, when carried back, imply duality in the nature of God. Our conception of God's character must be formed from our knowledge of the highest revelation of God's nature which it was possible that we should receive under the conditions of this universe. When we interpret God in terms of that perfect personality we come as near to the truth as we can ever come. But the revelation in Christ is not a static and unprogressive revelation. It leads on to the many other things which await to be said as soon as we can bear them. The Spirit of truth leads us on into all truth. Our conception of God in terms of Christ will lead us to the knowledge of the one true and living God. The God conceived in terms of Christ is the God experienced in the response of the Holy Spirit. Our communion is with God, whether it be through the ascended Lord or through the Holy

Spirit. And since God is one, we cannot have fellowship with him except it be a sharing in the fellowship of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. To have an experience of the risen and glorified Christ, which is not at the same time an experience of the Father through the Holy Spirit, must be an impossibility. To try to discriminate between our experiences of God as if we could have separate and distinct experiences of Father, of Son and of Holy Spirit is surely an error. It is like trying to distinguish between thought, will and emotion as if they could have any existence apart from the unity of a personality that thinks, wills and feels as an organic whole. Father, Son and Holy Spirit have no meaning or existence except in the unity of a personal God.

CHAPTER III

THE RESPONSE OF DIVINE GRACE

GOD is the centre of the whole system of relationships which constitutes the universe. Relationships which are durational and relationships which are non-durational (that is, eternal) are alike co-ordinated in God. God is related to all that exists; but the manner of the relation is different towards different objects. While recognising the activity of the Holy Spirit everywhere, we must equally recognise the diversity of operations. It is all the work of the Holy Spirit. Creation and redemption are all of one piece and result from one agency; but the manner of God's presence in redemption is different from the manner of his presence in creation. And we want a word which will indicate the difference between the work of God in creation and in redemption, and which at the same time will emphasise the higher degree of divinity in the work of redemption. The word which marks off the response of God in redemption from the wider activity of God throughout the world is the word "grace." By grace we mean God's relation to developing personality. Since the object of this divine response is unique (personality being distinct from all else in the universe), it follows that the relationship of God towards personality must also be unique. Grace is the unique response of God to personality, and it has no meaning except in that connection. This response of divine grace is not only unique, but of all the relationships between God and the universe it is the one which is most characteristic of God. Since personality is the highest value that has emerged within the universe, the response between it and reality must express the nature of reality more fully and truly than it is possible for the nature of

reality to be expressed at any lower stage in the process of evolution. Grace is, therefore, the response which is most congenial to the nature of God.

The earliest effect of the divine response of grace is seen when from the centres of consciousness within the universe there is evoked an answering response which in its nature is personal. It is by response to the initiative of a personal God that personality first begins to emerge from consciousness. The origin of personality is the first fruit of grace. And the development of personality is the result of the constant operation of grace evoking ever higher and more adequate response to the perfectly personal God. Only in personal intercourse and communion can personality arise and develop. And the personal influence which induces and fosters the growth of personality from its first rudimentary beginnings up to the perfection of its potentiality is divine grace. It is by grace first and last and all the time that we are saved. The grace which first calls upon us to respond to a personal God and which afterwards perfects both the response and the personality responding is "sanctifying grace." It is in the perfecting of personality that we see the true function of grace. The necessity that the initiative in evoking and sustaining personality should come from God may be indicated by the use of the old phrase, "prevenient grace." Grace is the prior stimulus from God which causes an answering response in us. "Thou shalt call, and I will answer thee." It is true that the experience of communion with God as a response from us to an invitation from him is fully recognised as such only at the higher stages of religious development. But whether recognised as such or not, the nature of all experience is response to a stimulus. The stimulus to which we respond with our personality as an integrating whole is the initiative of God's grace.

When, however, the response to the divine appeal is wanting, or is deficient, or is deliberately refused, then the work of sanctifying grace in leading on the person-

ality from stage to stage in the way to its perfection is interrupted. Accordingly, before the sanctifying process can continue a saving process must intervene. The grace which to the responsive soul is sanctifying grace, to the unresponsive soul becomes "saving grace." Grace, so to say, has to go out of its way to bring back those that have wandered down some wrong path. The failure or refusal of man to respond to sanctifying grace does not mean the defeat of grace. The resources of grace are unlimited. "Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." The sin of failing or refusing to respond to divine grace creates a new situation that requires a new and more potent response from God to evoke a response from insensitiveness by breaking down the resistance of self-centredness. The task of saving grace is to prevent any arresting in the growth of personality or (what is worse and what follows upon persistent failure to advance) the slow dissolution of personality. Instead of making increasingly rich and full response to God in himself and in his universe, personality often tries to limit the circle of response, and in so doing becomes resistant and insensitive to all that lies outside of a narrow sphere. The aim of the self then is to gain dominance over a small area instead of surrendering to the claims of the whole. Such limitation of interest or self-centredness of purpose can only result in the atrophy of personality. The work of saving grace is to overcome the narrowness and exclusiveness of the self and to re-orientate the life so that God instead of self becomes the new and true centre of response.

Grace is the response of God to human need. But God responsive to, or in relation with, an object is God the Holy Spirit. Grace is, therefore (as already indicated), an activity of the Holy Spirit. To say that God pours out his Spirit or bestows his grace upon man must mean the same thing. Grace is the Holy Spirit in relation with man. And this special activity of the Spirit which

is known as grace is the same work that is accomplished by the incarnate Son. Salvation and sanctification, the effects of grace, are the results of the revelation of God in Christ. The Spirit that is effectual in grace is, therefore, the Spirit whose operation is continuous with the work of Christ. We speak alike of the grace of God and of the grace of Christ. Grace comes from God on either interpretation, and in both cases it comes from God as Father through God as Son. We do not, however, speak of the grace of the Holy Spirit because the gift of grace *is* the gift of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit when it influences man is divine grace. Neither in experience nor in doctrine can we distinguish between the gift of the Spirit to man and the gift of grace.

It is, of course, possible and advisable to distinguish between God and the grace of God, as also between Christ and the grace of Christ. But while distinguishing we must be careful not to separate. Grace is as much a part of the nature of God as the Holy Spirit itself. The perfect response within the nature and being of God is the Holy Spirit. The achievement in time and space of a perfect system of relationships is the extension of this same Spirit of response into the *field* of God's existence. The response of God to emergent and developing personalities within that field is likewise the same Spirit. And this Spirit directed to usward is grace. Hence, God stands to God's grace as the Father stands to the Holy Spirit. Our experience of God is by God's grace, just as our experience of the Father is through the Spirit. Similarly, we must not make any cleavage between Christ and the grace of Christ, for the two are related in a manner analogous with the relation between the eternal Son and the Holy Spirit. Our experience of Christ is by the grace of Christ, just as our experience of the Son is through the Spirit. In receiving grace we receive God. Grace is God's self-giving to man. Grace is God responsive to man. But God's self-giving response to man is made in Christ. Whether we describe

our experience of grace as the grace of God or the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ or as the gift of the Holy Spirit depends upon our interpretation of the manner of the reception of grace. If we are aware chiefly of the unity, objectivity and reality of the object responded to, we shall speak of our response as a yielding to the grace of God. If we have uppermost in our minds the character of God as revealed in the person of Christ, we shall speak of the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ. And if we think mostly of the relationship itself as fellowship and communion, or as inspiration and power, we shall speak of the gift of the Holy Spirit. But it is all the work of grace and all a response to God.

The essential unity of the Godhead, qualified by the Trinity of the divine nature, must be reflected in our experience of divine grace. Nowhere is this qualitative and harmonious unity of the being of God more clearly recognised than in the summary of Christian experience contained within the apostolic benediction: "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit." Here we have the full response to Christian monotheism. The grace, love and fellowship are not three gifts, but one; and the bounteous giver of all is God. In writing to the Corinthian Church, St. Paul speaks of the fellowship which comes by the grace of Christ as the unspeakable gift of God's love.[1] Whether we speak of God's love or God's grace or of fellowship with God we are speaking of the richness and fulness of the mutual response between God and our own souls. God's response to us is grace and love and fellowship. God's response to us is from the Father through the Son and in the Holy Spirit; but it is one response and one experience. So rich and varied is the experience that many names would fail to describe all that belongs to it. But the giving of many names to the one experience would lead to misunderstanding if the identity were thereby

[1] 2 Cor. ix. 15.

obscured. God's love is grace and God's grace is love, and by God's gracious love we have fellowship with him.

The distinction between nature and grace will be readily seen to be a real distinction but not a complete separation. It is the same God who is manifest in nature and in grace, but the degree of manifestation differs. God's character is revealed in grace as it could never be revealed in nature. But what is present in grace is the operation of the same Spirit that is manifest in nature. The relationship between God and the physical world is distinguishable from his relationship to personality. The one is a relationship of nature, the other of grace. But the distinction is not absolute. What is of nature may become a means of grace. Just because it is the same God manifest in nature and in grace, the knowledge of God through his grace may lead to the discovery of God in nature, while nature itself may thus become an aid to or medium of fellowship with the God of grace. The oneness of the spirit working through creation and in redemption may become so evident that the soul's contact with nature may be discerned to be a continuance of its communion with God. Or, again, the disparity and seeming contradictions between the laws of nature and the ways of grace may emphasise the wide difference in the degree of revelation conveyed through nature and through grace. Such experiences of the apparent absence of God from some aspects of nature compel us to the belief that God's presence in the universe is graded. It is only when we know the fullest declaration of God's character in the response of grace that we can rightly estimate the value of nature as a means of revealing God to the soul. From knowledge of the God of grace we may come to the understanding of God in nature. But without the revelation of the God of grace in Jesus Christ we could never have discovered his true character. From nature we cannot rise to grace without a higher revelation of God than has anywhere been given in nature. But from

grace we may descend to nature and find there a further declaration of God.[1]

Our response to God is the co-ordination of our adjustments and adaptations to the complete environment of human life. When that response to God is the perfect response of a fully developed personality, then the whole environment will become a sphere of grace. Everything will be related, and rightly related, to God, and will therefore be seen to be transfused with his Spirit. Grace will then mean an environment saturated with God. But the saturation point will vary throughout the environment. God will not be equally present everywhere bestowing his grace equally at every turn. God will be understood more readily and fully because of the gradation of his presence throughout the universe. The mother-bird hovering over the nest may show a quality of spirit essentially akin to the Spirit of God and differing only in degree. But the fierceness of the tiger is not so closely related to the Spirit of God; although a place for it must be found. The patient and willing serviceableness of many beasts of burden may seem to express a spirit faintly resembling the suffering servant. But there are also the venomous snakes and the microbes of disease, which also belong to the realm of nature and which must find their level in an environment of grace. Nature may become sacramental of God's grace to those who already know the experience of grace. But it is a false use of the word "sacrament" when it is applied to nature without the qualifying conception of a graded presence.

Nature can only become a means of grace in a secondary sense. The sacramentalism of nature is dependent upon the sacrament of grace. We do right in extending the sacramental principle beyond the walls of a church so that it includes nature, industry, art and every other sphere which may become a means of grace.

[1] This was the order of religious development in the Old Testament.

But in so doing we are working from a summit downwards. The highest level is the sacrament of grace. All that is sacramental must reach back to the redemptive work of Christ. This it is which gives meaning to the sacramental principle. Just as grace is the highest phase of the spirit's activity, so the sacrament of Holy Communion (because it declares the saving sacrifice of the cross) is the highest means of grace. But just as grace is not the only operation of the Spirit, so the Lord's Supper is not the only means of grace. Yet whatever else becomes a means of grace acquires that value through the supreme sacrament of redemptive love, and could never have become sacramental except by the widening of the experience of grace learnt at the foot of the cross. Like all else in the universe, the media of grace are graded: but being graded they have a highest degree. God is not equally present throughout the universe; but is supremely present under certain conditions. The conditions which allow of the fullest, truest, most real presence of God are the conditions which bring us nearest to the cross. God's presence, of course, can be mediated in many ways, and our knowledge of his presence in the supreme sacrament enables us to recognise the sacramental value of the whole universe. Also, of course, it cannot be denied that God's presence may be immediately discerned by the soul in prayer. Yet it may be questioned whether both the extension of sacramental means and also the experience of the immediate presence do not both and equally depend upon the knowledge of God received through the cross as the highest degree of his self-revelation.

The highest degree of divinity throughout the world has been reached once for all in Jesus Christ. In subsequent times the highest degree of divinity has usually been experienced in the sacrament which commemorates the supreme and culminating act of Jesus Christ. As the completest and most efficacious means of grace is the cross of Christ, whereon the full and perfect sacrifice of

self to reality, of incarnate Son to eternal God, was made; so, from the day when that sufficient oblation of self-hood to ultimate being and truth was made, the most potent means of grace has been that service which most resembles the original act in significance and value—the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. It is here that the response of grace is at its intensest. On the human side the conditions of receptivity are raised to their highest pitch of sensitiveness. Memory, association, suggestion, tradition, everything that can aid the preparation of the soul to make the answering response of faith to the proffered gift of grace is there present. On the side of the divine the highest degree of grace could find no more fitting medium than that which has the abiding value of the cross of Christ. Christian experience throughout the ages has borne continuous witness to a real presence here in such a degree as is nowhere else to be found.

Sometimes, however, this sacrament is spoken of as if, differing from other sacraments, its function was to convey "a higher gift than grace." And it is, of course, understandable that the supreme means of grace should be exalted above other sacraments. When, however, the difference between this and other sacraments is made one of kind rather than degree, then it must be questioned whether this is not an instance of that explanation which is condemned in the Thirty-Nine Articles, because it "overthroweth the nature of a sacrament." If a sacrament is a means of grace, then that which is a means of something else and not grace, whether that something be a higher or lower gift, is not a sacrament. When the gift is a higher or lower degree of grace, then the means is still sacramental. But when, as the verse in Newman's hymn implies, the gift is of a different kind from the gifts of grace mediated by other sacraments, then the means of conveying the "higher gift" can only be a sacrament if by sacrament we understand something different from a means of grace.

The fundamental issue, however, is whether or not there can be a higher gift than grace. In trying to answer this crucial question we must allow at the outset that the difference in degree between the grace of the supreme sacrament and the grace of other sacraments justifies the use of language in describing this sacramental experience which would be inadmissible in any other connection. That is right and proper. But when the terms used are subsequently interpreted as indicating not merely intensity in degree but uniqueness in kind, then it must be inquired whether such language is not inconsistent with the very idea of God as given in Christian monotheism.

Let us ask, then, what it is that God gives us when he bestows upon us his highest gift? In Jesus Christ God gave to the world, as a token of his love and as a fulfilment of his purpose of salvation, his only begotten Son. In giving his eternal Son he gave himself. True giving is always the giving of self. The thing given as a present is but a sign of the love given from person to person. Spiritual giving is always a response of person to person, and in such giving the giver gives himself. The true gift is the response. The self-giving is in the response. Such a personal self-giving is not a surrender of numerical identity or a reduction of the being of personality. We speak of one person entering into another, of two persons becoming one; but our meaning is always spiritual and qualitative, never material and numerical. There is no contraction of personality when in love one self is given to another self. Rather, in such giving both personalities become richer and fuller. There is no coinciding of two centres of consciousness so that in the end there is one subject of experience whereas formerly there were two. That would be an impoverishment. Rather, the experience of each subject becomes enriched by sharing in the experience of the other. The self is given in the response to the other self. And the more perfect the response, the fuller the self-giving on

either side. But there can be no giving of self in any other sense than in the response. Apart from response there is no self-giving, and there is no self-giving which is not a personal response. Such is the nature of personality, and such is personal relationship.

When, therefore, a personal God gives himself, or, what is the same thing, his eternal Son, or what again is the same thing, his Holy Spirit, he is giving himself in his response to man. There is no other way in which God can give himself, if the giving is to be personal and spiritual. God's response is God's self-giving. God's response to man is grace. In grace God gives himself. There is not and cannot be a higher gift from person to person than the full and perfect response of the one to the other. No person can truly and spiritually possess another person in any other sense than in the perfect response freely and lovingly offered and received. We receive and possess God in the measure in which we respond and yield ourself to God. Our response, our self-giving to God, is faith: God's response, God's self-giving to us, is grace. We cannot receive and possess God in any other way than by personal response. There is no higher gift than grace, for grace is the response of God to human need. And in the response of person to person the self is given truly, spiritually and in the only way in which self can be given.

The experience of mutual response between the self and God is often described either as "being in Christ," or, as having "Christ in us." The meaning of both phrases must, of course, be spiritual and not local or material. We are in Christ in so far as the mutual response between our souls and God is qualitatively the same as the response of the incarnate Son to the eternal Father. And to have Christ in us must mean also that the response to us resembles increasingly the response to the person of Christ. The condition of soul which is rightly so described is produced, not magically, but morally. The reception of grace is always moral and

spiritual. The more Christlike we become, and the more perfectly Christ is formed in us, and the more fully we enter into the character of Christ—the more we shall be qualified to respond to God with that perfect trust, love and obedience which are found in the response of Christ. The effect of grace is to produce in us those moral and spiritual conditions which enable us to make an ever more and more adequate response of faith. The fruits of the Spirit are the effects of grace. They issue from communion with God, and they lead to a yet loftier and richer experience of divine fellowship.

When we remember that the reality of all that is is constituted by relationship to God as the centre or principle of a co-ordinated system, then we shall be assured that the reality of our own existence and experience depends upon right-relatedness between our personalities and the personal God. There can be no higher or other reality than that which belongs to perfect adjustment and adaptation to the whole of being. It is in the response which we make to reality that we become increasingly real. It is in the response of God to us that God confers upon us the reality that belongs to him. We receive reality, or eternal life, when we fit into the perfect system of ultimate truth and existence. We have no reality in isolation. Eternal life is not acquired in the solitude of individualism. Reality is a system in which everything has a place. But it is a system which includes as integers personalities in a society. Personality enters into the full scheme of reality by becoming organic to that type of systematic whole which is a perfect society. The work of grace is to develop personality for perfect fellowship. But this is only another aspect of salvation and sanctification. The essence of personality is response. Without a society there could be no growth of personalities. Grace is continued in love and completed in fellowship. Without love there can be no true social union. Without fellowship there can be no perfection of personality.

The relationship of grace, love and fellowship between the individual soul and God is the essence of religion and the constituent of reality. But souls which are severally related to God as the centre of their being are also collectively related to one another. The system of which God is the character and source includes at its summit an organic society of personalities. The love which comes direct from God to the soul, and is returned direct from the soul to God, comes also through kindred souls and is returned also through kindred souls to God. In this way all are knit together into one system of response the quality of which is the quality of the divine response. Grace is the response of God to man, and the word must be reserved for that unique relation. But the love and fellowship born of that grace are extended to all personal relationships. These relationships between soul and soul, in so far as they resemble the response of God to man in forgiveness, encouragement and helpfulness may be called gracious. Thus, magnanimity and humility are gracious qualities in man. But the ground of all real love and true fellowship is in the unique response of God to man which is called grace.

The love and fellowship which are inseparable from grace, and which by their very nature must link up directly or indirectly with every other personality, work towards the production of a perfect society of souls, each of which makes an appropriate response to God and to every neighbouring soul. This society of souls dominated by God is what in the Gospels is spoken of as the kingdom of heaven or the kingdom of God. It is created by God's grace. Within it is reality, or eternal life. The extension of the kingdom is the work of the church. The church is the kingdom in embryo. When the work of the church is accomplished, the church and the kingdom will be one. Meanwhile, the church is a society of souls dominated by God. Within the church is salvation; for to be a member of this spiritual society is to share in the nature of ultimate reality. Only as

members of such a society can we as personalities fit into that perfect scheme of being which is ultimate and eternal. The one great end and purpose of life is to enter into and advance the society of those souls who are rightly related both to God and to one another. Only by being first rightly related to God as the centre of reality can we be rightly related to our fellows; but as surely as we are becoming more and more perfectly related to God we shall also become increasingly adapted to the true nature and needs of one another.

The church is the society of grace, and outside the church there is no salvation. There cannot be salvation outside the church because to be outside the church is to be unadjusted to reality: it is failure to fit into the nature of ultimate being; it is refusal of the response from God seeking to save us and to sanctify us for fellowship with himself and with all others who are being saved. In rejecting the claims of a spiritual community we are cutting ourselves adrift from the nature and purpose of reality.

But when we speak thus of the church we must mean by the church the society of all those souls who are responding to God and endeavouring to respond for God's sake to all their neighbours, near and far. Since, however, this consequence must follow whenever there is genuine response to God as revealed in Jesus Christ, we may say simply that the church is the society of all those who respond to God through Christ. Such a definition of the church would seem to have more truth and reality than a formal definition limiting the church to the sacraments. And since we must recognise that grace is wider than the sacraments, it would seem to follow that grace is a surer foundation for the church than merely sacramental grace. The church is the fellowship of grace rather than the society of the sacraments. But in saying this nothing is implied in disparagement of sacraments. Such a conclusion respecting the nature of the church is drawn simply because it appears to be the right

deduction from the truth that grace is not limited to the sacraments. To limit the church to the sacraments is to exclude some who are recipients of divine grace. The only foundation which is wide enough for the society of the redeemed is a foundation which is as wide as God's love and mercy. Such a foundation we have in God's grace.

The sacraments, however, remain the outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual grace. And only a sacramental church can be a visible embodiment of the true and spiritual church. We cannot identify the sacramental with the spiritual church, but the more nearly the two coincide the better for the sacramental church. And no greater disaster can be contemplated than the complete severance of the two. Without the spiritual church the sacramental church would be dead, its sacraments no sacraments, its church no church. But without the sacramental church the spiritual church would be remote, abstract and unreal. The spiritual is not that which is dissociated from the physical. The spiritual is that which gives to the physical its meaning and value, its place in a system, its element of reality. A purely spiritual church would be impotent and unreal in a universe of space and time. The spiritual is not the negation of the physical but the affirmation of its significance and truth for ultimate being.

The visible church is not the prison of grace, but its home whence it goes freely abroad and returns again to its own. The visible church has not the monopoly of grace, but it is the greatest means of grace in the world. Not only is it the habitation of the society of souls who are being saved by God's grace, it is also the storehouse of the experience of all those who have responded to God throughout the Christian ages. The New Testament is the product of the Holy Spirit working in and through the church. Freely she lends it to all who will take it and read; but it is her creation and remains her unique possession. Much experience is preserved in the

church which had otherwise been lost. With all her faults (and none know them better than those who have entered farthest into her inner recesses) the church is the perpetual witness to the gospel of grace. And that gospel is the power of God unto salvation. It binds together into a fellowship of love all those who will respond in faith to the call of God.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELIGION OF REALITY

THE question, What do we mean by God? has suggested an answer which tells what is the least that we can mean by God if we are to mean anything that is adequate to the name. And this is the only answer that has been attempted here. It is, however, assuredly more profitable to hear those who tell of the greatest things that we mean by God. But such utterances may be heard from the lips of many who have a richness of experience and a depth of conviction which entitle them to deal with such high themes. It is to the saints and prophets that we must always come to learn the authentic story of what God is and what he does for the souls of men. But some there are who, hearing this story told, re-echo the thoughts of that patron saint of all loyal doubters, the apostle Thomas, and reply: "Except I understand by an extension of scientific method and by the completion of philosophic inquiry—except I can apply, in as far as they are applicable, the rational tests which I am accustomed to use, I will not believe." To such earnest seekers the first requirement seems to be, not how good is the most that we can mean by God, but, rather, how certain is the least that we can mean when we mean God. If that least, however little it may seem to confirmed believers, be truly God, then this least must imply more than it measures, and must accordingly lead on gradually to loftier and fuller conceptions. Just as an odd page torn out of a New Testament has been sufficient to convince a follower of some other religion of the superiority of Christianity and has led to the search for more knowledge; so the minimum belief in God, because it is true of God, will lead on to

the perfect faith which, kneeling with St. Thomas, confesses, "My Lord and my God."

There are many to-day who, owing to their studies in science, medicine, psychology and philosophy, find it hard to accept much of the teaching which claims for itself, rightly or wrongly (and too often wrongly), to be the faith once for all delivered to the saints. Sincerity, humility and genuine love for truth constrain many minds to say: "Except there be sufficient evidence, I will not believe." And the purpose of this book has been to try to show that there is sufficient evidence for the acceptance of the minimum creed. The minimum creed is expressed in the words: "Whosoever cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him." If the nature of the evidence be such as to justify this belief, then the consequences of such belief being what they are, acceptance becomes an obligation. There are some who, having been constrained to declare, "I believe," are still constrained always to couple with that confession an inward prayer, "Lord, help thou mine unbelief." And behind both the confession and the petition lies the more fundamental assurance that there is only one truth, and that if God be the source of all truth then science, philosophy and religion must each be confirmatory of the others.

When we ask ourselves, What is the least we can mean by God? we must answer what that least is in the light of modern science, philosophy and religion. The meaning of God cannot be separated from the conception of the universe or from the interpretation of experience. In some directions the meaning of God thus reached may be wider than the meaning commonly found in religion when religion is separated from both science and philosophy. And for this enlargement, religion must be grateful. In other directions it cannot but seem to religion that this minimum creed is an impoverishment of truth. Religion, however, above all

must exercise patience, charity and trustfulness. If religion has that trust in God which it ought to have then it will believe that, however weak and faltering the faith of others in God may be, God can by his grace answer the prayer of those who cry: "Lord, increase our faith." Though science and philosophy should seem to hold back and tarry long, religion must be patient. And though science and philosophy may still refuse assent to anything more than the minimum creed, religion must not be intolerant of their fellowship. Charity is comprehensive, not exclusive. The desire of charity is surely not to repel those who cannot accept the whole of the church's teaching and practice, but rather to attract all those who in any measure believe the truth. Companionship between those who believe more and those who believe less may lead to a larger faith in the doubting members and a wiser faith in the believing. But separation must lead to a narrowing of belief in those on the one side as well as a hardening of unbelief in those on the other side.

In welcoming science, medicine and philosophy into the church there cannot, however, be any patronage or condescension on the part of religion, if religion be true to itself. By recognising that all truth brings us nearer to the Holy Spirit, which is the Spirit of truth, religion will feel herself indebted to all sincere and earnest seekers. Those whose religion is clear as noonday must not be unsympathetic towards those whose religion is a wrestling in the darkness with the nameless secret of existence. There is a spiritual superiority which is surely as unchristian as moral superiority. We do wrong to despise those who fall into sin, since we ourselves, confronted with their temptations, might also have fallen. With this point of view all would agree, at least in theory. But is it any more defensible for those whose faith is unclouded owing to their ignorance of the difficulties to belief raised in science and philosophy to stand spiritually aloof from those to whom belief is not easy? May it

not be urged that if we had their knowledge we might be far less religiously minded than they are? Of course it is an obvious retort that if increased knowledge means diminished religious faith then it is better to be without the knowledge. But such a position is intolerable both in practice and in theory. Who, for instance, would deplore the advance of medicine on the score that medical knowledge made more difficult of acceptance the teaching of the church? But, apart from all such practical issues, the distrust of knowledge argues a belief that faith and knowledge issue from two different sources and can never flow together. This tacit assumption, however, needs only to be exposed in order to be denied by all who believe that the truth shall make us free.

The motive behind all exclusiveness, narrowness and intolerance is invariably fear. Only after she had lost the love that casts out fear would religion be able to withhold her welcoming hand from science and philosophy. If there is nothing to fear from these friends of truth, then let them be received into the household of faith. But is it certain that there is nothing to be feared? Were it not safer to ask scientists and philosophers to come merely as men, and leave their science and philosophy outside? Such an attitude of mind is not uncommon. But while in appearance it is loyal to the faith, it is in reality a betrayal. It is an acknowledgment that, although we baptise men as members of the church, we have no faith that science and philosophy can be baptised into Christ. It is as if we accepted a business man into the church on condition that he left his business outside. But what a mistake this is. We want to baptise the business too, and sign it with the sign of the cross; so also with science and philosophy. But perhaps it seems as if there were a difference here. Business, it may be said, does not challenge the faith once for all delivered to the saints, but science and philosophy do. Business, however, most

openly challenges the moral teaching of Christianity; and can it be held that the moral is less essential than the dogmatic? Do they not both stand together and depend upon each other? Yet, since, for all that can be said, suspicion does attach to science and philosophy, we must inquire further why this is so.

The hidden cause of the fear which erects barriers and forbids admission is probably to be discovered in the conviction that some of the so-called treasures of religion cannot be exposed to the gaze of science or philosophy without their falsity being detected. Inwardly, it is recognised that some of these treasures are shams; that some of the riches are in spurious coin; that some of the glitter is artificial and needs dim lights in order to be effective. If the searchlight of truth discovers this unreality, then either the whole deposit must be rejected, or the whole must be tested and the genuine left while the false is destroyed. Unquestionably, the second course ought to seem altogether desirable. It could only seem otherwise on the assumption that the Christian faith is identical with the whole lump. On that assumption the sifting process must appear destructive of the faith, since what would be left after the sifting would not be the faith but something else. But what was left afterwards would nevertheless be true, and what was rejected would be false. It would appear to be the right course, therefore, to identify the essence of faith with the abiding truth and to account for the rest as false accretion. And there could be no objection to this course unless for some reason the whole lump were preferred to the embedded truth within it. Such preference, however, could only result from a belief that the deposit of faith entrusted to the church was a catena of definite principles, some of which were true and some false. But the definition of religious faith as an acceptance of dogmas is unsatisfactory, even if the dogmas are free from all admixture of error. Faith is a personal response to the unseen reality. The dogmas of faith are attempted explanations

of the experience of faith. Without these explanations faith itself would weaken and fail. But where the dogma falsifies, distorts or impoverishes the experience of faith, then the acceptance of the faith requires the rejection of the dogma. Science and philosophy may call in question some of the teachings and practices of the church. When, however, the teachings or practices of religion obscure or pervert the truth, their rejection can only benefit religion in the end. And there are some who think that the lack of this critical mind within the church is a serious handicap to the church in its mission of establishing the kingdom of heaven.

Although science and philosophy may themselves only be able to accept the minimum creed, that does not mean that they will in any way discourage others from believing the much more that a full Christian experience has to contribute. The only requirement on their part would be that the much more which is added should not contradict the minimum for which sufficient evidence can be adduced. To deny the truth of whatsoever went beyond the minimum would be the changing of the minimum into a maximum. The true function of the minimum, however, is twofold; first, it must be the basis on which to build up a complete edifice; and, secondly, it must be a standard by which to test what may and may not be used in the construction. We must go beyond the minimum. The least that we can mean by God is something great and glorious in itself. But also it is something that by its very nature carries us on beyond itself. There need be no fear lest science and philosophy should limit and impoverish the idea of God. Their effect will be rather to clarify that idea, and in so doing to increase its value.

The limiting of the idea of God is more likely to result from a religion that is divorced from science than from a science that is wedded to religion. Religion, quite rightly, conceives of God as meeting human need. But it may also, quite wrongly, think of God as merely exist-

ing for that purpose. The nature of God, that is to say, may be reduced to the measure of human requirement. And when that is done then God will be made to depend upon man. But such an idea robs religion alike of truth and of power. The secret of religious power rests in its objectivity. It is because our nature depends upon God and our reality upon our godliness that religion is able to mould us, to perfect our personality and to save us. Science and philosophy will always remind us that we are not the centre of the universe; that God does not exist for our happiness; that our need is not the ultimate measure of what is real. The universe has a meaning for God, and only when we see it as centred in God can we understand it aright. Our true happiness can only result from the submission of self to God. We can never attain to blessedness by using God for our own ends. Science and philosophy will provide for religion a corrective to the narrowing of the divine nature. We shall all have a wider, less self-centred religion when science and philosophy are baptised into Christ.

And as we shall be saved from narrowness in religion so also shall we be saved from materialism. It must come to many as a strange and unexpected discovery that science and philosophy can dispel materialism. But their association with religion is sure to have this effect. The methods employed and the habits of thought acquired in science and philosophy are such that their inclusion within religion must make for the spiritualising of religion. All that is crude, carnal or anthropomorphic will seem a hindrance rather than a help to communion with the God of reality. Whatever savours of idolatry, magic and sacerdotalism will be seen as a distortion of truth. It will be impossible to regard sacramentalism as the contracting, confining and controlling of the spiritual by means of the physical. Sacramentalism will be seen to imply the dominance of the physical by the spiritual. Everything will depend on the spiritual presence and on the mutual response between person and person, between

developing personality and ultimate reality, between the soul and God.

The worship which will satisfy the sincerity and humility of all genuine seekers after truth must be the worship which expresses religion at its purest, highest and fullest reach. It must be the worship in spirit and in truth. Such worship will be in touch with all truth and with all reality. There is to be found near the South Downs a little church without any stained glass in its windows. The worshipper looking towards the Lord's Table sees also through the windows the waving trees and the distant hillside. He is not secluded from God the Creator of the world when he worships God the Redeemer of mankind. He is reminded of the valleys standing thick with corn, and he remembers the cattle upon a thousand hills which are God's also. The effect of science and philosophy upon religion will be seen in the removal of the stained-glass windows which represent man's imagination, and the substitution of glass that is clear enough to admit the full flood of God's daylight truth. Thus will the worshipper be compelled to look beyond the house of prayer and to see reality as God presents it to us. What a vast expanse we might behold if only we would permit the removal of those human imaginations which shut out reality. When we invite science, medicine, psychology, economics, philosophy, art and music each to furnish its clear window for the church of God, then our worship will be worship in reality and in truth.

But we must confess that we prefer stained glass to clear; we prefer our own imaginations to the pure truth. Why is it that we fear the destruction of our pictures of truth? Do we not believe that truth itself abides unchanged? If we loved truth should we not be prepared to break all the windows that obscure or falsify the light of truth? But we do not trust truth. In our heart of hearts we fear that truth will rob us of what we hold dear, Our imagination satisfies our wants. It is close, warmly

coloured and friendly. It shuts out all that is unpleasant and harsh. But truth is too searching, too exacting, too bewildering. We can control our imaginations, but truth is uncompromising, unrelenting, insistent. Our imaginations will yield to our needs; but truth demands that we must yield, and will itself yield nothing to our private hopes and fears. Truth demands all that a man has and imposes a cross in return. We hesitate, saying we know not where the truth will lead us. But what we ought to ask is only this: Will the truth bring us nearer to God? If not, then God is not the God of truth. If so, then truth is the only way to God.

We should feel safer in yielding ourselves to truth, however, if only we could limit truth. Why may we not concern ourselves with religious truth and assume that other kinds of truth are of no concern in this connection? Or, better still, could we not identify the truth of religion with church teaching, or with the Bible? Is there not irrelevancy in introducing science and philosophy when religion is the topic of discussion? Let us keep to our own departments and agree not to interfere with one another. This or that belief or practice may not appear true in the light of science or philosophy, but if it appear true in the dim religious light, then for religion let it be true. Such sectionalism, however, is as impossible when dealing with truth as it is when dealing with goodness or beauty. The same desire is noticeable in the region of æsthetics. There, too, we resent the intrusion of the critic who tells us that our ecclesiastical art is beneath contempt and that our standards of sacred music are disgraceful and vicious. We are called upon to lift church art and music to the level of the recognised standards which apply universally; but we reply that in religion it must be different. If these tawdry decorations and sentimental melodies seem beautiful to the religious, then let them be known as examples of religious beauty, and let music critics and art critics recognise their sphere and not intrude where they are out of place. As with

truth, so with beauty, we want special privileges to be extended to religion. But what should we say if morality were likewise circumscribed? Suppose the church should claim exemption from the strict and impartial laws of universal right and wrong, what would the moralist then think of the church? And what right has the church to look for respect from the scientist and philosopher or from the artist and musician when it refuses to recognise the universal claims of truth and beauty? The abhorrence felt by the church for industry or politics when either claims exemption from impartial moral requirements ought to suggest what must be the feelings of science and art when their impartial requirements are repudiated.

But for all that can be said by way of reassurance, there remains a fear that general truth will contradict religious truth, or, at least, ecclesiastical truth. The intrusion of science and philosophy, it is feared, will mean the alteration of much and the abandonment of not a little. Such a fear, it must be admitted, is not without foundation. For, unquestionably, some of the beliefs and practices which are full of meaning for religion are devoid of significance for mere science or philosophy. And is there not justification for assuming that science, once admitted to the church, will try to destroy forthwith all that it cannot at once understand? The fear of such a consequence is natural enough in so far as it arises from the conviction that what would thus be destroyed as unscientific would be of the very essence of religion. Against any such catastrophe religion is under obligation to safeguard itself. Indeed, in defence of its unique contribution to truth, religion must be prepared to hold its own at whatever sacrifice and cost. This fear lest the citadel should capitulate to science is, however, unworthy of religion and false to its real character. It is at bottom a fear of its own ability to stand fast when the assault is made. The foundation for this fear of scientific truth is to be found in a secret distrust of religious truth. If

we really believed our religion we should be sure that no power could overthrow it. We ought to expect that religion will appear more true as more light is shed upon it. The more thoroughly it is examined, the more secure will its foundation and structure be shown to be. And this being so, science will be playing the part, not of a foe, but of a friend.

This fear of science and philosophy on the part of religion indicates, not only distrust of its own position, but also an ungenerous and suspicious attitude towards these fellow-seekers after truth. Old quarrels and misunderstandings may have done much to foster this mistrust, but surely it is like religion to forget enmity and seek co-operation. And, in point of fact, the temper of modern science and philosophy is very different from what it is often supposed to be by those whose judgment is based entirely on experiences of the past. The consequence of admitting science into the church would assuredly not be the denial of all that could not be understood. That is not the mood of science. The scientist is already familiar with so much that he cannot understand that he will readily welcome further evidences of truth beyond his present reach. The aim of science is not to deny, but to explain. By explanation science increases understanding. And so it will be with religious experience. We shall understand more fully. Science cannot, without being false to itself, deny anything that is true. If, in its search after established truth, it exposes certain untruths which we once believed to be truths, that will be a gain and not a loss in whatever branch of investigation the discovery is made. Religion has already gained greatly by the removal of many encumbrances to faith as a result of a scientific and critical study of the Bible, of comparative religion and of the psychology of religious experience. And the science which has removed lumber has also discovered unsuspected treasure. So it will ever be. Science will only deny what is contradictory and incompatible with its fundamental principles; and

only what is false or mistaken in religion can be destroyed by science.

But if we believe that God is the source of all truth, we must be prepared at any moment to modify partial truth in the light of larger truth. The essence of religion cannot be changed, because that belongs to reality. But the externals of religion and the explanations of religion may need revision from time to time in view of new discoveries in science. In the interests of truth and religion we ought all to welcome such reformation and restatement as soon as the time is ripe. There is danger, of course, in revising a position before new discoveries have been sufficiently tested. But once a new truth is assured, then the danger lies in delay. We must adjust our position to the new truth as soon as may be. Much as we all dislike changes we must be prepared, for truth's sake, to make them. The changes will have to be sometimes in the external forms of religion and sometimes in the dogmatic explanations of religion. But in such changes we are not changing the truth. That we cannot do. What we do in reference to truth is to apprehend it more fully. It is the fuller apprehension of truth that necessitates the reform in ceremony or doctrine. Refusal to make any change is disobedience to the heavenly vision. As soon as the fuller truth is seen, then adherence to the old forms means the obscuring of the new light. New wine must have new bottles. But he who has tasted old wine does not straightway desire the new, for he says that the old is good.

The essence of religion, that which cannot change, but which needs restatement as experience grows and as truth is more and more clearly apprehended, is the personal response between the soul and God. There we touch reality. The religion of reality is personal religion. "Thy soul and God stand sure." Religion true and real, religion essential and unique, is communion and fellowship between developing personality and reality conceived as God. Whatever aids this spiritual experi-

ence of at-one-ment with God is right and good; whatever expresses this deep conviction of nearness to God is genuine and true. But whatever hinders or disguises this personal and intimate relationship of child to father is false and wrong. Our endeavour to state what we mean by God in such terms that science and philosophy may be expected to accept the statement as declaring the least that we can mean if we are to mean anything that deserves the name of God has led us to the discovery that what is fundamental to religion is mutual response between personality and reality. Upon that foundation, and upon that only, we must build both our doctrine and our ceremony. Upon that foundation some types of superstructure will stand firm, while other types must sooner or later collapse. These crumbling types of edifice would require another kind of foundation for their support. But this is the only foundation which is embedded in reality. The test of the reality of religion must always be personal. The question to be asked is: Is this type of religion a personal intercourse with God? If a man's religion is a mutual response between his soul and the living God, then the inevitable outcome of that experience will be the gradual development of his own personality and the increasingly adequate adjustment of the self to reality as a whole. Where this effect is not present it must be inferred that the religion is unreal.

It is the unreality of religion that alienates students from the churches and drives them to seek reality by other means. This tendency is a healthy and hopeful sign. In religion as nowhere else, it is felt, we ought to be in touch with reality. Here, at least, we ought to feel a contact between our souls and something fundamental and enduring. However troubled the waters beneath us, however dense the mist around us, however black the sky above us, in religion we expect to find a cable that will hold us to a firm anchorage. "The eternal God is thy refuge, and underneath are the everlasting arms." That is what we look for when we turn to religion. And

if we are offered in the name of religion something less strong, less dependable, less ultimate, we turn away disappointed of our hope. The unreality which is the denial of true religion may take many forms. It may even pervade the whole of doctrine and ceremony. Something nearly as disastrous as this actually happened prior to the new awakening of faith which led, in due course, to the Reformation. And to-day once again unreality is all too prevalent. Unreality may be detected both in the insincerity of a teaching which has little or no ground in personal experience, and also in a perfunctory formalism which is empty of spiritual content. But whether in doctrine or ceremony, and whatever the particular guise assumed by unreality, the source of unreality in religion is always the same. It is the absence of personal response between the soul and God.

Whenever religion is unrelated to the whole of developing personality—body, mind and spirit; emotion, will and intellect—then unreality begins to creep in. If the appeal of religion be to the intellect alone, or if its moral code alone be accepted, or if its emotional side alone be experienced, then, in so far as this limitation is allowed, religion is made unreal. Its influence upon the subjective factor in experience is thus weakened. The magnetic current grows faint. But the same result follows when something less than ultimate reality is set up as the point of contact upon the objective side. There is, then, a sense of distance from the true end. The spiritual current is intercepted and returned by a short circuit. There is no contact with the source of power. Our religion takes us so far and then leaves us with the awareness that we are as remote as ever from the centre of all being and existence. Whatever is set up in place of God, be it image, or sacrament, or dogma, or church, stands as a barrier to intercept the religion which should unite personality with reality. There are, as we have seen, true and effective means of grace; but there are also actual and effective barriers to grace. Whenever

that which is intended to be an aid becomes an obstacle to personal response between God and man, then unreality begins to sap the strength of religion.

The religion which touches only a side of human nature will reach only a part of the way to ultimate reality. Emotionalism in religion will want something less than ultimate reality as its object, something smaller and more sensuous, something more within the sphere of the imagination. It is emotion which, when improperly harmonised within personality, reduces the religious object to the smallest dimensions, and so removes it farthest from reality. Moralism takes the soul farther. Its conception of what is fundamental to its need is ampler. But until it passes over into religion (as it must do at last) it does not reach to a reality which is essentially moral, because it is essentially personal. Intellectualism, again, although it will demand reality as its goal, will not (until it becomes religious) have a rich enough conception of reality to meet the needs of a full personality. The greatest danger that confronts religion, therefore, comes from an excessive emotionalism, accompanied on the one hand by an insufficiency of intellectual discernment and on the other hand by a disregard of moral discrimination. If religion is to be delivered from the taint of unreality it must become a response of the full personality to the whole reality. Wherever there is an experience of the self in mutual response with reality there is the genuine consciousness of religion.

The corrective to the partial and unbalanced response which makes for unreality in religion is to be sought in a more adequate conception of the object which evokes and sustains the response from personality to reality. We need an idea of God which belongs to the ultimate and absolute. As we have abandoned the tribal and national God, so we must outgrow the ecclesiastical God. This advance does not mean that the tribe or nation is left without a God; nor need it mean (nor ought it to mean) that God is not in a special sense still present

within his church. What has gone is the limitation of God to the tribe or nation, and what must also go is the restriction of God to the church. God is the God of reality. The God worshipped in the church, being the true God, must be the God who is reality. Reality as a system or character or quality or principle or person —is God. Religion brings us into proper relation with reality as God. And when religion brings us to reality it awakens in us an interest in and a love for all that is real, because all that is real belongs to God and in some measure reflects his nature. Our desire to know reality will be increased as our love for God grows in fervour, because our increased knowledge of reality will mean a fuller understanding of God.

With the conception of the object of religion as reality we shall be more sincere in our worship of God. That idea will bring reality into our worship, and will make our worship a truly religious act. In worship we shall respond to reality, and by our response we shall ourselves increase in reality. And with this conception of God we shall want to experience a fellowship in worship with all who in any way are seeking the reality that we believe is revealed to us in our religious consciousness. Barriers that divide seekers after truth and shut out from religion those whose object of quest is a religious object will be gradually broken down. Such barriers belong to unreality. Real distinctions there must be within religion, since we must always mark the advance from lower to higher stages. But these differences rest upon moral and spiritual conditions. It is true, of course, that much more than either science or philosophy can provide is necessary if the heart of religion is to be reached. When, however, science and philosophy begin to share in religious experience, although their experience may be weak and faltering, nevertheless, since it is religious experience, they deserve a place within the church.

Those within the church, however, are concerned mainly about the effect that the entry of science and

philosophy is sure to have upon their own practices and beliefs. They fear that the church will be expected to lower its standards, to water down its teaching, indeed, to compromise its position—in order to make room for those who, they suspect, have no right to enter. But radical and wide-reaching reform could only be necessary if the church had wandered very far from the way in which the Holy Spirit had sought to lead her. If she has fully and faithfully obeyed the spirit of truth in her midst, then, since truth cannot contradict itself in whatever language it speaks, she will have nothing to modify and nothing to deny. But if in some points she has gone beyond the leading of the spirit, or contrary to the line of its direction, then the incompatibility between such a position and the position reached by those who have followed the leading of truth in other paths, will demand revision and a return to surer ground. Such a change, however, would be a very great gain to the church itself. And when it had been thus aided by science and philosophy, the church would be the debtor to both, and would be constrained to recognise the manifold workings of the Spirit of God.

In any revision or restatement made necessary by the inclusion within the church by baptism into Christ of economics, politics, industry, science, medicine, philosophy, art and music—one principle only would need to be applied in order to discover what belongs to the religion of reality and what does not. Personal response between the self and reality conceived as God is the basis of true religion. God is the value of reality; and when we are related to God our religion is real. Here will be the criterion alike for ceremony and doctrine. Does it aid and express the personal response between God and soul? The reality of Holy Communion lies here in the personal response of the soul to God. Without that mutual response there is no real sacrament, no real presence, no real sacrifice. But in that experience of personal response there is found an assurance that the

object of religion is present evoking and answering the response. And in that response there is a surrender of the self to the claims of reality upon it. Without that response between the soul and the personal God revealed in Christ, consecration is devoid of reality. But consecration as an aid to and expression of that intimate communion and fellowship between the soul and her Lord is both real and effectual. It is by being intensely personal that the sacrament is saved from becoming either magical or material. And in this sacrament of Holy Communion it is that religion by being experienced in its most intimate and personal manner should find its most effective means of grace. It is in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper that the nature of reality is shown forth and, in so far as we spiritually discern and accept its truth, we receive into ourselves the reality which through sacrifice redeems us and sanctifies us for communion with God who is the ultimately real.

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Valentine, Cyril Henry.

What do we mean by God? Some studies in the objectivity of Christian experience, by Cyril H. Valentine ... New York, The Macmillan company, 1929.

v p., 2 l., 11–248 p. 20½cm.

"A short bibliography": p. [244]

A 5251

1. God. 2. Christianity. 3. Religion. 4. Psychology, Religious. I. Title.

29—15726

Library of Congress BT101.V3 1929a

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